Unite & Rise, Follow China’s Light, Jeffrey Sachs tells Africa

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COGGS Content Team

IN A PODCAST INTERVIEW with Fidias Panayiotou, a Cypriot politician, and YouTuber-turned-independent Member of European Parliament, Economist Jeffrey Sachs stressed Africa’s unification and adopting China’s model for future prospects. Sachs, acclaimed for his bold strategies in poverty reduction, economic reform, and addressing global challenges such as climate change and disease control, argued that unity is essential for Africa’s success: When asked if this division will change, he stated, “they will unite it they have to.“.

Sachs, a staunch critic of the Western powers, explained the size and structure of the African continent, contrasting it with unified nations like India and China.

“Africa if you add up the 55 countries of the African Union that’s about 1.5 billion people same size as India same size as China,” he elucidated. He further told that a crucial difference lies in the history of imperial domination: “the big difference is that the imperial powers divided Africa into 55 little countries not one of which can thrive on its own“. In contrast, “India and China because of the history remained unified countries after,” he said in the podcast.  He emphasized this need for continental cohesion: “I tell them every single time I have the opportunity that the African Union is the key as 55 you can’t make it but as one African continental economy you can make it. “

In the two-hour long podcast, published on 31 Oct 2025, speaking widely on Africa, China, World Economy, and his current business, Jeffrey Sachs mentioned three points he prescribe the African leaders.

I. “first be Africawide” (meaning unity).

II. “second get on quickly with mass education because that is the key to the economic development”.

III. “third look at what China did follow that model“.

 

Africa : The Future of the Century

Speaking on Africa’s demography and future, he said “what’s happening now is Africa’s population is continuing to rise it’s the only place in the world with rapid population growth”. Regarding the rest of the world, he noted that “everyone else has peaked or just about to peak or actually beginning a decline”.

Sachs provided significant figures, presenting future demographic shifts: “Africa’s population today is 1.5 billion by 2050 it’ll be 2.5 billion that’s a lot adding a billion people in the next quarter century“. “if you go even farther and just try to extrapolate based on current trends Africa’s population reaches about 3.5 billion and according to the UN most recent forecast 3.7 billion by the end of the 21st century“.

This growth will radically transform the global balance: “Africa goes from being 9% of the world population to being more than 30% of the world population it’s going to be completely different world,” he said in the interview. 

 

 

Rise Africa, follow China’s Light

Jeffrey Sachs prescribed China model as the significant and applicable blueprint for Africa’s rapid development. He highlighted that around 1980, China was impoverished with a poverty rate even higher than Africa today, yet through opening up its economy and implementing strong policy measures, China transformed into a high-income economy and became the world’s largest economy by purchasing-power parity over 40 years.

Sachs further identified key growth pillars for Africa, inspired by China’s success: massive investments in education to build skills, infrastructure development including power, digital access, and transport, and fostering a vibrant private sector supported by enabling policies . He stresses the necessity for a mix of domestic resource mobilization and international financing at low costs to fund this development. Sachs contrasts the China model with the traditional IMF approach, favouring the former’s focus on state-led strategic investment and policy reform.

Jeffrey Sachs’ academic paper “Economic Reforms and Constitutional Transition” (2000) co-authored with Wing Thye Woo and Xiaokai Yang, insightfully highlights the risks of state opportunism during transitions and the high costs of gradual dual-track reforms. The widely cited paper presents a nuanced perspective on economic reform by linking it to political constitutional transition. Using China and Russia as contrasting case studies, Sachs went on to argue that economic reforms cannot be fully understood outside the broader political context. China’s success, according to this paper, is due to economic reforms occurring within a stable political monopoly, whereas Russia’s problematic transition was marked by political competition and constitutional struggles.

His 1997 paper, that appeared in the dawn of globalisation, “Economic Reforms in China and India: Selected Issues in Industrial Policy,” co-authored with Nirupam Bajpai and Tianlun Jian, provides a comparative analysis of the reform experiences in these two populous nations. Sachs highlights China’s far-reaching deregulation, especially in labor and price reforms, and the superior performance of China’s township and village enterprises and special economic zones. The paper underscores how China’s market-oriented reforms have outstripped India’s more cautious approach, attributing China’s rapid economic growth to the strategic policy environment that fosters private sector dynamism, foreign investment, and export-led development.

As demographic shifts are taking place, Jeffrey Sachs has emphasized that Africa should replicate China’s comprehensive economic opening, infrastructure investment, regional integration, and skill development to achieve rapid and sustained growth. To implement these goals, Africa needs to be united, as no single country could sustain itself alone according to the acclaimed economist.

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Global South: How Oglesby Coined the Term and Academia Branded it

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Andhini Octa Maharatih, Prattyush Kala and Ayanangsha Maitra

 

PRIOR TO THE EXISTENCE of the term Global South in the vocabulary, the world was divided into three broad identical categories.
The First World consisted of the United States and its Western allies.
The Second World comprised the Soviet Union and its satellite states in the Eastern Bloc.
And the Third World, which represented the liberated, non-aligned, or underdeveloped nations in a fractured century . The term Global South distinguishes geographic regions experiencing economic inequality and the lasting effects of colonialism.

 

An American playwright turned writer Carl Oglesby coined it during a period of political clarity. The Vietnam War revealed the flaws of American liberalism, and Oglesby – once a technical writer for a defence contractor – became one of its strongest critics. His 1965 speech at the Washington Monument for Students for a Democratic Society combined Southern storytelling with sharp political analysis, arguing that both liberals and conservatives used democratic language to mask imperial ambition.Thus the term Global South became his shorthand for nations harmed by this system- countries shaped by colonialism, extraction, and exclusion.

 

Oglesby’s intellectual legacy is reflected in works such as Containment and Change (1967, with Richard Shaull), which dissected Cold War liberalism; The Yankee and Cowboy War (1976), a study of elite factionalism in U.S. politics; and Ravens in the Storm (2008), a memoir chronicling the rise and fall of SDS. His vocabulary terms like “imperial liberalism,” “radical centrism,” and “Yankee vs. Cowboy”- unveiled the hidden architecture of American power.

Oglesby highlighted how colonized regions were exploited for resources. The term first appeared in Commonwealth magazine in 1969 and remains relevant today. He went on to argue that the North’s dominance over the Global South had persisted for centuries, peaking during the Vietnam War. More importantly, Oglesby emphasized that the Global South was defined not by geography but by shared political, cultural, and economic inequalities rooted in colonialism.

Initially, the term saw limited use, as many other labels existed at that time. However, after the Cold War, it gained traction among European and American academics who viewed earlier terms as inadequate. The phrase “Global South” grew in popularity when the UN’s 2003 “Forging a Global South” project promoted development cooperation among southern nations to reduce dependence on the North. Since then, it has become a key concept in development and international relations studies, appearing widely in publications and summits to strengthen cooperation among Global South nations.

 

The Debate Surrounding the Term 

The idea behind the term Global South evolved from debates about underdevelopment caused by colonialism. Geographically, the term refers to nations in the Southern Hemisphere – Africa, Asia, and Latin America – facing economic disparities with the North. Its roots trace back to the term Third World, introduced by  a French demographer Alfred Sauvy in 1952 to describe countries outside the Western (First) and Eastern (Second) blocs during the Cold War. Sociologist Peter Worsley later expanded on it in The Third World: A Vital New Force in International Affairs, detailing non-aligned countries dissatisfied with both blocs’ political systems.

 

Over time, “Third World” faced criticism for implying dependency and backwardness. As industrialization advanced, alternative classifications emerged—LDCs (Least Developed Countries), LLDCs (Landlocked Developing Countries), and SIDS (Small Island Developing States). Yet, inequalities between North and South persisted. The term Global South gained preference for being more neutral and emphasizing development and geopolitical relations rather than hierarchy.

 

Carl Oglesby: Personal Life and Professional Work

 

Carl Oglesby was born in 1935 into a working-class family and experienced class inequality in the US. He began his career as a playwright but later became politically active in Ann Arbor, Michigan, where he joined the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and rose to its presidency. Known for his sharp criticism of U.S. policies in Asia, he became an icon of the 1965 anti-war demonstrations following President Lyndon Johnson’s bombing of North Vietnam. His speech “Let Us Shape the Future” marked his prominence as a leader of the anti-war movement.

 

Throughout his life, Oglesby was often labelled a radical by politicians and academics. His influential book The Yankee and Cowboy War (1976) metaphorically portrayed the “Yankee” as the Global North and the “Cowboy” as the emerging Global South. The book examined Washington’s internal conflicts and high-profile political cases like the deaths of John F. Kennedy and Dorothy Hunt. Oglesby passed away in September 2011 at age 76.

 

How the Private Enterprises Perceived the Global South

The British imperialism began with the East India company’s activities. The western private enterprises are widely criticized for exploiting the resources of the South. The Global South’s dependence on Northern investment is a hallmark of modern globalization. Multinational corporations (MNCs) often view it as a lucrative opportunity due to abundant resources, affordable labour, and expanding markets. As discussed in Eva Nelson and Martin Fougere’s article “Views on Building Partnerships with Corporations: An Agonistic Struggle in the UN and Beyond,” MNCs regard the Global South as a “goldmine” for investment, exploiting both natural and human resources at low cost—a practice known as offshoring.

While these ventures promise growth, they often perpetuate neo-colonial tendencies, where Northern dominance continues through corporate influence. Private entities maintain their image through Corporate Social Responsibility activities and sustainability programs while benefiting from cheap labour and weak regulation. Despite positive rhetoric about development, many corporations fail to meet Western labour or ethical standards in the Global South.

 

Today, the Global South has evolved beyond postcolonial critique the term now represents a coalition of low- and middle-income countries asserting agency in global governance. From BRICS summits to climate negotiations, the Global South demands equity, reparative justice, and epistemic recognition. Though criticized for vagueness, the term’s symbolic power endures in a multipolar world. Corporations once viewed the Global South as unstable and marginal but now see it as essential for supply chain resilience, ESG innovation, and digital transformation. With two-thirds of the world’s workers and a growing consumer base, its strategic value is undeniable. Yet Oglesby’s question still resonates: Who gains from this integration, and who sets the rules of exchange?

Revisiting Oglesby’s vision reveals more than a historical term— the term offers a critical lens on power, resistance, and justice. His ideas continue to challenge narratives of dominance and development, reminding us that the Global South is not merely a geography, but a proposition for a more just world.

[ Authors work for COGGS. ]

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Bandung to BRICS+: The Evolution of South-South Cooperation

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Navodita Kumari

SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION has appeared as a defining theme in this era of multipolarity. The United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC) defines South-South Cooperation (SSC) as “a common endeavour of peoples and countries of the South, born out of shared experiences and sympathies, based on their common objectives and solidarity, and guided by, inter alia, the principles of respect for national sovereignty and ownership, free from any conditionalities.” Started as a common voice against colonialism, imperialism, and oppression, the SSC has now become a major platform through which the Global South countries exchange technological know-how, resources, and best practices to help each other in socio-economic development and growth. The emergence of this Third World solidarity  can be traced back to the Asian-African Conference, and  Bandung conference of 1955. The ‘Bandung Spirit,’ which symbolized the emergence of New Asia and New Africa, was described as “the spirit of love for peace, anti-violence, anti-discrimination, and development for all without trying to intervene for one another wrongly, but to pay a great respect to one another.” It became a guiding light for the emergence of the non-aligned movement (NAM), which allowed the newly emerged nation-states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America to remain free from the Cold War bloc politics and exercise strategic autonomy to safeguard their national interests. Thus, the Bandung Conference and NAM provided the political foundation for SSC, which later transformed into economic cooperation through platforms like the Group of 77 or G-77.

 

The divergent economic interests of the North and the South that came to the fore during the deliberations of the Preparatory Committee, established to finalise the agenda for the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), became the basis for the emergence of G-77 in 1964. The G-77 marked the institutionalisation of the SSC, which helped in enhancing the negotiating power of developing countries and promoting collective economic interests at the international level and within the United Nations system. The economic upheavals of the 1970s further advanced this agenda, which ultimately resulted in the adoption of the ‘Declaration and Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order’ by the United Nations General Assembly in 1974. Speaking at the Fourth Ministerial meeting of the grouping in 1979, Julius K Nyerere had pointed out that ‘complete liberation of the Third World countries from external domination’ is the very objective of the G-77. The term ‘complete liberation’ meant the end of economic dependence of the developing countries on the industrialised North in every form and the establishment of a fairer international economic order. Thus, while NAM advanced the political and diplomatic freedom of the global south countries, the G-77 echoed the same freedom in the economic domain. Furthermore, the establishment of UNDP’s special unit for SSC in 1974 expanded cooperation and coordination among the developing countries in different arenas. Later renamed as the United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC), the platform facilitates knowledge sharing and technology transfer, promotes innovative development solutions, and helps implement climate change adaptation funds (such as IBSA and India-UNDP Fund) primarily to ‘enable developing countries to pursue more resilient and sustainable development.’

The latter half of the 1970s and early 1980s saw greater emphasis on enhancing technical cooperation among developing countries (TCDC). These efforts resulted in the first-ever United Nations Conference on TCDC in 1978 in Buenos Aires. The conference adopted the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA), which ‘sets out a comprehensive conceptual and operational framework for the promotion of TCDC.’ Following this the UN High Level Committee on Technical Cooperation was established in 1980, which in its report titled ‘New Direction for Cooperation Among Developing Countries’ in 1995 highlighted that although TCDC has not been fully integrated into the United Nations system but the concept remains valid and should focus on major themes such as poverty alleviation, production and employment, debt, trade and investment, among others. Thus, BAPA became a guiding light for strengthening cooperation in the technical arena among developing countries.

Diagram 1: Evolution of South-South Cooperation

 

Source: https://cooperacionsursur.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/18-DT05-Chrono-South-South2014.pdf#:~:text=in%201990%20resulted%20in%20the%20establishment%20of%20the%20South%20Centre%2C%20an&text=slogan%20on%20South%2DSouth%20Cooperation»11%20(1980)%2C%20«South%2DSouth.

SSC in the Era of BRICS and BRICS+

The post-Cold War era was largely characterised by globalisation and economic liberalisation, and SSC during this period, called ‘SSC 2.0’, shifted towards development cooperation and trade. In this expansionary phase, SSC became more visible with the emergence of groupings and forums such as the IBSA Forum, BRICS, IAFS (India-Africa Forum Summit), etc. Among these, BRICS emerged as the largest platform for enhancing horizontal cooperation by challenging the North-led inequities, particularly in the commercial and financial arena. As raised by the NIEO, the reform in the Bretton Woods system to create a transparent and democratic global economic order has been a key demand of BRICS since its first Summit in 2009. Demands such as a reform in the governance structure of the IMF ‘to increase the quota allotted to developing countries’ and to enhance representation of developing countries in the administrative structure of the World Bank and the IMF have been successful due to greater cooperation among the BRICS countries. However, despite these reforms, BRICS has established its own financial institutions and currency swap arrangements, such as the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA), largely to reduce dependence on West-led international financial institutions (IFIs).

The BRICS-led NDB was launched in July 2015 to mobilise ‘resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs).’ Since its inception, NDB has financed 108 projects worth USD 35.6 billion in various sectors such as social and digital infrastructure, clean energy, transportation, environmental protection, water and sanitation, creating ground-level impacts in developing countries (see Table 1). To give an example, NDB has financed the ‘Delhi-Ghaziabad-Meerut Regional Rapid Transit System Project’ in India, which has provided a fast and reliable public transport system for people living in surrounding areas and has improved access to education and job opportunities, particularly for vulnerable groups.

 

Table 1: Project Portfolio by Area of Cooperation in NDB

Area of Cooperation USD Amount
Clean Energy & Energy Efficiency 3.026 billion
Transport Infrastructure 10.479 billion
Water & Sanitation 2.684 billion
Environmental Protection 680 million
Social Infrastructure 810 million
Digital Infrastructure 300 million
Multi-area 3.235 billion
COVID-19 Emergency Assistance 9.016 billion

Source: https://www.ndb.int/projects/

Furthermore, the Contingent Reserve Arrangement has provided a new impetus to the SSC framework by moving towards a transparent economic architecture. Announced in the Durban BRICS Summit, CRA is a ‘USD 100 billion pooled reserve fund (see diagram 2) created to help emerging nations deal with liquidity shortages and to strengthen financial systems during a crisis.’ Established as a regional safety net for developing economies, CRA can provide financial stability to Global South countries from macroeconomic volatility, primarily at a time when reforms in IFIs are moving at a very slow pace. The governance architecture of CRA is quite democratic in nature. Although it resembles the IMF’s quota-based voting distribution for operational decisions, it does not provide veto power to any single entity party to the arrangement, making the environment consensus-driven.

Moving forward, the successful political, economic, and diplomatic coordination among the five BRICS countries has led them to make it more inclusive and multilateral by admitting countries from Southeast Asia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The new members, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Iran, joined the grouping formally in 2024, representing the mature institutional phase of SSC. Marking an inflection point in the SSC, this expansion would not only help BRICS members present their demands more emphatically at the global stage, but it would also strengthen their aim to move away from the Western-dominated international order. The call for de-dollarization at the 2024 Kazan Summit emphasizes a critical geoeconomic shift in an era where protectionist policies and tariff diplomacy are taking center stage. Accounting for 40% of the world economy and 49.5% of the global population, BRICS nations have vast market potential with a huge consumer base. Thus, BRICS countries have the rigor and diplomatic clout to further strengthen SSC and create a more inclusive, multilateral, equitable, and representative international system where the voice of developing countries is not suppressed under the weight of ‘white man’s burden.’

 

Diagram 2: BRICS Countries Contribution to CRA

 

Source: Created by author from https://brics.br/en/about-the-brics/new-development-bank#:~:text=The%20Contingent%20Reserve%20Arrangement%20(CRA,needed%20to%20request%20CRA%20resources.

 

The transformation of SSC from the Bandung Spirit to BRICS+ has been a remarkable journey representing the resilience and commitment of developing nations to make their voice heard in the almost North-led and North-dominated global order. However, power asymmetry, fragmentation, and competition among the Global South countries are some of the key obstacles in the path of SSC. To succeed in the unequal global system, countries must prioritize cooperation and collaboration instead of competition.

 

[ Navodita Kumari is an Intern at COGGS and PhD Research Scholar at University of Allahabad, India. ] 

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UN Day of South-South Cooperation Observed, Triangular Cooperation Stressed

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United Nations Day for South-South Cooperation

United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 58/220 designated 12 September as the United Nations Day for South-South Cooperation. This commemorates the 1978 adoption of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (BAPA), a seminal framework that redefined collaboration among nations of the Global South. BAPA recognized the agency of developing countries not merely as aid recipients, but as partners, problem-solvers, and innovators in charting a shared path of development.

“On this United Nations Day for South-South Cooperation, we celebrate the growing momentum of opportunity, innovation and solidarity across the Global South. In an increasingly multipolar world, developing countries are demonstrating remarkable resilience and ingenuity – not only in responding to crises, but in driving transformation.

They are creating bold, homegrown solutions and sharing them across borders, such as climate-smart agriculture, green technologies, digital finance and health breakthroughs.  These solutions are forged in mutual respect, shared learning and common purpose.

 South-South and triangular cooperation are engines of progress and vital to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.  Yet we also recognize the responsibilities of developed countries to help address rising inequalities and advance sustainable development. As we mark this important Day, let’s celebrate South-South collaboration as a catalyst for reinvigorated multilateralism and building a more inclusive, equitable world for all,”  António Guterres, Secretary General of the UN speaking on the observation said.

 

 

In 2025, as the international community moves beyond the midpoint of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and reflects on the outcomes of the 2024 Summit of the Future, the imperative of South-South cooperation has gained renewed urgency. The Summit’s Pact for the Future has infused momentum into multilateral reform and underscored the indispensable role of solidarity, collective action, and equitable global governance in shaping a just and sustainable world.

Development Challenges in a Polycrisis World

The global landscape remains fraught with overlapping crises:

  • Climate change: intensifying disasters, from heatwaves to flooding, disproportionately affect Global South nations.
  • Debt distress: many developing countries continue to allocate more resources to external debt servicing than to essential social investments.
  • Digital inequality: uneven connectivity perpetuates divides in education, trade, and innovation.
  • Health security and food systems: fragile supply chains and pandemic aftershocks continue to compromise resilience.
  • Extreme poverty: as of 2025, over 650 million people remain trapped in conditions of deprivation.

These challenges not only undermine progress on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), but also highlight the urgency of knowledge-sharing and context-sensitive solutions rooted in the realities of the Global South.

Focus on Triangular Cooperation

South-South and triangular cooperation function as dynamic development modalities. They are not a substitute for North-South engagement but provide complementary and adaptive pathways to address global challenges. This year’s theme, “New Opportunities and Innovation through South-South and Triangular Cooperation”, highlights the transformational potential of peer-to-peer solidarity in advancing sustainable development. Their added value lies in:

  • Practical, adaptable models: grounded in domestic experiences of resilience, recovery, and economic adjustment.
  • Innovation ecosystems: spanning digital transformation, climate-resilient agriculture, community-based health systems, and sustainable financing.
  • Inclusive partnerships: bringing together governments, civil society, the private sector, and multilateral agencies in co-designing solutions.
  • Triangular cooperation: scaling innovations by linking Global South initiatives with technical and financial support from Northern and multilateral partners.

The recent findings of UNOSSC’s Global Report on South-South Cooperation, “Bridging Horizons and Continents”, emphasize that solidarity-based cooperation is not just symbolic but a proven framework for resilience, scale, and sustainability.

Financing for a Stronger Future

At the 22nd Session of the High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation, Member States reaffirmed the necessity of sustainable financing mechanisms. Calls were made to:

Expand access to blended finance, debt-for-SDG swaps, and impact investment instruments.

Establish dedicated financing windows for South-South initiatives within UN entities.

Develop more predictable, longer-term financing models that move beyond ad hoc pledges.

These demands echo broader debates on reforming the international financial architecture to better serve low- and middle-income countries, an agenda also underscored by the Summit of the Future and the Third South Summit.

Strategic Arenas of Collective Action

The Global South today is not merely an arena of need but is emerging as an engine of innovation and leadership. Through South-South and triangular cooperation, countries are advancing systemic change in several key domains:

  • Digital Transformation: scaling digital public infrastructure to expand financial inclusion, promote e-governance, and bridge connectivity gaps.
  • Climate Resilience: advancing peer-driven climate adaptation strategies such as drought-resistant cultivation and regional renewable energy corridors.
  • Health Systems: sharing innovations in universal health coverage, pandemic preparedness, and technology-enabled care.
  • Sustainable Financing and Trade: strengthening regional value chains, building trade corridors, and creating South-led mechanisms to reduce vulnerabilities.

Toward a Just, Peaceful, and Sustainable World

The Global South is home to the majority of humanity and a critical source of solutions to today’s pressing challenges. By harnessing the strength of shared experiences, resources, and capacities, South-South cooperation embodies the spirit of global solidarity. It is central to achieving the Pact for the Future’s call for a just and peaceful world.

Member States across multiple fora — from BAPA+40 High-level Conference on South-South Cooperation to the High-Level Conference of Middle-Income Countries — have underlined the need to mobilize these modalities more strategically. The message is clear: countries of the Global South have much to offer, irrespective of their stage of development.

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How Brazil Bridging Global South?

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-Dhea Marsha Ananda

 Multilateralism, a Global South’s drive, aims to balance global power, raise issues of development, economic justice, and climate change from the perspective of developing countries, and form an international system that is more democratic towards the needs of all countries, not just a handful of major powers. The need to redefine multilateralism is because the system of international cooperation based on shared rules has lost its legitimacy and success since it has failed to deal with major problems such as terrorism, war, pandemics, climate change, and economic instability (Thakur, 2025). This failure has led to geopolitical divisions, allowing minilaterals (a small group of special-purpose countries) and the Global South (GS) a stronger voice. This is especially true for developing countries like Brazil, India, and South Africa. Thus, BRICS and SCO evolved in response to the inadequacies of conventional multilateral institutions such as the UN, World Bank, IMF, and WTO. However, due to their exclusive nature, they also have the potential to threaten the viability of multilateralism. Therefore, the Global South now demands greater representation in global governance, proposes UN reforms, and emphasizes the importance of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the role of civil society in maintaining international justice. 

 

However, it is possible that the plan faces real challenges such as high poverty and inequality, and dependence on foreign aid and debt with political or economic conditions. There is also a lack of representation in global institutions, despite their growing population and economic contribution. Despite these challenges, the countries of the Global South are still working to redesign the international order, because multilateralism is no longer just a matter of diplomacy between powerful countries, but also an arena of struggle for the redistribution of global power, recognition of colonial history, and strengthening the voices of countries that have been marginalized.

Brazil and Multilateralism

Brazil demonstrates a clear commitment to form a new, inclusive multilaterality in global forums through strategic roles in the G20, BRICS, and environmental agencies like COP. At the 2024 Summit, Brazil successfully promoted the theme “Building a Just World and a Sustainable Planet” by launching important initiatives such as the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty, and G20 Social as a platform for civil society participation (The Brazilian G20 and the Climate Finance Agenda, n.d.). By encouraging the use of local currency in trade and working together on projects pertaining to artificial intelligence and climate change, Brazil also sought to strengthen the agenda for economic cooperation and increase the number of its members during its 2025 BRICS chairmanship. Brazil was successful in making BRICS a workable global model for developing countries. Additionally, by preparing for COP30, which was held in Belém do Pará, Brazil demonstrated its commitment to global environmental challenges—lowering greenhouse gas emissions, becoming ready for climate change, and giving the Global South money (Watts, 2025).

 

Black and white photo of the iconic Christ the Redeemer statue in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
The iconic Christ the Redeemer statue in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

 

IBSA is a forum for strengthening diplomacy between the South and the South that was co-founded by India, Brazil and South Africa in 2003. The nation plays an active role in promoting UN reform and social justice, including food security and gender equality. It supports peace in the South Atlantic through ZOPACAS and advocates for UN Security Council reform as part of the G4. By rejoining UNASUR and leading the Brasília Consensus, Brazil has strengthened its regional influence. Its peacekeeping efforts in the DRC, Haiti, and Lebanon show its global commitment.

However, rising trade tensions with the U.S., including a 50% increase in export tariffs, pose major challenges to Brazil’s international ambitions. This triggered countermeasures from Brazil through the WTO, with a decision to favor dialogue (Paraguassu, 2025). Another challenge was that the organization of COP30 in Belém was hampered by the accommodation crisis with “extortionate” prices accompanied by infrastructure deficiencies, to the threat of moving the location, so the government prepared alternative lodging places such as cruise ships (Borenstein, 2025).

Brazil balances its relations with the Global South and the West as part of its non-aligned foreign policy. Its policy of diplomatic and economic diversification is seen in its improved ties with the United States, China, Japan, and Mexico. Key initiatives include cooperation with Japan on supply chains and climate justice, applying for full IEA membership, and launching the “Redata” scheme to attract green tech investment in renewable-powered data centers. In addition, a US$1 billion investment with IFC and BTG Pactual was made by Brazil for bioeconomy and climate resilience initiatives in the Amazon region.

It can be concluded that Brazil successfully combined formal diplomatic leadership with practical action to strengthen the multipolar global structure. Although multilateralism is in an identity crisis due to the weak performance of global institutions and increasing geopolitical fragmentation, recovery remains possible through reforms, stronger Global South representation, flexible minilaterals, and active civil society roles in promoting justice and sustainability. Brazil’s strategy has boosted its global image and empowered Southern nations in multilateral engagement.

 

[ Dhea Marsha Ananda is an intern at COGGS and student of International Relations, UPN “Veteran” East Java University ] 

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Is Global South Modern?

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– Natasya Aulia

MODERNITY IS OFTEN understood as a product of European history that was then imposed as a universal standard for the world. This paradigm places the Global South as an entity that is always lagging behind, “less modern,” and must catch up by imitating Western development models. However, an important question that now arises is to what extent the Global South is able to define its own standards of modernity, not only as a critique of Eurocentric modernity, but also as an operational alternative. Through conceptual studies and case studies from Asia, Latin America, and Africa, evidence has emerged of a shift towards contextual plural modernities, although still overshadowed by structural obstacles such as financial and technological dependence (Fikriyah, 2024).

 

[ Russia based Political Philosopher Alexander Dugin on Global South and Modernity in an exclusive interview with COGGS. ] 

Historically, the category of the “Global South” was born not as a geographical description, but as a political construct rooted in the legacy of colonialism and Western-biased modernization. (Fry, 2017) emphasizes that the Global South was shaped by relations of domination that not only deprived it of resources, but also destroyed the value systems, knowledge, and future orientation of societies in the South. Modernity, in this case, cannot be separated from colonialism, which created conditions of “ruination” and ongoing dependency. This understanding shows that the Global South’s efforts to define standards of modernity are essentially an attempt at decolonizing knowledge (decoloniality) that seeks to dismantle old epistemic structures.

The concept of “multiple modernities” developed by Einstadt (2000) offers a theoretical framework for understanding these dynamics. Rather than a single linear path toward Western modernity, modernity can be understood as a plural process rooted in the traditions, institutions, and histories of each society. In the context of the Global South, multiple modernities are evident in the combination of global technology adoption and local values, such as the digitization of public services in India linked to social inclusion, or the solidarity economy model in Brazil that emphasizes distributive justice. In other words, the Global South is not only a consumer of modernity but also a producer of alternative standards.

However, the process of articulating plural modernities in the South is not easy. Structural barriers remain strong. A report (Aynaoui et al., 2023) published by ISPI, ORF, and PCNS shows that although the economies of the Global South now contribute a significant proportion of global GDP, political representation and decision-making capacity in international institutions remain uneven. For example, BRICS, which collectively controls 26% of global GDP, only has 14% of the votes in the IMF, an indication of epistemic and institutional injustice that hinders sovereignty in determining development standards. In these conditions, the discourse on epistemic sovereignty becomes increasingly relevant.

Indonesia and the ASEAN region provide concrete illustrations of how the Global South is attempting to negotiate its own modernity. As a country with a long colonial history, Indonesia has developed a development model that attempts to combine democracy with local cultural plurality. Meanwhile, ASEAN collectively promotes the concept of the ASEAN Way, which emphasizes consensus and non-intervention, a governance model that is often considered “unmodern” by Western standards, but is functional in maintaining regional stability (Fikriyah, 2024). Similarly, India, with its Digital India program, is not simply adopting Western technology, but emphasizing national data sovereignty. Brazil, through its social policies, presents a form of modernity that emphasizes the distribution of welfare, while South Africa seeks to articulate modernity through the discourse of Ubuntu, which emphasizes collectivity.

Although the discourse on the Global South is growing stronger, we must not turn a blind eye to the potential for fragmentation within it. As noted by (Shield, 2021), the term Global South often oversimplifies reality, given that countries included in this category have different political interests, economic orientations, and historical experiences. Differences in attitudes toward global issues, such as responses to the war in Ukraine or the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, demonstrate that solidarity within the Global South is not always linear or consistent. Therefore, when discussing alternative modernity from the Global South, it is important to avoid viewing it as a homogeneous bloc. It is precisely this internal diversity that needs to be taken into account so that the proposed standards of modernity do not lose their legitimacy or relevance.

In the context of policy design and cultural practices, (Fry, 2017) asserts that criticism of Eurocentrism is only the first step. What is more urgent is to build a knowledge ecosystem based on the needs, values, and local realities of communities in the Global South. This means that the Global South must develop a policy architecture that tangibly supports sovereignty standards, whether in the form of technology regulations, digital data governance, or development indicators that are more sensitive to social and environmental contexts. If the Global South has often been in a position of being determined by global actors, now is the time to move towards becoming an active actor that determines its own path, not only in discourse but also in institutional practice.

The concept of sustainment proposed by Fry (2017) is crucial to understanding the new direction of modernity in the Global South. Sustainment emphasizes the importance of maintaining a sustainable relationship between design, modernity, and the survival of the planet. This sustainment-based model of modernity opens up space for the Global South to offer new standards that differ from the Western model of extractive industrialization. Examples can be found in renewable energy programs in Africa that emphasize local community solutions, or in digital economy practices in Asia that expand women’s participation. The report (Aynaoui et al., 2023) also highlights that more and more Southern countries are beginning to link their development agendas to principles of social inclusivity and environmental sustainability, rather than solely economic growth.

Overall, the question “Can the Global South define its own standards of modernity?” can be answered with cautious optimism. There is ample empirical and conceptual evidence showing that Southern countries are moving towards a form of modernity that is more in line with local needs and values. However, significant obstacles remain, ranging from financial dependence on international financial institutions, technological dominance by developed countries, to global knowledge hegemony that places Western theories and experiences as the main benchmark.

Therefore, efforts to build a Global South version of modernity cannot stop at criticizing the West, but must be realized in the form of strong policy development, regulations that favor domestic interests, and an independent knowledge ecosystem. This challenge is also a great opportunity. If successful, the Global South can show that modernity does not have to mean imitating European or American models, but can arise from the historical experiences, cultures, and creativity of Southern societies themselves. In other words, modernity from the Global South has the potential to bring about new standards that are more inclusive, fair, and sustainable for the world.

 

[ Natasya Aulia is an Indonesian intern at COGGS and student of International Relations.]

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Global South’s Climate Challenges: Victim or Negotiator ?

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– Iftah Al Aqliyah

The biggest crisis of the twenty-first century is climate change and it threatens ecosystems, economies, and human security globally. The Global South, a broad term for nations in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Pacific, is experiencing this crisis severely over the past few decades. These nations suffer the most from the effects of climate change, including persistent droughts, devastating floods, sea-level rise, and increasing food insecurity, even though they emit least in the world. Because of this systemic disequilibrium, the Global South has historically been perceived as the “victim” of global warming and reliant on the technological and financial assistance of the Global North. New global climate diplomatic patterns, however, herald a change.Global South nations are becoming more proactive negotiators rather than passive recipients of aid, as seen in the establishment of the Loss and Damage Fund during COP27, the G77 + China’s braver step, and South-South cooperation taking shape. This article explores this ambivalence by examining the paradoxes and difficulties of the Global South’s dual role as a victim of global warming and a emerging new agenda-shaper in international climate negotiation.

Global South as the Victims

Even while the Global South contributes significantly less to global emissions than the Global North, they still face the brunt of the climate catastrophe.  In other areas, the influence is evident.  Food shortages, severe flooding, and protracted droughts are persistent issues in Sub-Saharan Africa, where most nations are classified as high vulnerability and low readiness.  While Bangladesh, India, and the Philippines are regularly struck by severe floods and tropical storms, small island nations like Tuvalu and the Maldives in South Asia and the Pacific face the prospect of submersion.  Similar circumstances exist in Latin America, where forest fires and deforestation increase climatic sensitivity and pose a health risk to the populace. The Germanwatch Climate Risk Index report ranks Pakistan, India, and the Philippines as the countries with the highest impact of extreme climate disasters in the last three decades.

Some social groups in the Global South are more severely impacted by climate change than others, in addition to being geographically vulnerable.  For instance, when disasters occur, women and children are more likely to lose access to food, healthcare, and education.  People with impairments and older individuals frequently encounter obstacles when trying to evacuate or get emergency help.  Meanwhile, when droughts or floods devastate agricultural land and essential infrastructure, disadvantaged communities and informal laborers are the first to lose their livelihoods.  According to a comprehensive assessment, these populations face socioeconomic disparities that worsen their circumstances in addition to physical harm.

However, the Global South remains a victim because to its weak capacity for adaptation.  According to Columbia University’s 2025 Global Climate Risk Index on Vulnerability and Access to Finance, two-thirds of the nations in the “red zone” category are in Africa and have little access to international adaptation funding.  Countries in the Global South are dependent on aid from the Global North and international organizations due to a lack of financial resources, poor technology, and a weak infrastructure for adaptation.  This demonstrates that their situation will continue to be impacted by the global climate problem in the absence of equitable support. Protest sign at climate change rally reading 'There is no Planet B'.

Global South as Negotiator

Despite its reputation as the most climate-vulnerable region, the Global South has changed from being a victim to an active participant in international climate diplomacy.  In international forums, this shift in role is particularly noticeable since the 2022 COP27 in Egypt.  The establishment of the Loss and Damage Fund, which acknowledges the historical responsibility of wealthier nations for the climate issue, was successfully pushed for at that gathering by countries in the Global South.  Because the voices of poor nations are now influencing the design of global climate policy for the first time, this achievement is regarded as a significant turning point.

Active engagement also strengthens negotiations. Diplomatic efforts by Global South countries in seeking climate justice and fairer access to funding are still led by the G77 + China. In addition, platforms such as the High-Level Global South Dialogue, to be held in 2025 from Marrakech to Belém, demonstrate the growing cross-regional coordination. As actors with the ability to steer international debate, Global South countries are not only addressing the impacts of climate change but also developing an agenda for a just energy transition. Additionally, South-South Cooperation (SSC) improves the Global South’s bargaining power outside of international venues.  Countries like South Africa, Brazil, and Indonesia actively contribute to the development of adaptation capability in their areas, whether it be through disaster management, renewable energy, or sustainable agriculture technologies. These programs demonstrate that the Global South is providing practical answers that can be implemented globally rather than only waiting for assistance.

In fact, developing nations are now using the Columbia Climate Vulnerability Index (2025) study as a guide when calling for more equitable access to international finance, demonstrating their capacity to employ technical tools to bolster their diplomatic stance. Through various active initiatives, the Global South has successfully demonstrated that it is not merely standing by and waiting for assistance, but is moving forward to fight for justice for vulnerable countries and promote a more equitable and sustainable transformation of global governance.

Despite the fact that the Global South’s participation in climate diplomacy is becoming more significant, several significant obstacles still limit its efficacy.  Since the interests of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) diverge from those of big developing nations like China, Brazil, or India, priorities and interests are a significant problem.  Furthermore, several nations face a conflict between their commitments to climate change and economic growth due to their reliance on extractive sectors like coal, oil, and palm oil.  Their negotiating position at the table is further weakened by limited access to foreign funds and adaption technologies.

 

Conclusion

Being both a victim and a negotiator puts the Global South in a precarious situation.  It is undoubtedly the most susceptible to the effects of climate change, but it is also increasingly influencing the structure of international climate diplomacy.  It is no longer a passive actor, as evidenced by its leadership in the Global South dialogue and the successful negotiation of the Loss and Damage Fund at COP27. But in order to be genuinely acknowledged as equal negotiators, the Global South must resolve its own issues, fortify regional unity, and make sure that climate diplomacy is implemented domestically. Whether the Global South can continue to hold this dual position as the foundation for the fight for global climate justice will have a significant impact on the direction of climate diplomacy in the future.

 

[ Iftah Al Aqliyah is an Intern at COGGS and student of International Relations, UPN Jawa Timur  Veteran University, Surabaya, Indonesia. Opinions expressed don’t necessarily reflect the views of COGGS.  ]

References

Adjani, W. K. (2022). Mapping Indonesia’s South-South triangular cooperation initiatives. Global South Review, 3(1), 59–78. https://doi.org/10.22146/globalsouth.64191

Columbia Climate School. (2025, June 25). Global Climate Risk Index ranks 188 countries by vulnerability and access to finance. Columbia University. https://news.climate.columbia.edu/2025/06/25/global-climate-risk-index-ranks-188-countries-by-vulnerability-and-access-to-finance/

Germanwatch. (2024). Global Climate Risk Index 2024. Germanwatch e.V. https://www.germanwatch.org/en/cri

Golding, J. (2023). COP27 and the new rise of the Global South. New England Journal of Public Policy, 35(2), Article 9. https://scholarworks.umb.edu/nejpp/vol35/iss2/9

Ngcamu, B. S. (2023). Climate change effects on vulnerable populations in the Global South: A systematic review. Natural Hazards, 118(2), 977–991. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-023-06070-2

Sono, D., Wei, Y., & Jin, Y. (2021). Assessing the climate resilience of Sub-Saharan Africa. Land, 10(1205), 1–15. https://doi.org/10.3390/land10121205

United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation. (2025, July 30). From Marrakech to Belém: High-level Global South dialogue amplifies Southern leadership in shaping the climate agenda. UNOSSC. https://unsouthsouth.org/2025/07/30/from-marrakech-to-belem-high%E2%80%91level-global-south-dialogue-amplifies-southern-leadership-in-shaping-the-climate-agenda/

Wuppertal Institute. (2024). From COP28 to COP29: Climate negotiations at a crossroads. Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy. https://wupperinst.org/en/a/wi/a/s/ad/9003/

Budiana, M. (2024). Climate change and international politics: Cooperation or conflict. Journal of Law, Social Sciences and Humanities, 6(2), 23–35. https://doi.org/10.5555/jlssh.2024.6.2

 

Global South’s Climate Challenges: Victim or Negotiator ? Read Post »

What makes the SCO Resilient?

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The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has set a model for a new type of international relations, Chinese President Xi Jinping made the remarks while addressing the 25th Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the SCO in China’s Tianjin on September 1. The member states were the first to put forward the vision of global governance featuring extensive consultation and joint contribution for shared benefit as an effort to practice true multilateralism,  President Xi said.

Against protectionist headwinds, true multilateralism is what the international community has called for several times.Under this vision, the SCO’s remarkable development over 24 years has propelled it into a vital platform for regional security, economic collaboration, and international diplomacy, demonstrating a model of multilateralism rooted in mutual trust and respect.

“We were the first to conclude a treaty on long-term good-neighborliness, friendship and cooperation, proclaiming our commitment to forge lasting friendships and refrain from hostilities,” Xi added.

Over the past decades, the SCO has made substantial strides in fostering mutual political trust and safeguarding regional security. What was initially founded as a security group has evolved into a comprehensive organization representing a quarter of global GDP over the years.

China’s investment stock in other SCO member states has exceeded $84 billion, and its annual bilateral trade with other SCO member states has surpassed $500 billion. Chinese companies have established over 3,000 enterprises in other SCO member countries, generating an average of more than 200,000 employment opportunities annually, according to China’s Ministry of Commerce.

This year’s summit has further consolidated these gains, reaffirming the SCO as a stabilizing force amid turmoil.

Xi pledged to provide 2 billion yuan ($281 million) in grants to SCO member states this year. The country will also issue an additional 10 billion yuan ($1.4 billion) in loans to the member banks of the SCO Interbank Consortium over the next three years. Pragmatism is a key word that was stressed several times in Xi’s Monday remarks. This perhaps explains the SCO’s increasing popularity on the international arena.

It is worth noting that this year’s summit is the largest in SCO history, reflecting the organization’s expanding membership and influence. The organization has now expanded into a 26-nation family spanning Asia, Europe and Africa.

This growth enhances the SCO’s significance as an alternative model for regional cooperation compared to Western-dominated organizations.

The inclusion of diverse members underscores the SCO’s appeal as a platform where sovereignty and non-interference are respected while pursuing common goals of security, economic development, and cultural exchange. This adherence to core principles has made the SCO attractive to countries seeking balanced partnerships.

China, as a founding member, has proposed the Belt and Road Initiative, the SCO Interbank Consortium and others to strengthen this vision of a shared future.

Hosting the summit in Tianjin is a showcase of China’s commitment to leading a cooperative, multipolar world order. China, on several occasions, has clearly indicated its dedication to making the SCO not just a forum for dialogue but a substantive actor in global governance.

This set the tone for the summit’s agenda, aiming to chart the course for a high-quality, sustained partnership among member states. China’s focus on equality, mutual respect, and shared growth resonates within the SCO framework, enhancing the organization’s appeal and influence.

 

This year’s summit comes at a challenging time. But the SCO’s enhanced cooperation mechanisms and expanding appeal underscore its relevance in today’s multipolar world. The SCO Tianjin Summit has further cemented the organization’s role in fostering a stable, prosperous and interconnected region, embodying the enduring “Shanghai Spirit” and setting a precedent for the future of international cooperation.

[ This article is republished from CGTN’s First Voice  under a content syndication arrangement. The views expressed are those of CGTN.] 

What makes the SCO Resilient? Read Post »

Europe and the Global South: A Maltese Perspective in a New Era of Conflict

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– Dr. Christian Cardona
Europe stands today at a turning point. The wars in Ukraine and Palestine have revealed more than just the fragility of its security architecture. they have exposed the erosion of Europe’s credibility. By defending sovereignty and international law in one conflict while appearing to ignore them in another, Europe has invited the charge of double standards. The Global South has noticed and, crucially, it is no longer content to remain silent.
The Global South is not the passive partner of yesterday. It is a dynamic bloc of states shaping trade, energy markets, and diplomatic agendas across the globe. In the UN, at the G20, and through coalitions like BRICS, the South is setting terms rather than merely receiving them. For Europe, this is not a challenge to be managed but a reality to which it must adapt. Without meaningful engagement, Europe risks isolation in a world that is increasingly multipolar.
For Malta, these shifts are not distant abstractions. Our geography places us at the crossroads of Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. regions where the strength of the Global South is already tangible. We see it in the growing assertiveness of African states demanding fairer migration and trade policies, in the energy partnerships that link the Mediterranean to the Gulf, and in the moral clarity with which Latin America and others speak about Palestine. The South is no longer waiting for Europe’s permission it is charting its own course.
Vibrant image of the Maltese flag waving proudly against a clear blue sky, showcasing Malta's national pride.
Prime Minister Robert Abela of Malta has rightly raised these realities within the European Council, urging Europe to move beyond selective morality and embrace a consistent vision of peace and security. Likewise, Foreign Minister Ian Borg has underlined that Malta’s diplomacy must be rooted in dialogue and neutrality, principles that give us credibiAdd a heading (1)lity as a bridge between continents.
But credibility is also undermined when Malta’s voice at the highest European level becomes indistinguishable from that of larger powers. Roberta Metsola, as President of the European Parliament, has too often served as an unquestioning mouthpiece for Brussels’ dominant interests. Her readiness to adopt strong positions on Ukraine while remaining hesitant, or silent, on Palestine reflects exactly the inconsistency that alienates the Global South. In moments of crisis, leadership demands independence and courage. To simply echo the agenda of the powerful is not leadership but abdication.
What Europe must now accept is that the Global South is not asking for recognition but is demanding it. Its collective economic power, demographic weight, and moral authority are reshaping the balance of the international system. Europe can either engage with this reality as an equal partner, or it can continue clinging to outdated hierarchies and watch its influence fade.

[ Agency is more important than Geography: Dr. Cardona on Global South at Global South Economic Forum 2025, Abu Dhabi, hosted by COGGS and AGDA] 

Malta understands this better than most. As a small state, we know that influence does not come from size but from credibility. And credibility today means consistency — consistency in upholding international law whether in Kiev or in Gaza, consistency in dialogue, and consistency in respecting the equal voice of the South. The wars of our time should be Europe’s wake-up call. A Europe that dismisses or lectures the Global South will be a Europe left behind.
[Dr. Cardona is former Economy Minister of Malta, International Trade Law Specialist and Advisor COGGS.  The views expressed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of COGGS.]

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ASEAN–GCC Relations in Transition: Diplomatic Engagement to Economic Integration

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Read and Download the paper: ASEAN–GCC Relations in Transition- Diplomatic Engagement to Economic Integration

Regional cooperation is one of the factors that shapes economy of any country. The awareness of the importance of this cooperation is one of the backgrounds for the establishment of regional cooperation organizations such as ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council). ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) is a regional organization that accommodates Southeast Asian countries to enhance economic and security cooperation. ASEAN consists of 10 member countries, including Brunei, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia, Philippines, Myanmar, Malaysia, Vietnam, Laos, and Singapore – although Timor Leste is slated to become 11th member. On the other hand, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) accommodates 6 Middle Eastern economies. As one of the largest economic blocks in the world, ASEAN cooperates with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and other GCC member countries in the spheres of economy, trade, as well as cultural exchange. Although trade and investment activities between ASEAN and Gulf Arab countries have been carried out since the 1970s, the relationship between ASEAN and the GCC was only established in 1990 through the first contact between ASEAN and the GCC. At that time, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Oman,

Yousuf Bin Alawi as Chairman of the GCC Council of Ministers expressed the GCC’s desire to establish formal relations with ASEAN….

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COGGS Impact Paper: ASEAN in Addressing Drug Trafficking in the Golden Triangle Region

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Click below to Download the Paper

ASEAN in Addressing Drug Trafficking in the Golden Triangle Region (2)

Introduction

Muhammad Indrawan Jatmika

Asisstant Professor, International Relations Department Universitas Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Jawa Timur

Adrian Naufal Rizqullah

Student, International Relations Department Universitas Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Jawa Timur

Drug trafficking is a significant threat that has garnered substantial attention in Southeast Asia. Classified as a form of transnational crime, drug trafficking poses a severe threat to international security and stability (Anggraini, 2016). The issue of illicit drug trade has been a long-standing problem in the region, making Southeast Asia one of the areas most affected by this global challenge. Central to this issue is the Golden Triangle, a region recognized as a major hub for drug production and trafficking. The Golden Triangle spans parts of Eastern Myanmar, Northern Thailand, and Western Laos, making it a focal point for the cultivation, production, and distribution of opium on a global scale. During the 1970s and 1980s, this region emerged as the world’s largest opium producer (Anggraini, 2016). The Golden Triangle remains one of the largest narcotics-producing regions globally, contributing approximately 60% of the world’s opium and heroin supply (BNN, 2018). The thriving drug trade in this region is facilitated by international drug cartels and syndicates, which have established extensive networks with groups operating in Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. These networks are instrumental in smuggling narcotics into Southeast Asia through the Golden Triangle, further establishing the region not only as a production hub but also as a strategic transit route for drug trafficking (Othman, 2004). The countries within the Golden Triangle—Myanmar, Thailand, and Laos—are often characterized by weak border controls, which exacerbate the problem of transnational crime. This lack of effective oversight has been exploited by non-state actors, who pose significant threats to regional security. These actors utilize the Golden Triangle as a transit point to supply narcotics to other Southeast Asian nations. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Southeast Asia’s narcotics trade is one of the busiest globally, rivaling the Golden Crescent region (comprising Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran) in the Middle East (Yanuarizki, 2016).

In addition to serving as a trafficking route, the Golden Triangle is a leading producer and cultivator of opium (Yanuarizki, 2016). Myanmar, Thailand, and Laos are the primary contributors to drug production in Southeast Asia. In northern and western Laos, local farmers cultivate opium extensively for distribution, predominantly within the region. Due to its strategic location, Thailand often serves as the initial destination for drugs transported from Myanmar and Laos before being distributed to other areas. Beyond opium, the Golden Triangle is also known to produce various narcotics, including methamphetamine, amphetamine, heroin, kratom, and marijuana (Anggraini, 2016). The repercussions of drug trafficking extend beyond the borders of the Golden Triangle, impacting other countries across Southeast Asia. This issue demands the attention of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a regional organization that has taken an active role in addressing transnational crime, including drug trafficking (Anggraini, 2016). Many Southeast Asian countries are characterized by weak governmental institutions, which contribute to the prevalence of transnational crimes, including drug trafficking. The rapid evolution and increasing scale of the drug trade necessitate immediate and coordinated responses from ASEAN as a regional organization. ASEAN has actively facilitated collaboration among Myanmar, Thailand, and Laos to address these challenges (Aryani & Leksono, 2017).

[ Pls download and read the paper. ]

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GCC-Africa Ties: Can Desert Find Comforting Shade of Green?

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Ayanangsha Maitra, Prattyush Kala

AS THE STORMS of pragmatic geopolitics unsettle old certainties, their ripple effects—most visible in the soaring prices of essential food across African nations—are compelling the Gulf and Africa to recalibrate their equations. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the phenomenally prosperous hexad, is testing new paths for diversification and influence, making Africa, a prime ground for their engagement, soft power and development as well as capacity building partner. The fastest growing markets, and logistical corridors of Africa offer new possibilities to GCC but the one major generic factor brings the two regions together: the linguistic fraternity. At least 10 nations in the mosaic continent of 54 nations speak Arabic.

[ Screen grab , Business Insider Africa]
With lack of arable land in the region, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have turned to the  nations across the continent, known for its vast arable as well highly fertile lands not only to secure affordable food supplies but also to stabilize energy flows through investments in solar, wind, and LNG projects.

 

Saudi Arabia’s Export & Import Composition with Africa, 2023
[ Courtesy: Atlas of Economic Complexity and Control Risks ]
Political stability across geographies of Africa remains a priority for GCC. Horn of Africa and Red Sea regions are adjacent to critical maritime routes like Suez Canal. The blue line has been under watch of the GCC. GCC nations have expanded their military bases and increased diplomatic presence to safeguard trade as well as project power. Eritrea (Assab port, leased for 30 years) and Somalia host military bases of  UAE. UAE also runs bases on Socotra and Perim islands in Yemen in order to secure strategic maritime routes like the Bab El Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden, support counter-terrorism, anti-piracy efforts, and provide regional influence through military and economic cooperation.

In the horn region, Saudi Arabia has inked a 92-year contract to build and operate a Saudi Logistics City in Djibouti’s port area. This logistics zone is intended to serve as a major hub for Saudi exports and commerce across Africa. Djibouti port is a critical gateway for African trade, and the logistics zone will provide Saudi Arabia with enhanced access to African markets. 

 

Top Trade Partners of Middle East and North African (MENA) Countries
[ Courtesy: Visual Capitalist]
The cultural dimension is also significant as the bonhomie gets warmer. GCC nations have been funding the building and renovation of mosques, Arab-Islamic centers, and cultural events across Africa. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait, have come in the help of Ethiopia, Kenya, Senegal, Sudan, Nigeria, and Egypt for cultural and societal needs. The Gulf’s humanitarian aid efforts in Africa are also highly commendable.

Economic partnership is the forefront of the GCC-Africa ties. Over $100 billion has been invested by GCC countries in Africa in recent years, with the UAE leading at $59.4 billion, followed by Saudi Arabia with $25.6 billion, and Qatar at $7.2 billion. These investments have primarily targeted capacity building in the continent, infrastructure, energy, agriculture, and logistics. In the shipping domain too, GCC has made a significant mark. UAE’s DP World, operates ports in over ten African nations, transforming them into regional trade hubs and creating massive local employment. Saudi Arabia’s ACWA Power has committed $7 billion to several energy projects – which are enabling access to electricity, healthcare, and education.

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have contracted to get access to large tracts of farmland in Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, and Tanzania to produce cereals, fruits, and. Saudi Star’s rice farm in Ethiopia  is projected to expand to 500,000 hectares. Gulf  enterprises are also investing in agro-processing units, ensuring value-added food production before export. Complementary infrastructure, including irrigation systems (e.g., Qatar in Senegal, Saudi-funded dams in Mali and Chad) and logistics (e.g., DP World’s ports), strengthens food supply chains.

Africa’s food inflation rate is a significant factor for greater level of cooperation. Horrifying increases in prices for staple items such as cereals, meat, dairy, oils, fruits, and vegetables send shockwaves to households to the political corridor. Global South actors such as Angola, Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Nigeria, Sudan, South Sudan, South Africa, Uganda, Zambia are facing severe food inflation.

At a time edible essential items are hitting hard across Africa,  UAE has invested in livestock, poultry, fish processing, and date palm cultivation in Egypt, leveraging the country’s global leadership in date production. Saudi Arabia, through SALIC, has acquired significant stakes in Olam Agri Holdings, with Egypt as a key node. The $5 billion injection from the Saudi Public Investment Fund into Egypt in 2025 underscores the Gulf’s long-term commitment to agribusiness, infrastructure, and food processing. Egyptian ministries are streamlining policies to facilitate such investments, while promoting joint ventures, tech collaboration, and regional food security strategies involving Egypt, the UAE, Jordan, and Iraq.

Nevertheless, triangular partnerships between GCC, South Asia, and Africa are  emerging. In these arrangements for food security and economic integration, South Asia provides agri-tech and expertise, Africa offers land and labour, and the GCC supplies capital and logistics. The partnership is growing into other sectors, including mining (e.g., lithium in Zambia), tourism, real estate, and industrial development.

Saudi Arabia and UAE have earned reputation in several African defence headquarters, by offering professional military training. The gulf nations are active in conflict mediation, as seen in Qatar’s involvement in Chad and the Congo-Rwanda peace talks. Furthermore, GCC are engaging with the African Union and AfCFTA to influence policy and trade standards across the continent.

Regional conflicts dent Middle East performance in 2025 Soft Power Index | Arab News

Yet, these challenges weigh heavily on the capitals of both the GCC nations and African states. Political instability in several African states, including military-led governments, sovereignty concerns around land acquisitions and foreign military presence, and competition from other global actors like China and EU pose risks. In an era of multipolarity and coalition, areas of cooperation are emerging faster. These may range from port access for landlocked African nations, development of healthcare and education infrastructure, industrial investments in critical minerals and hydrocarbons, upskilling African youth for Gulf labour markets, easing migration and visa policies, to spheres of technological collaboration in climate-resilient agriculture.

Being the bridge nation between the two, Egypt comes into the scene with big prospects and bigger dreams. Strategically located at the intersection of Africa, the Middle East, and Europe, the resurgent economy offers Gulf investors access to COMESA and AfCFTA markets, while the Suez Canal facilitates efficient trade flows. GCC sovereign wealth funds – such as Saudi Arabia’s PIF and UAE’s ADQ – have invested billions in Egyptian companies and infrastructure, using the country as a launchpad into Africa. Egypt’s strong diplomatic ties with both the GCC and African nations further position it as a mediator and platform for development collaboration. Through the Egyptian Agency of Partnership for Development (EAPD), Gulf-backed aid and technical assistance are channelled into African development initiatives.

GCC-Africa bonhomie goes far beyond cultural affinity. It is emerging as a strategic recalibration that integrates economic ambition with geopolitical foresight, development diplomacy, and shared aspirations for stability.

Security cooperation is strengthening, but food security remains the decisive front where futures will be won or lost. Africa’s fertile lands and growing agricultural capacity, combined with GCC expertise in agri-tech, fertilizers, irrigation systems, and farmer upskilling, can forge a pathway to mutual resilience. As Africa explores its abundance of Rare Earth Minerals, the Gulf finds yet another opportunity to contribute meaningfully – helping the continent unlock prosperity while diversifying its own economic future in a sanction-disrupted global marketplace.

 

GCC nations like UAE, with its reputation as a hub for agricultural science and growing ambition as a global AI enabler, is well-positioned to empower Africa with AI Technology. GCC has the ability to upskill African farmers and producers into more productive, applying superior technologies. Saudi Arabia and Qatar, with their deep financial and knowledge resources, can complement this vision by powering Africa’s transitions in energy, connectivity, and mobility – essentials for building a 21st-century knowledge economy.

For GCC nations to cement a constructive role in Africa’s transformation, it must think long-term, prioritize trust-driven partnerships, and align itself with each African nations aspirations. While the two are vocal about South-South cooperation, basics such as food and energy security, and upskilling youths should be kept on top priority in an era to be governed by AI. As robust Global South actors African partners across public and corporate have to learn from the past in order to remain a committed partner of the GCC.

[ Ayanangsha Maitra  and Prattyush Kala work at COGGS. Opinions expressed not necessarily reflect the view of COGGS. ]

GCC-Africa Ties: Can Desert Find Comforting Shade of Green? Read Post »

Will Red-Carpet Treatment to US Goods Boost Indonesia’s Economy?

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Dhea Marsha Ananda

 

THE PROGRESS OF Indonesia‘s international trade is key to economic progress, with a focus on shifting from a commodity-based economy to investment, production, and high-value services through strategic policies. The goal of Indonesia’s economic transformation is to improve international trade ties and solidify Indonesia’s position as a global economic leader by focusing on the development of human resources, energy, infrastructure, transportation, public finance, industry, trade, and agriculture. Indonesia’s international trade growth is also influenced by far sighted economic policy. The closed model of Indonesia’s international trade has given way to a more open, globally linked model that is centered on exports as the world economy changes.

 

Indonesia’s trade strategy has developed rapidly, with the aim of becoming a competitive and advanced economic power. One of the strategies driving Indonesia’s economy is export-import activities, by reforming tariff policies and increasing export competitiveness. Currently, Indonesia is focusing its efforts on increasing export activities as a strategy to expand its market reach. Specifically in June 2025, Indonesia’s exports saw an increase of 11.29% year-on-year, reaching a total of U$ 23.44 billion, which is higher than the market forecast of 10.41% (Suroyo, 2025). This surge can be attributed to several factors, including:

I. Acceleration of exports in anticipation of US tariff policy

This may occur due to new tariff policies from the US. Indonesia has successfully reached an agreement that reduces US tariffs from 32% to 19%, and exporters are accelerating shipments before the deadline takes effect.

II. Non-oil and gas export performance

III. Commodities such as metal ore, slag, and ash experienced a surge of up to 3,736.49%.

IV. Animal/vegetable fats and oils increased by 22.5%, contributing 2.85%.

V. Precious metals and jewelry rose by 104.44%, contributing 2.59%.

VI. The agriculture, forestry, and fisheries sectors showed an increase of 49.55%.

As a result, exports have achieved positive cumulative growth. As of June 2025, Indonesia’s national export value reached US$135.41 billion, marking a 7.70% increase compared to the same period in the previous year. This growth reflects the strengthening performance of the international trade sector, driven by efforts to optimize export markets and diversify leading commodities.

Tabel 1. The Value of Exports (Million US$), 2025

 

This happened because of an evaluation of import and export tariffs. In the recent most trade negotiation, Indonesia has eliminated tariffs on more than 99% of US goods and scrap all non-tariff barriers facing American firms. However, there are exceptions for certain products, such as alcoholic beverages and pork, which are specifically excluded from the zero percent tariff provision. The US government reduced import duties on Indonesian goods from 32% to 19% in reaction to this strategy.

The US Census Bureau reports that between January and May 2025, US exports to Indonesia came to $ 4.21 billion, or Rp 67.4 trillion. In comparison, during the same period, U.S. imports from Indonesia reached $13.92 billion, or nearly Rp 222 trillion. In 2024, the United States exported goods worth  $10.15 billion (around Rp 162 trillion) to Indonesia, while its imports from Indonesia amounted to $28.05 billion (approximately Rp 448 trillion). The following 10 biggest non-oil and gas export goods from the United States to Indonesia in 2024 are the target of the 0% tariff policy, according data from the United Nations (UN) Comtrade cited by Trading Economics (July 17, 2025):

I. Seed oil, grains, oleaginous fruits, seeds, and fruits, with a combined worth of $ 1.26 billion (about Rp 20.1 trillion).

II. Boilers, machinery, and nuclear reactors, totaling $1.11 billion (about Rp 17.7 trillion).

III. Organic compounds, which are worth about Rp 14.6 trillion ($ 914.96 million).

IV. Animal feed, residues, and food industry waste, totaling $ 618.06 million (about Rp 9.8 trillion).

V. Spacecraft and aircraft valued at $ 523 million, or roughly Rp 8.3 trillion. 6. Electronic and electrical equipment, valued at around Rp7 trillion ($438.46 million).

VI. Electronic and electrical equipment, valued at around Rp7 trillion ($438.46 million).

VII. Waste, fibrous cellulose products, and wood pulp, valued at $400.76 million (about Rp6.4 trillion).

VII. Equipment for photography, technology, medicine, and optics, worth $ 271.24 million (about Rp 4.3 trillion).

VIII. Food items, dairy products, eggs, and honey, totaling $214.76 million (about Rp 3.4 trillion).

IX. Plastics, valued at around Rp 3.2 trillion ($ 204.36 million).

It is anticipated that imposing zero percent tariffs on certain items will boost market access, boost bilateral trade volume, and promote expansion in key industries in both nations. It can conclude that Indonesia’s 2025 international trade policy transformation is a strategic move toward improving economic competitiveness through tariff policy reforms and export activity optimization.  The 11.29% increase in exports in June 2025 is concrete proof that the national economy may benefit from quicker shipping tactics, commodity diversification, and the performance of the non-oil and gas industry. Mutually beneficial trade relations have been strengthened through bilateral trade cooperation with the United States, which includes the implementation of zero percent tariffs on the majority of commodities, a reduction in US import tariffs on Indonesian goods from 32% to 19%,  Trade data indicating a surplus for Indonesia suggests significant possibilities for further market expansion and Indonesia has the potential to become one of the major economic powers in the world if it adopts a consistent and deliberate approach.

 

[ Dhea Marsha Ananda is an intern at COGGS. ]

References

Budiman, A. T. (2025). Hit by US tariffs, Indonesia plans to sell shrimp to China instead. PANDEGLANG: Reuters.

Dewi, N. K. (2025). 99 Persen Produk AS Dipatok Tarif 0 Persen Masuk Indonesia. Kok, Bisa? Jakarta: Tempo.com.

Gulo, D. P. (2024). ANALISIS DAMPAK KEBIJAKAN PERDAGANGAN BEBAS ASEAN TERHADAP PERTUMBUHAN EKSPOR INDONESIA KE PASAR ASEAN. Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu Administrasi Negara , 751-760.

Sudarshan Varadhan, F. N. (2025). Indonesia nickel slump piles pressure on coal miners hit by falling exports. Singapore: Reuters.

Suroyo, G. (2025). Indonesia’s exports rise again in June as U.S.-bound shipments jump. Jakarta: Reuters.

WARDANA. (2024). Indonesia’s Trade Policy Regime amidst Global Challenges. The University of Adelaide SA 5005 Australia, 1-6.

 

 

Will Red-Carpet Treatment to US Goods Boost Indonesia’s Economy? Read Post »

Bears, BRICS and Garudas: How Indonesia “Socialized” with Russia?

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Andhini Octa Maharatih and Alinda Rana Permata Surya

 

On the sidelines of the 28th St Petersburg International Economic Forum , June 18-21 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin held a meeting with President of Indonesia Prabowo Subianto during his state visit. [Photo: RIA Novosti/ Kremlin Photo Bank. ]
◉  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN Indonesia and Russia has been warm since before Indonesia’s independence. Russia (the Soviet Union) played a role in supporting Indonesia’s independence and actively advocated for its right to sovereignty. Even after Indonesia officially gained independence, cooperation between Indonesia and Russia (the Soviet Union) has continued to this day, beginning during the era of Indonesia’s first president, Soekarno. The closeness between Indonesia and Russia has been reflected in strong diplomatic relations and bilateral cooperation since 1950—five years after Indonesia became an independent nation. These diplomatic ties have been mutually beneficial. Early on, Indonesia purchased a pair of fighter jets and two helicopters from Russia. In return, Russia requested payment in the form of Indonesia’s primary commodities, such as rubber and palm oil.

In addition to defense and economic cooperation, Moscow offered several scholarships for Indonesian students to study in the nation. Nikita S. Khrushchev, the Soviet leader at the time, warmly welcomed Indonesian students to the University of Russia in Moscow in 1960. Infrastructure development, such as the construction of the Bung Karno Stadium, was also credited largely to Soviet support.

 

Why Indonesia Prefers Russian Defence Supply Over American?  

Indonesia has viewed Russia as a strategic partner in defense and security technology development. In addition to being a producer of modern weaponry, Russia offers relatively low prices and simpler regulations for defense equipment sales. Although Indonesia has not yet fully developed its own defense equipment, Russia has shown openness to technology transfer, allowing Indonesia to modify and adapt this technology domestically. This contrasts with the United States, whose strict regulations are seen as less favorable to Indonesia. As a result, Russia has become a more attractive partner for long-term defense and diplomatic cooperation.

Although relations cooled after the Indonesian Communist Party’s (1965 G30S) rebellion—when Indonesian students in Russia were repatriated—ties gradually improved after the political situation stabilized.

 

New Order and Post-Suharto Era

During the New Order regime, Indonesia leaned more toward the West due to the lingering effects of the communist threat. Under President Soeharto, Indonesia’s relationship with Russia began to recover after 22 years, marked by a diplomatic visit to Russia in 1989.

Following this, Indonesia entered a difficult period of political transition, facing domestic conflicts that required inward focus. Relations with Russia improved again under President Megawati Soekarnoputri, the fifth President of Indonesia. Under her leadership, cooperation that had stalled was revived in 2003, especially in technology and economic development.One example was the cooperation between Vneshtorgbank and PT Bank Mandiri to support Indonesia’s banking system during a global financial crisis. Although Megawati’s presidency was brief, she reopened channels for engagement between the two nations.

President SBY’s Era

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) continued and expanded this cooperation. Beginning in 2007, SBY intensified Indonesia’s bilateral relations with Russia, focusing on new areas such as investment, defense, and natural resources—including bauxite, aluminum, oil, and gas. These areas marked a new phase in Indonesia–Russia cooperation.

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono also promoted soft power diplomacy, particularly in tourism, and collaborated with Russia in defense modernization. Cooperation included technology transfers to Indonesia’s domestic defense industries such as PT Pindad, PT Dirgantara Indonesia, and PT PAL.

Indonesia’s closeness with Russia was evident during SBY’s presidency, especially in economic sectors. For instance, palm oil exports—although only 2% of Indonesia’s total exports in 2011—were considered significant. When talks of Indonesia joining BRICS arose, SBY remained neutral, stating that Indonesia was transitioning from a developing to an emerging economy and aimed to strengthen its national economy before joining.In competing for the Russian market, Indonesia faced challenges, especially from European countries dominating exports. To increase competitiveness, Indonesia sought to promote exports of automotive products, footwear, tires, and furniture. Trade between Russia and Indonesia increased by 4.9% in the 2011–2014 period for non-oil and gas sectors and continued to improve in 2016.

 

Jokowi’s Era, Connectivity and Strategic Expansion

Under President Joko Widodo (Jokowi), Russian investment in Indonesia significantly increased. Jokowi encouraged local governments to establish sister-city relationships to attract long-term and sustainable investments. Several sister-city partnerships were established, including:

  • Jakarta–Moscow (continued from SBY’s era)
  • Palembang–Belgorod
  • Yogyakarta–St. Petersburg
  • Magelang–Tula

The nature of these city connectivity projects are different, while all of them cementing Indonesia- Russia ties. The Magelang–Tula partnership, for instance, is based on similarities in geographical conditions. Tula is an advanced city in industry and agriculture, while Magelang, located between Mount Merbabu and Mount Sumbing, has a cool climate suitable for highland farming. The partnership, however, focuses more on public services, branding, economic development, and environmental management.

Meanwhile, the Yogyakarta–St. Petersburg partnership emphasizes cooperation in arts, culture, tourism, and education—proving effective in strengthening diplomacy during the Jokowi era. Long-term investments were also pursued, such as the oil refinery in the Jenu area, Tuban. This refinery, under cooperation between PT Pertamina and Russian company Rosneft, has been under construction since 2016 and is projected to process 30 million liters of fuel daily, with a capacity of 320,000 barrels per day. This project aims to enhance national energy security and reduce fuel imports.Despite geopolitical challenges such as the Russia–Ukraine conflict, Indonesia maintains a neutral, “free and active” foreign policy—supporting Ukraine’s independence while still partnering with Russia.

 

Indonesia in BRICS

[Foreign Minister of Indonesia Sugiono during the arrival of head of delegations at Kazan Expo to attend the 16th BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia. Kirill Zykov / BRICS-KAZAN- RIA Novosti]
Indonesia’s diplomatic presence is expected to grow further following its entry into BRICS on January 6, 2025. This move comes amid a global trade war triggered by U.S.-imposed tariffs. BRICS aims to challenge Western dominance, particularly that of the U.S. and its allies. Indonesia’s entry strengthens the bloc and provides new opportunities for economic cooperation. As a BRICS member, Indonesia can benefit from easier access to Russian defense technology and increased investment opportunities. Russia, in turn, sees Indonesia as a vital partner in Southeast Asia and a gateway to ASEAN markets. This partnership opens new avenues for cooperation in energy, technology, defense, and trade. On the global stage, both nations are likely to support each other in international forums—especially regarding world order reform, state sovereignty, and support for Palestine. Indonesia’s free-active foreign policy adds value to BRICS, helping position the bloc as an alternative for developing nations beyond Western influence. However, Indonesia must balance its global diplomacy carefully, ensuring that closer ties with Russia do not strain its relationships with Western nations like the U.S. and EU. With Indonesia joining BRICS and Russia seeking to expand its global influence, the bilateral relationship is expected to become more intensive, strategic, and mutually beneficial.

Also Read: The Falcon and Bear Braving a Storm: UAE and Russia in the Dawn of Multipolarity

[ Andhini Octa Maharatih and Alinda Rana Permata Surya are interns at COGGS from Surabaya, Indonesia, and students of International Relations at UPN Veteran Jawa Timur University. The opinions expressed do not reflect the views of COGGS. ] 

 

 

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