Impact Paper (

Two Roads, One Destination: India, China and the Next Chapter of BRICS

In September 2026, leaders will convene in New Delhi for the 18th BRICS Summit, with India serving as the host nation. This year’s theme will be “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation, and Sustainability.” This summit represents an evolution from the original five-member group established in 2009. BRICS has now expanded to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the UAE, and Indonesia. Additionally, a partner tier includes nearly ten other countries, such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Malaysia, and Vietnam. BRICS+ collectively accounts for nearly half of the global population and, by purchasing power parity, represents a larger share of global output than the G7. Therefore, it is no longer just a discussion forum. Instead, it has become a constituency, and constituencies ultimately seek to achieve their objectives.

In the context of global economic dynamics, India and China should be considered as complementary engines of growth rather than mere competitors vying for popularity among the Global South or Beijing’s chequebook against Delhi’s charm. Rather, their respective development strategies offer different yet harmonious perspectives. BRICS serves as a valuable platform to integrate and leverage complementary approaches for mutual benefit.

Different instruments, identical objective

China’s economic model is built on scale and delivery. The Belt and Road Initiative has moved somewhere around $1.4 trillion in construction contracts and non-financial investment across more than 150 countries, and 2025 was a record year for new engagement.

China–Africa trade has reached around $300 billion, and zero-tariff treatment, initially extended to 33 least-developed countries under FOCAC 2024 alongside an RMB 360 billion commitment, has since been extended to all 53 African partners. Beijing’s initiatives for global development, security, civilisation, and governance create a framework that guides these activities.

India’s approach focuses on three key areas: infrastructure, accessibility, and human resources. The EXIM Bank provides credit lines totalling about $27–33 billion to around 60 to 65 countries. Since 1964, the ITEC program has trained officials and technicians from over 160 nations. Through the Vaccine Maitri initiative, India has sent about 301 million vaccine doses to more than 100 countries. Additionally, India’s duty-free tariff preference scheme for least developed countries (LDCs) has covered nearly 98 per cent of tariff lines since 2008. Most importantly, India’s Digital Public Infrastructure includes Aadhaar, which serves over 1.4 billion people, and the UPI, which processed a record 23.66 billion transactions worth nearly ₹30 lakh crore (USD 360 billion) in July 2026. This system offers partner countries an open, flexible, and independent model instead of a proprietary platform. Furthermore, India has positioned itself as a convener, amplifying developing nations’ concerns through Voice of the Global South Summits. Rather than competing dollar for dollar, India offers a partnership model that focuses on shared strength and technological empowerment.

Where convergence is already proven

Both countries share a history of productive collaboration, although this is seldom highlighted in reports. Together, they champion the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities in climate negotiations, advocate for special and differential treatment at the WTO, and secured the public stockholding peace clause at the Bali conference. They also express a united stance against unilateral carbon border adjustment measures. The India–South Africa TRIPS waiver proposal from October 2020, which received China’s support, yielded a modest yet tangible outcome at the WTO by June 2022, demonstrating that coalitions within the Global South can effect change within entrenched systems.

In global governance, India and China share common interests in reformed multilateralism. Both nations remain underrepresented in institutions like the IMF and the World Bank relative to their economic weight. The Global South still holds well under 40 per cent of IMF quota shares. China holds 6.40 per cent and India 2.75 per cent, against a US share of roughly 17.4 per cent and an effective veto. The 16th General Review raised total quotas to SDR 715.7 billion without redistributing influence. They both understand that bilateral competition alone won’t resolve this; only coordinated pressure will.

Yet, their approaches to certain systemic changes, such as de-dollarisation, reveal internal heterogeneity. China is promoting the internationalisation of the renminbi and conducts most of its bilateral trade with Russia using national currencies, while India takes a more cautious approach. Although New Delhi has expanded rupee-denominated settlements to bypass friction, it maintains that it has no strategic interest in actively undermining the US dollar, reflecting a more cautious integration into the global financial system.

Conclusion

The 2026 BRICS Summit in New Delhi offers an invaluable opportunity to reshape the dialogue around Global South development by focusing on constructive collaboration rather than ideological competition. Addressing the significant $4 trillion annual financing gap for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) calls for a strategic partnership between the world’s two largest developing economies—India and China. By harnessing the multilateral framework of BRICS and the New Development Bank (NDB) to build trust, these nations can turn structural vulnerabilities into valuable resources.

The proposed agenda emphasises a proactive approach: transitioning from restrictive trade policies and geopolitical grandstanding to fostering actionable, technical public goods. Initiatives like modular digital infrastructure, human capital development, and green manufacturing partnerships exemplify this shift towards sustainable capacity building, aiming to enhance resilience rather than create dependencies. Ultimately, the success of this summit will hinge on our ability to prioritise shared economic resilience and third-market development, cultivating collaboration over bilateral frictions.

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COGGS Impact Paper: ASEAN in Addressing Drug Trafficking in the Golden Triangle Region

 

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ASEAN in Addressing Drug Trafficking in the Golden Triangle Region (2)

Introduction

Muhammad Indrawan Jatmika

Asisstant Professor, International Relations Department Universitas Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Jawa Timur

Adrian Naufal Rizqullah

Student, International Relations Department Universitas Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Jawa Timur

Drug trafficking is a significant threat that has garnered substantial attention in Southeast Asia. Classified as a form of transnational crime, drug trafficking poses a severe threat to international security and stability (Anggraini, 2016). The issue of illicit drug trade has been a long-standing problem in the region, making Southeast Asia one of the areas most affected by this global challenge. Central to this issue is the Golden Triangle, a region recognized as a major hub for drug production and trafficking. The Golden Triangle spans parts of Eastern Myanmar, Northern Thailand, and Western Laos, making it a focal point for the cultivation, production, and distribution of opium on a global scale. During the 1970s and 1980s, this region emerged as the world’s largest opium producer (Anggraini, 2016). The Golden Triangle remains one of the largest narcotics-producing regions globally, contributing approximately 60% of the world’s opium and heroin supply (BNN, 2018). The thriving drug trade in this region is facilitated by international drug cartels and syndicates, which have established extensive networks with groups operating in Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. These networks are instrumental in smuggling narcotics into Southeast Asia through the Golden Triangle, further establishing the region not only as a production hub but also as a strategic transit route for drug trafficking (Othman, 2004). The countries within the Golden Triangle—Myanmar, Thailand, and Laos—are often characterized by weak border controls, which exacerbate the problem of transnational crime. This lack of effective oversight has been exploited by non-state actors, who pose significant threats to regional security. These actors utilize the Golden Triangle as a transit point to supply narcotics to other Southeast Asian nations. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Southeast Asia’s narcotics trade is one of the busiest globally, rivaling the Golden Crescent region (comprising Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran) in the Middle East (Yanuarizki, 2016).

In addition to serving as a trafficking route, the Golden Triangle is a leading producer and cultivator of opium (Yanuarizki, 2016). Myanmar, Thailand, and Laos are the primary contributors to drug production in Southeast Asia. In northern and western Laos, local farmers cultivate opium extensively for distribution, predominantly within the region. Due to its strategic location, Thailand often serves as the initial destination for drugs transported from Myanmar and Laos before being distributed to other areas. Beyond opium, the Golden Triangle is also known to produce various narcotics, including methamphetamine, amphetamine, heroin, kratom, and marijuana (Anggraini, 2016). The repercussions of drug trafficking extend beyond the borders of the Golden Triangle, impacting other countries across Southeast Asia. This issue demands the attention of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a regional organization that has taken an active role in addressing transnational crime, including drug trafficking (Anggraini, 2016). Many Southeast Asian countries are characterized by weak governmental institutions, which contribute to the prevalence of transnational crimes, including drug trafficking. The rapid evolution and increasing scale of the drug trade necessitate immediate and coordinated responses from ASEAN as a regional organization. ASEAN has actively facilitated collaboration among Myanmar, Thailand, and Laos to address these challenges (Aryani & Leksono, 2017).

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