Why US-mediated Congo-Rwanda Peace Deal called a ‘Trade Deal’?

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COGGS Contents Team |

UPON REACHING WHITE HOUSE,  Democratic Republic of Congo’s President Felix Tshisekedi is set to sign a deal with his Rwandan counterpart Paul Kagame, aimed at securing peace in eastern Congo on December 4, 2025. The ongoing peace-talks  between Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda represent a critically high-impact, yet fragile moment in the region’s decades-long conflict. While facilitated by global powers and driven by strategic economic interests, the viability of the deal is currently undercut by persistent military hostilities, deep seated animosity,  mutual distrust, and unresolved conditionalities concerning armed groups and troop withdrawals. The  Washington-brokered peace initiative, also involving Qatar, has been characterized by powerful geopolitical and economic motivations that arguably give this particular attempt at reconciliation more global weight than efforts made earlier.

Democratic Republic of Congo, the second-largest country on the continent is immensely rich in critical minerals ranging from cobalt, gold, copper, and coltan. These elements  highly are essential for the global production of electronic goods, electric cars, solar panels, and AI data farms. Needless to say,  the US has commercial interests in DRC. 

 

Courtesy: UN News MONUSCO/Aubin Mukoni UN peacekeepers patrol in Goma

The peace deal, which aims to give the US increased access to Congolese natural resources, is seen as a means to incentivize US investment in the country. On the other hand, the US effort as a strategic move to push back against China’s fast march in the mineral market across Africa.

The economic dimension has generated significant controversy, particularly regarding Europe. DRC has accused  European Union of demonstrating a “double standard” by making a 2024 minerals deal with Rwanda. This deal was inked aiming at boosting Europe’s supply of raw materials for hi-tech industries, such as electric car batteries and microchips. The DRC Foreign Minister, Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, argued the memorandum of understanding with Rwanda is “void of any credibility” because Rwanda has been accused of siphoning off Congolese resources extracted through brutal conditions of forced labour, including child labour for the purpose of export. The EU has imposed sanctions on certain individuals and a Rwandan gold refiner for fueling the conflict and violating DRC territory, yet has been urged by the DRC to levy much stronger sanctions, similar to those imposed against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine.

The Peace Framework

The peace accord was initially scheduled to be signed by the foreign ministers of the DRC and Rwanda in Washington DC on June 27th, 2025 following three days of talks between delegates. The draft of the peace deal includes specific language on the prohibition of hostilities, respect for territorial integrity, and the disarmament of armed groups. The treaty further contains provisions for the return of refugees with the support of the UN refugee agency UNHCR, and increasing humanitarian aid. A final agreement will be signed by the Presidents of both nations in Washington. Despite subsequent accusations of delay, the DRC presidency scheduled the signing of the final peace deal for December 4th in the US capital. In addition to the US, Qatar, and the African Union are slated to supervise the process, while UN-sponsored peacekeepers are expected to continue their mission to protect civilians.

Despite the official signing of the agreement in June by the DRC’s chief diplomat, the implementation has faltered due to a cycle of mutual recrimination, military activity, and some conditional demands.

 

Courtesy: UN News

Rwanda’s Position and Demands

Rwandan President Paul Kagame accused the DRC of shelving the signing of the US-mediated peace deal by setting ‘different conditions’ since the June agreement. Rwanda maintains that it will only withdraw its troops from Eastern DRC after the FDLR ( one of the largest foreign armed groups operating in the territory of the DRC) militia is disarmed. Rwanda accuses the DRC of continuing to support the FDLR (a militia  group formed in 2000 by members of ex-FAR and Interahamwe who were responsible for Rwandan genocide). While the DRC Foreign Minister acknowledged that some individuals within the Congolese military (FARDC) might support the FDLR, she asserted that this is not ‘state policy,’ in contrast to the alleged presence of about 4,000 Rwandan troops on DRC sovereign territory, which the DRC considers a blatant state policy violation.

DRC’s Position and Accusations

The DRC Minister of Communication, Patrick Muaya, dismissed the accusation of delay as false and instead blamed Rwanda for refusing to pull its troops out of Eastern DRC. The DRC accuses the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) of fighting alongside the M23 rebels. A group of UN experts reported that up to 4,000 Rwandan troops were fighting alongside M23 and that the Rwandan military was in ‘de facto control of M23 operations’. The M23 rebels have reportedly seized swathes of DRC territory, several major cities, and are accused of establishing and consolidating a parallel administration.

Challenges to Implementation and Concerns over Justice

The  US and Qatar brokered peace process faces significant skepticism and operational challenges and it further  reflects the failure of many previous attempts at reconciliation where agreements were simply ignored on the battlefield.

Fights are still going in Eastern DRC despite the peace agreement framework. The hostilities have resulted in a humanitarian crisis, claiming thousands of lives since 2021 and forcing thousands of people to flee their homes. According to the UN, over 7.8 million people are internally displaced in the Eastern DRC region.

M23 Non-Compliance and Impunity:

A crucial challenge is the commitment of the M23. DRC demands the full restoration of state authority and will not accept a prolonged presence of the force. M23 is accused of blocking a UN verification team from operating effectively in occupied areas, hindering investigations into human rights abuses. Furthermore, negotiations over a prisoner swap are stalled because the DRC government refuses to mistake the swap process with impunity for M23 members who committed atrocities like massacres, raping, and looting. DRC maintains that sustainable peace cannot be built on a foundation of impunity.

DRC Foreign Minister has voiced doubt regarding Rwanda’s sincerity, noting that Rwanda still has thousands of troops illegally on DRC territory, ‘looting,’ ‘killing,’ and ‘raping’. She expressed greater trust in the levers and pressure points of the mediators US and Qatar to ensure accountability, noting that a lack of accountability caused previous deals to fail.

The peace talks agreement, despite being termed as historic, has been met with skepticism within DRC, with a former Congolese president calling it ‘nothing more than a trade agreement.’ Furthermore, there is concern that if the process fails to include nationwide buy-in, particularly from local groups, and is confined to deals among political elites, it will not work effectively, as past deals have led to corruption and continued instability. The two presidents presence at White House will reshape the regional politics. Under the pressure, it is expected the two nations will abide by the deal and have lasting impacts in Africa, a sanctuary of armed rebels and reformers.

Why US-mediated Congo-Rwanda Peace Deal called a ‘Trade Deal’? Read Post »

EU–Central Asia Economic Forum: Europe’s Renewed Push Into Post-Soviet Heartland?

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COGGS Content Team║

IN ORDER TO get the Central Asian nations out of the clutch of Russia and China, the European Union has been pulling up its socks and contemplating the best ways to engage with the region. The Third European Union-Central Asia Economic Forum was convened in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, on November 26, 2025, followed by the EU-Central Asia Summit in Samarkand. The forum hosted business leaders, investors, and government representatives from over 32 countries, where the EU contingent was led by EU Commissioners Jozef Síkela and Marta Kos.  

EU–Central Asia Economic Forum in Tashkent warmed up EU–Central Asia economic ties, with six cooperation agreements worth nearly €100 million signed across irrigation, ecology, digital geodata, and security, framing 2025 as “The Year of Europe” in the region. The EBRD highlighted its cumulative €21 billion already invested in 1,227 projects in Central Asia, while a new €3 million EU–EBRD agreement targets sustainable mining of critical raw materials to feed Europe’s green transition.

The Forum’s inking of six major €100 million deals , ranging from DATA4CRM (€7.5M) for investor-attracting geodata modernization, SECURE CRM (€3M) and GROW CRM (€3M) for transparent critical raw materials chains, the €48.8M Aral Sea restoration, to BOMCA (€12M) and CADAP (€18M) for border security and anti-drug efforts reflects a commitment of EU. 

Central Asia is comprised of five post-soviet states Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, where as EU remains a 27-member European club, after UK’s exit from the bloc. EU–Central Asia Economic Forum was considered a precondition for success for both the EU’s presence in the region and for Central Asia’s desire for increased business with Europe. Central Asian Development projects are subjected to create a sustainable future, generate jobs, establish value chains, and generate wealth in the region. The drives are simultaneously intended to increase the economic security and resilience for Europe.  

The economic partnership is currently at a pivotal juncture, with discussions focusing on strengthening regional connectivity and exploring sustainable investment opportunities. The habitat of 80 million Central Asia is readying herself to accommodate 100 million people by 2050.  The central asian nations have shown great camaraderie on regional and international issues, despite internal tussles back home. 

The economic engagement between the EU and Central Asia is based upon couple of factors ranging from bilateral commerce, particularly with Uzbekistan, and substantial financial allocation from European institutions. 

The EU maintains its position as Uzbekistan’s largest investor. In 2024, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) allocated a total of two billion euros to Central Asia. Of this figure, 85 million euros were allocated specifically to Uzbekistan.

GDP of the Central Asian nations. Data: IMF. Chart: The Times of Central Asia.

EU is one of Central Asia’s primary trading partners, accounting for 24.7% of the region’s combined foreign trade in 2024, with overall trade volume reaching approximately €54 billion ($60 billion ). EU imports from Central Asia surged 68% in 2024, dominated by commodities like crude oil, gas, metals, and cotton fiber, especially from Kazakhstan, where EU trade hit €45 billion and Kazakhstan sends 37% of its exports to the EU—while EU exports to the region, mainly machinery, transport equipment, and manufactured goods, dipped slightly by 5%. Key frameworks include the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA) with Kazakhstan since 2020, Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP/GSP+) for Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, plus recent €12 billion Global Gateway investments in transport (i.e Middle Corridor), critical raw materials, green energy, and digital connectivity, alongside €100 million in new deals from the 2025 Tashkent Forum.

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has emerged as the leading institutional investor in Central Asia. It has provided over €2.26 billion to 121 projects in 2024 alone and mobilizing more than €3 billion for the region’s real economy, with a strong focus on private-sector development, sustainable infrastructure, and green transition. 

 

 

Whereas Brettonwoods institution IMF usually focuses macroeconomic stabilization, balance-of-payments support, and policy advice through instruments and capacity-building platforms (such as CCAMTAC center in Almaty), EBRD is primarily a project-based lender and equity investor designed to boost market-oriented economies and crowd in private capital. World Bank’s Central Asia portfolio, on the other hand, underscores large-scale public-sector investments and policy reforms in areas such as social services, connectivity, and climate resilience, operating one of its largest programs globally in the region, while Asian Development Bank (ADB) positions itself as a regional development financier with a strong focus on infrastructure, regional integration, and knowledge support.

EBRD’s niche lies in its deep local presence, its role as the largest green lender in Central Asia. About 58 percent of EBRD 2024 financing supported green economy projects and its capacity to work directly with firms and municipalities, often co-financing alongside World Bank and ADB and complementing IMF policy conditionality rather than competing with it. This makes the EBRD a critical bridge between macro-level reform agendas driven by the IMF and World Bank and the micro-level, commercially oriented investments needed to embed market disciplines, support SMEs, and operationalize the region’s shift toward sustainable, diversified growth.

As the European nations are finding alternatives of Russia and China for essential energy supplies, Central Asia appears to be the perfect fit. The forum has positioned Central Asia as a multipolar transit hub via Trans-Caspian routes while  generating local jobs and green reforms. 

EU–Central Asia Economic Forum: Europe’s Renewed Push Into Post-Soviet Heartland? Read Post »

Victor Gao on China’s Perspective on US, Development, and Worldview

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COGGS Content Team

[ The Thinker: Victor Gao is a notable Chinese legal scholar, businessman, and geopolitical commentator known for his extensive work on China’s rise and global strategic affairs.  He is the Vice President of Center for China and Globalization, a Beijing based think tank. He has authored, co-authored, and edited over 25 books in English and Chinese, advocating that China’s modernization and global engagement represent a restoration of historical balance rather than domination, with a focus on sovereignty, mutual development, and non-Western narratives of democracy and human rights.

His ideas emphasize China’s firm stance on national unity concerning Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, criticize Western liberal universalism, and position China as a pragmatic force in a multipolar world fostering cooperation in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Gao was a English interpreter for the Chinese premier Deng Xiaoping.]

Thinker Victor Gao, Irina Sarenko, Professor of Russian Academy of Sciences, Mohammad Saqib, Convenor of COGGS in a TV Panel. [Courtesy: CGTN Screengrab ]
China’s View of America and the Dynamics of Misunderstanding and Decoupling

China, according to Professor Gao views the United States through a lens of economic engagement, policy critique, and strategic caution, particularly regarding Washington’s approach to global trade and re-industrialisation efforts. 

The fundamental Chinese view is that the United States is currently pursuing economic policies, specifically tariffs whichare misleading the citizen of America. In a podcast with Indonesian podcaster Gita Wirjawan, Professor Gao opines that US presidents lack the “courage and the decency and the honesty to tell the American people that the tariffs they are talking about are fundamentally going to be paid by the American people”. He argues that these tariffs “are an additional tax against the American people”. Furthermore, he critiques the idea of “fair trade” without “free trade,” stating plainly: “there will be no fair trade without free trade”.

On re-industrialisation, China presents itself as the definitive expert, highlighting its success since 1978. If the US is “really serious about bringing back manufacturing jobs,” President Trump “needs to talk to China”. China is the world’s “most important industrialized country,” capable of producing over 200 different items recognised by the UN system, with production normally constituting “more than 50% of the global production”. However, for the US to achieve re-industrialisation, Professor Gao advises necessary preconditions, including ensuring US power generation is “minimally doubled if not increased by three times,” and that American container ports become “very very efficient”. The implication is that the US has not done its “solid homework” necessary for success.

 

 

China firmly rejects the concept of ‘decoupling.’ Attempting to decouple the economies is likened to “talking about decoupling the earth from the moon”. Should such an attempt succeed, “mankind will be hit with a greater disaster and peace may disappear and war may be initiated”. Decoupling risks plunging mankind into a crisis, forcing countries into “opposing blocks meant for war rather than peace”. Furthermore, decoupling may severely impact the US’s own ‘national defense strategy,’ especially regarding access to ‘the rare earth that China is providing,’ which is necessary for advanced military technology.

Geopolitically, the US is seen as susceptible to ‘overreach,’ a concept drawn from the historical analysis of great empires. China observes that the US, after attaining primacy post-Cold War, has ‘fought one war after another’, spending trillions in conflicts like Iraq and Afghanistan. When the US overreaches, it risks its “own demise”. China sees the US’s complete support for Israel amid the Gaza crisis as a contemporary example of overreaching ‘to do the wrong thing’, denying the ‘basic rights of the Palestinian people in their own homeland’. Professor Gao urges the US to use its ‘tremendous amount of might’ to be a “noble leader” that champions “philosophy use morality use rule of law to do the right thing”.

 

China on Southeast Asia / ASEAN and Regional Development Strategy 

From the Chinese perspective, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its 11 member states are “very very important” partners and neighbours with historical ties spanning thousands of years.

China views its relationship with ASEAN highly, noting that the “Azan China trade is the largest trade volume as far as China’s concerned”. Despite the success of ASEAN as a regional organisation, China perceives it as “one of the most highly fragmented regional grouping in the world”. This fragmentation is attributed to differing historical colonial imprints (British, French, Dutch, Spanish, US), diverse languages, religious beliefs, and natural endowments.

China’s primary recommendation for ASEAN’s improved development, especially in light of China’s superior GDP per capita growth over the last 30 years – is to improve integration and connectivity. Professor Gao emphasises that “internal integration improvement of connectivity” is crucial. Quoting a Chinese saying, he stresses: “if you really want to make riches build a road”. He highlights the need for improved highways, railways, and other connectivity links throughout the region, including extending infrastructure from the Chinese border southward and linking archipelagic nations like Indonesia and the Philippines internally.

Regional Stability

China places a “premium on peace and stability” in Southeast Asia. The existence of frictions and conflicts (such as those involving Myanmar, Bangladesh, Thailand, and Cambodia) is considered “very traumatic from the Chinese perspective”.

Regarding bilateral tensions, such as territorial disputes with the Philippines, China insists on using “diplomacy and negotiation”. China strongly advises against the Philippines becoming “a proxy of another major power which may actually destroy our part of the vote”. While China does not wish to “impose our views or our values” on ASEAN, it offers its post-1978 transformation as a “textbook” example for ASEAN member states seeking to accelerate development. China believes it possesses a “better recipe” for rapid economic growth, evidenced by the fact that China’s economic size is now about five times as big as India’s, though they were “more or less comparable with each other” in 1978. China also maintains a willingness to learn from smaller nations, citing Singapore’s effective governance and anti-corruption measures as a specific example.

 

Economics, Development, and Statecraft: The China Model

China’s current approach to economics, development, and statecraft is fundamentally rooted in the legacy and vision of Deng Xiaoping, whom Professor Gao served as an interpreter.

The Vision of Deng Xiaoping

Premier Deng Xiaoping is described as the “transformer of China” who ‘not only changed the China he also changed the world’. Deng’s vision was based on strategic foresight, projecting China’s path decades into the future, up to the middle of the 21st century. His core principle was integrating China with the rest of the world ‘on equal terms,’ believing China could achieve what developed countries did through “peace through peaceful coexistence” rather than ‘wars and conquests and colonizations’.

The Priority of Development For China, “development should always be the hard truth”. The path to modernization requires that China “constantly improve yourself constantly innovate and recreate yourself”. China’s vast industrial capabilities—including its industrial output being ‘more than the combined amount of the United States Japan Germany and quite a few other leading manufacturing countries’—were achieved by ‘following the principle of free trade’ and ‘working very hard in very disciplined way’. This success was attained without “firing any single shot at any country in the world,” or “engaging in slavery or exploitation”.

Core Principles of Statecraft China commits to three major principles in its statecraft: global integration, non-hegemony, and mutual respect.

Globalization is an ‘irreversibility’ and the ‘mega trend’. China views the world as a ‘highly interconnected world and very much integrated into one small global village’. Policies promoting ‘reverse globalization’ or trying to ‘create walls’ are against the fundamental interests of the world.

China seeks a ‘multipolar world a multilateral world’ where all civilizations have ‘an equal chance to perform and no one should be allowed to dominate the world’. China pledges to “always view other countries now we have about 200 countries in the world big or small as an equal”. 

 

China seeks to be a force for good, promoting stability and ensuring that the global community defends “free trade”. China also uses its position in the world to advocate for human rights and justice, such as its continued leadership in calling for the “two-state solution” and defending the “legitimate interests of the Palestinian people” in the UN Security Council. This stance is presented as adhering to the principle of respecting the dignity and rights of all people, viewing them “as much human beings as you and me and rest of mankind”.

Victor Gao on China’s Perspective on US, Development, and Worldview Read Post »

South Africa’s G20 Presidency, Global South Concerns and the Outcomes

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[  The 2025 G20 Summit, held from 22 to 23 November 2025 in Johannesburg, marked the first-ever G20 summit hosted on the African continent. Under the theme “Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability,” the nation known for its social prestige and political merit, used this historic presidency to highlight Africa’s development priorities and the broader Global South agenda, stressing climate adaptation, debt relief, inclusive industrialization, and global governance reform. The summit faced the absence of key leaders, including US President Donald Trump, who boycotted the event while criticizing the South African presidency for its perceived divergence from the G20’s consensus principle. Amid chaos and wars, the summit secured a landmark Leaders’ Declaration addressing global inequalities.]

 

COGGS Content Team

SOUTH AFRICA’s PRESIDENCY of the G20, marking the first African G20 presidency, represented a significant moment for Global South to assert its collective aspirations for systemic reform and economic justice. The summit in the heart of Africa utilized diplomatic stature and coalition-building to illuminate the aspirations, contributions, and critical frustrations of Global South. The core of South Africa’s mandate was the resolute rejection of outdated and non-functional paradigms and a forceful demand for a “global reset”. South Africa recognized that current economic concepts and theories often prove inapplicable to the challenges faced by Global South and appealed for the renegotiation and review of existing global structures.

In its presidency, South Africa highlighted how the status quo is detrimental to low-income global south economies, especially concerning debt management. The focus was on mobilizing finance for essential transitions, such as a just energy transition, and harnessing critical minerals for inclusive growth. This push for new international architecture moves beyond the G20’s original finance-centric origins and it further demands systems that are fundamentally more inclusive as well as equitable.

South Africa championed the need to give WTO (World Trade Organization) more impetus to effectively deal with disputes and unilateral trade decisions. Such act reflects a collective desire among Global South members to defend themselves against larger economies whose actions might harm developing nations.

A major institutional success and reflection of sustained South-South advocacy was the inclusion of the African Union as a permanent G20 member. Bringing African voice within global governance forums is immensely significant.

During the G20, perhaps the most potent and humanely critical issue tables by South Africa was the crisis of debt sustainability for low-income countries. Approximately 74 countries of the Global South are either defaulting or on the verge of defaulting, urgently requiring debt renegotiation. The current debt arrangement is widely considered not favorable to these low-income Global South economies as highly increased interest rates hit and hurt them fiercely.

There’s a serious need to revise and reform Common Framework for Debt Treatment, initiated by G20 and Paris Club. The difficulty of this negotiation lies in bringing together disparate creditors—ranging from large banks to private lenders—who hold varying interests, making the negotiation process “agonizingly complex and slow”. The setting up of the Africa Expert Panel signalled an active attempt to design debt frameworks attuned to the developing countries’ interests and ensure fair as well as transparent practices.

South Africa, as the continent’s sole G20 member, successfully pushed the African agenda to the top of the global stage, demonstrating its role as an important global player and a “moral authority” on certain issues.

To ensure relevance and focus, the presidency commissioned an Africa report specifically related to the finance track stream to analyze continental challenges, alongside a report on inequality. Furthermore, the presidency, alongside Brazil, prioritized the Social Summit. This initiative was vital for ensuring that global economic policies address grassroots concerns and capture the views of ordinary people, specifically addressing endemic issues such as youth unemployment, gender-based violence (GBV), and housing shortages, which were raised by South African citizens.

G20 Leaders’s at Johannesburg Summit. Credit: The Presidency Secretariat, South Africa

 

Despite the advancements made, South Africa’s presidency confronted the realpolitik of global governance. The sources reveal a pronounced global fragmentation and resistance from powerful economies. The challenge of achieving consensus often stalled ambitious reforms; resistance came from the G7 and wealthier western economies, which displayed a limited appetite for the agenda items tabled by South Africa, particularly around debt relief and climate finance. This difficulty was evidenced by the fact that only one out of four finance ministerial summits resulted in an official communiqué.

South Africa’s diplomatic approach, however, was to maintain focus on key issues and avoid a “shouting match,” thereby safeguarding the stature of the first African G20 presidency.

The enduring challenge to realizing the tangible benefits outlined in the declaration remains the lack of a force of law to compel implementation. Systemic reform hinges heavily on sustained “political will,” raising concerns that the momentum built by the developing South might “regress” when the presidency transitions back to the developed North (e.g., the United States), potentially narrowing the focus solely back to the finance track and neglecting the broader social and equity agenda.

 

Global South spoke her mind at Johannesburg, loud and clear. Ensuring peace and stability were central to the G20 summit declaration, which prioritized a comprehensive and lasting peace in conflict zones including Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Palestinian territory, and Ukraine. Guided by the principles of the UN Charter, the G20 leaders committed to renewed diplomatic efforts to achieve sustainable peace and condemned terrorism in all its forms. The declaration also tabled pointed emphasis on the seriousness of climate change, marking a clear rebuke to US President Donald Trump, who boycotted the summit and has expressed skepticism about human-induced global warming. The summit’s enduring legacy rests on its demonstration that determined leadership, coalitional strategy, and an insistence on equity can steer global governance closer to the interests of global south, even while acknowledging that systemic global reform remains incremental, not transformative. In the dawn of multipolarity, South Africa embarked on its 2025 G20 presidency with a resolute vision to realign the global economic architecture toward greater equity, inclusivity, and sustainable development, firmly asserting the interests of the Global South amid rising geopolitical fragmentation.

South Africa’s G20 Presidency, Global South Concerns and the Outcomes Read Post »

COP30: Geo-Climate Politics, Climate Finance and Global South

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COGGS Contents Team

The thirtieth Conference of the Parties (COP30),  convened in Belém, Brazil, placed the financial and ethical demands of the Global South (Emerging Markets and Developing Countries, or EMDEs) at the core of the global climate agenda. The necessity of new financial mechanisms, and the crucial role of equity were among the top take aways from COP30. 

With the theme, “Building the Financial and Ethical Foundations for a Just Transition”, COP30 become a defining moment for the Global South to assert leadership amid rising climate and political heat. With the U.S. under President Trump turning inward and the EU distracted by internal strains, Global South actors like Brazil, India, South Africa and China are filling the vacuum with a more equitable climate agenda. More from the south are joining the league for a greater cause. COP30 has focused on climate finance, adaptation and a just transition, with Global South nations pressing Western economies to honour commitments on funding and loss-and-damage. Initiatives such as the Tropical Forests Forever Facility and proposed exclusion zones for sensitive ecosystems underscore their push to protect biodiversity while advancing clean energy.

Strengthened South–South cooperation, new plurilateral coalitions and calls for coordinated fossil-fuel phase-out plans all signal a big shift in climate politics. COP30 marks a turning point where the Global South is not just demanding climate justice but demonstrating its capacity to lead—if promised financial and technological support is finally delivered.

I. The Critical Finance Gap: A Question of Survival

The fundamental perspective driving COP30’s outcomes is the recognition that without massive financial mobilization, the climate goals of the Paris Agreement will not be met, and for many vulnerable nations, access to funds is “a matter of survival”.

Extreme Financial Disparity While global climate finance flows reached USD 1 trillion in 2023, the vast majority bypasses the Global South. The core finding of the COP30 Circle of Finance Ministers’ report is highly indicative of this crisis: “Global climate finance flows for all countries hit an all-time high of USD 1 trillion in 2023, more than doubling in three years, but only around 10% goes to Emerging Markets and Developing Countries (EMDCs), while less than 5% goes to adaptation. The lower bound of global estimated climate finance needs – USD 6 trillion – is still 3 times more than current flows” (source: page 9/ COP30 Circle of Finance Minister’s report )

Scale of EMDE Needs The developed world must massively scale up financial flows to EMDEs. EMDEs require investment of at least USD 2.4 trillion per year by 2030 and USD 3.3 trillion per year by 2035 to meet their needs for clean energy, adaptation, loss and damage response, natural capital, and a just transition.

Concrete Need: Adaptation The adaptation finance gap is stark: global adaptation needs are estimated at USD 215–387 billion annually by 2030, yet international public flows reached only USD 28 billion in 2022.

COP30 Circle of Finance Ministers Report_Final

II. New Financial Architecture for Implementation

COP30 focused on creating concrete mechanisms to ensure finance flows are directed “quickly, transparently and fairly” to those most in need.

 Baku-to-Belém Roadmap The Roadmap is positioned as a collective pathway for scaling climate finance for developing countries from all sources through 2035. The goal is to unlock the $1.3 trillion annually required. The COP30 Presidency stressed that delivering this ambition hinges on coordinated reforms across five priority action areas, including MDB mandates and domestic investment frameworks.

Concrete Mechanism: Country Platforms Brazil and the Green Climate Fund (GCF) strengthened investment architecture through new Country Platforms and a Country Platform Hub. These platforms are a major step towards aligning global support and investments with national climate priorities.

[Context: These platforms help countries integrate proposed climate plans into broader economic frameworks, and 13 countries released plans to develop them through the GCF readiness program. GCF Executive Director Mafalda Duarte noted that national platforms represent a strategic opportunity to bring together government, the private sector, and development partners to “identify priority policies and investments, as well as align public and private, international, and domestic financing”.]

A solitary tree stands against a cracked, arid landscape under a cloudy sky, illustrating drought and desertification.

III. Equity and Justice through Solidarity Levies and Local Recognition

The Global South nations emphasized that finance must be fair and debt-avoiding, reflecting the “polluter-pays principle”.

Concrete Mechanism: Solidarity Levies Leaders reaffirmed the growing global momentum behind solidarity levies as an essential tool for generating fair, more predictable, and debt-averting climate finance.

[Context: These levies target high-emitting, undertaxed sectors such as aviation, shipping, financial transactions, and cryptocurrencies, mobilizing concessional resources for adaptation, resilience, and loss-and-damage. The Premium Flyers Solidarity Coalition expanded to include countries like Benin, Nigeria, Fiji, and Vanuatu.]

 Laurence Tubiana, COP30 Special Envoy to Europe, stated: “The launch of the Premium Flyers Solidarity Coalition proves that solidarity levies can move from ideas to reality. This is only the first step. Now I call on more countries to join us at COP30 and turn this momentum into lasting global change”.

 

Inseparability of Justice and Action UN General Assembly President Annalena Baerbock stressed that “Climate action and social justice are inseparable,” noting how climate instability drives social crises: “Climate insecurity fuels hunger and poverty, poverty drives migration and conflict; and conflict, in turn, deepens poverty and deters investment”.

Local Demands: Indigenous Leadership Indigenous leaders attending the COP, including Chief Raoni, called for protection of standing forests and recognition of Indigenous leadership. They stressed that commitments on climate finance “hold meaning only when they translate into the protection of standing forests and the recognition of Indigenous leadership”.

IV . Climate Action as an Engine for Global South Growth

COP30 framed investment in the climate transition not as a cost, but as an opportunity for sustainable growth, offering tangible benefits for the Global South economy and population.

Economic Opportunity: Studies suggest that boosting green investment rates by 3–5% in EMDCs can “spur global growth, strengthen energy security dependence, and unlock millions of decent jobs”. Accelerated climate action is viewed as the foundation for a new era of sustainable, inclusive growth.

 UN Climate Change Executive Secretary Simon Stiell underscored this economic perspective: “When finance flows, ambition grows,” enabling implementation that creates jobs, lowers the cost of living, improves health outcomes, protects communities and secures a more resilient, prosperous planet for all.

The Cost of Inaction: The cost of delaying action is enormous, disproportionately affecting developing objectives. Long-term scenarios suggest that under current climate policies, global GDP could be up to 15% lower by 2050 compared to a world without climate change. Climate-related disasters are already causing severe economic losses, reaching USD 320 billion globally in 2024.

COP30: Geo-Climate Politics, Climate Finance and Global South Read Post »

Unite & Rise, Follow China’s Light, Jeffrey Sachs tells Africa

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COGGS Content Team

IN A PODCAST INTERVIEW with Fidias Panayiotou, a Cypriot politician, and YouTuber-turned-independent Member of European Parliament, Economist Jeffrey Sachs stressed Africa’s unification and adopting China’s model for future prospects. Sachs, acclaimed for his bold strategies in poverty reduction, economic reform, and addressing global challenges such as climate change and disease control, argued that unity is essential for Africa’s success: When asked if this division will change, he stated, “they will unite it they have to.“.

Sachs, a staunch critic of the Western powers, explained the size and structure of the African continent, contrasting it with unified nations like India and China.

“Africa if you add up the 55 countries of the African Union that’s about 1.5 billion people same size as India same size as China,” he elucidated. He further told that a crucial difference lies in the history of imperial domination: “the big difference is that the imperial powers divided Africa into 55 little countries not one of which can thrive on its own“. In contrast, “India and China because of the history remained unified countries after,” he said in the podcast.  He emphasized this need for continental cohesion: “I tell them every single time I have the opportunity that the African Union is the key as 55 you can’t make it but as one African continental economy you can make it. “

In the two-hour long podcast, published on 31 Oct 2025, speaking widely on Africa, China, World Economy, and his current business, Jeffrey Sachs mentioned three points he prescribe the African leaders.

I. “first be Africawide” (meaning unity).

II. “second get on quickly with mass education because that is the key to the economic development”.

III. “third look at what China did follow that model“.

 

Africa : The Future of the Century

Speaking on Africa’s demography and future, he said “what’s happening now is Africa’s population is continuing to rise it’s the only place in the world with rapid population growth”. Regarding the rest of the world, he noted that “everyone else has peaked or just about to peak or actually beginning a decline”.

Sachs provided significant figures, presenting future demographic shifts: “Africa’s population today is 1.5 billion by 2050 it’ll be 2.5 billion that’s a lot adding a billion people in the next quarter century“. “if you go even farther and just try to extrapolate based on current trends Africa’s population reaches about 3.5 billion and according to the UN most recent forecast 3.7 billion by the end of the 21st century“.

This growth will radically transform the global balance: “Africa goes from being 9% of the world population to being more than 30% of the world population it’s going to be completely different world,” he said in the interview. 

 

 

Rise Africa, follow China’s Light

Jeffrey Sachs prescribed China model as the significant and applicable blueprint for Africa’s rapid development. He highlighted that around 1980, China was impoverished with a poverty rate even higher than Africa today, yet through opening up its economy and implementing strong policy measures, China transformed into a high-income economy and became the world’s largest economy by purchasing-power parity over 40 years.

Sachs further identified key growth pillars for Africa, inspired by China’s success: massive investments in education to build skills, infrastructure development including power, digital access, and transport, and fostering a vibrant private sector supported by enabling policies . He stresses the necessity for a mix of domestic resource mobilization and international financing at low costs to fund this development. Sachs contrasts the China model with the traditional IMF approach, favouring the former’s focus on state-led strategic investment and policy reform.

Jeffrey Sachs’ academic paper “Economic Reforms and Constitutional Transition” (2000) co-authored with Wing Thye Woo and Xiaokai Yang, insightfully highlights the risks of state opportunism during transitions and the high costs of gradual dual-track reforms. The widely cited paper presents a nuanced perspective on economic reform by linking it to political constitutional transition. Using China and Russia as contrasting case studies, Sachs went on to argue that economic reforms cannot be fully understood outside the broader political context. China’s success, according to this paper, is due to economic reforms occurring within a stable political monopoly, whereas Russia’s problematic transition was marked by political competition and constitutional struggles.

His 1997 paper, that appeared in the dawn of globalisation, “Economic Reforms in China and India: Selected Issues in Industrial Policy,” co-authored with Nirupam Bajpai and Tianlun Jian, provides a comparative analysis of the reform experiences in these two populous nations. Sachs highlights China’s far-reaching deregulation, especially in labor and price reforms, and the superior performance of China’s township and village enterprises and special economic zones. The paper underscores how China’s market-oriented reforms have outstripped India’s more cautious approach, attributing China’s rapid economic growth to the strategic policy environment that fosters private sector dynamism, foreign investment, and export-led development.

As demographic shifts are taking place, Jeffrey Sachs has emphasized that Africa should replicate China’s comprehensive economic opening, infrastructure investment, regional integration, and skill development to achieve rapid and sustained growth. To implement these goals, Africa needs to be united, as no single country could sustain itself alone according to the acclaimed economist.

Unite & Rise, Follow China’s Light, Jeffrey Sachs tells Africa Read Post »

Global South: How Oglesby Coined the Term and Academia Branded it

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Andhini Octa Maharatih, Prattyush Kala and Ayanangsha Maitra

 

PRIOR TO THE EXISTENCE of the term Global South in the vocabulary, the world was divided into three broad identical categories.
The First World consisted of the United States and its Western allies.
The Second World comprised the Soviet Union and its satellite states in the Eastern Bloc.
And the Third World, which represented the liberated, non-aligned, or underdeveloped nations in a fractured century . The term Global South distinguishes geographic regions experiencing economic inequality and the lasting effects of colonialism.

 

An American playwright turned writer Carl Oglesby coined it during a period of political clarity. The Vietnam War revealed the flaws of American liberalism, and Oglesby – once a technical writer for a defence contractor – became one of its strongest critics. His 1965 speech at the Washington Monument for Students for a Democratic Society combined Southern storytelling with sharp political analysis, arguing that both liberals and conservatives used democratic language to mask imperial ambition.Thus the term Global South became his shorthand for nations harmed by this system- countries shaped by colonialism, extraction, and exclusion.

 

Oglesby’s intellectual legacy is reflected in works such as Containment and Change (1967, with Richard Shaull), which dissected Cold War liberalism; The Yankee and Cowboy War (1976), a study of elite factionalism in U.S. politics; and Ravens in the Storm (2008), a memoir chronicling the rise and fall of SDS. His vocabulary terms like “imperial liberalism,” “radical centrism,” and “Yankee vs. Cowboy”- unveiled the hidden architecture of American power.

Oglesby highlighted how colonized regions were exploited for resources. The term first appeared in Commonwealth magazine in 1969 and remains relevant today. He went on to argue that the North’s dominance over the Global South had persisted for centuries, peaking during the Vietnam War. More importantly, Oglesby emphasized that the Global South was defined not by geography but by shared political, cultural, and economic inequalities rooted in colonialism.

Initially, the term saw limited use, as many other labels existed at that time. However, after the Cold War, it gained traction among European and American academics who viewed earlier terms as inadequate. The phrase “Global South” grew in popularity when the UN’s 2003 “Forging a Global South” project promoted development cooperation among southern nations to reduce dependence on the North. Since then, it has become a key concept in development and international relations studies, appearing widely in publications and summits to strengthen cooperation among Global South nations.

 

The Debate Surrounding the Term 

The idea behind the term Global South evolved from debates about underdevelopment caused by colonialism. Geographically, the term refers to nations in the Southern Hemisphere – Africa, Asia, and Latin America – facing economic disparities with the North. Its roots trace back to the term Third World, introduced by  a French demographer Alfred Sauvy in 1952 to describe countries outside the Western (First) and Eastern (Second) blocs during the Cold War. Sociologist Peter Worsley later expanded on it in The Third World: A Vital New Force in International Affairs, detailing non-aligned countries dissatisfied with both blocs’ political systems.

 

Over time, “Third World” faced criticism for implying dependency and backwardness. As industrialization advanced, alternative classifications emerged—LDCs (Least Developed Countries), LLDCs (Landlocked Developing Countries), and SIDS (Small Island Developing States). Yet, inequalities between North and South persisted. The term Global South gained preference for being more neutral and emphasizing development and geopolitical relations rather than hierarchy.

 

Carl Oglesby: Personal Life and Professional Work

 

Carl Oglesby was born in 1935 into a working-class family and experienced class inequality in the US. He began his career as a playwright but later became politically active in Ann Arbor, Michigan, where he joined the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and rose to its presidency. Known for his sharp criticism of U.S. policies in Asia, he became an icon of the 1965 anti-war demonstrations following President Lyndon Johnson’s bombing of North Vietnam. His speech “Let Us Shape the Future” marked his prominence as a leader of the anti-war movement.

 

Throughout his life, Oglesby was often labelled a radical by politicians and academics. His influential book The Yankee and Cowboy War (1976) metaphorically portrayed the “Yankee” as the Global North and the “Cowboy” as the emerging Global South. The book examined Washington’s internal conflicts and high-profile political cases like the deaths of John F. Kennedy and Dorothy Hunt. Oglesby passed away in September 2011 at age 76.

 

How the Private Enterprises Perceived the Global South

The British imperialism began with the East India company’s activities. The western private enterprises are widely criticized for exploiting the resources of the South. The Global South’s dependence on Northern investment is a hallmark of modern globalization. Multinational corporations (MNCs) often view it as a lucrative opportunity due to abundant resources, affordable labour, and expanding markets. As discussed in Eva Nelson and Martin Fougere’s article “Views on Building Partnerships with Corporations: An Agonistic Struggle in the UN and Beyond,” MNCs regard the Global South as a “goldmine” for investment, exploiting both natural and human resources at low cost—a practice known as offshoring.

While these ventures promise growth, they often perpetuate neo-colonial tendencies, where Northern dominance continues through corporate influence. Private entities maintain their image through Corporate Social Responsibility activities and sustainability programs while benefiting from cheap labour and weak regulation. Despite positive rhetoric about development, many corporations fail to meet Western labour or ethical standards in the Global South.

 

Today, the Global South has evolved beyond postcolonial critique the term now represents a coalition of low- and middle-income countries asserting agency in global governance. From BRICS summits to climate negotiations, the Global South demands equity, reparative justice, and epistemic recognition. Though criticized for vagueness, the term’s symbolic power endures in a multipolar world. Corporations once viewed the Global South as unstable and marginal but now see it as essential for supply chain resilience, ESG innovation, and digital transformation. With two-thirds of the world’s workers and a growing consumer base, its strategic value is undeniable. Yet Oglesby’s question still resonates: Who gains from this integration, and who sets the rules of exchange?

Revisiting Oglesby’s vision reveals more than a historical term— the term offers a critical lens on power, resistance, and justice. His ideas continue to challenge narratives of dominance and development, reminding us that the Global South is not merely a geography, but a proposition for a more just world.

[ Authors work for COGGS. ]

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Bandung to BRICS+: The Evolution of South-South Cooperation

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Navodita Kumari

SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION has appeared as a defining theme in this era of multipolarity. The United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC) defines South-South Cooperation (SSC) as “a common endeavour of peoples and countries of the South, born out of shared experiences and sympathies, based on their common objectives and solidarity, and guided by, inter alia, the principles of respect for national sovereignty and ownership, free from any conditionalities.” Started as a common voice against colonialism, imperialism, and oppression, the SSC has now become a major platform through which the Global South countries exchange technological know-how, resources, and best practices to help each other in socio-economic development and growth. The emergence of this Third World solidarity  can be traced back to the Asian-African Conference, and  Bandung conference of 1955. The ‘Bandung Spirit,’ which symbolized the emergence of New Asia and New Africa, was described as “the spirit of love for peace, anti-violence, anti-discrimination, and development for all without trying to intervene for one another wrongly, but to pay a great respect to one another.” It became a guiding light for the emergence of the non-aligned movement (NAM), which allowed the newly emerged nation-states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America to remain free from the Cold War bloc politics and exercise strategic autonomy to safeguard their national interests. Thus, the Bandung Conference and NAM provided the political foundation for SSC, which later transformed into economic cooperation through platforms like the Group of 77 or G-77.

 

The divergent economic interests of the North and the South that came to the fore during the deliberations of the Preparatory Committee, established to finalise the agenda for the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), became the basis for the emergence of G-77 in 1964. The G-77 marked the institutionalisation of the SSC, which helped in enhancing the negotiating power of developing countries and promoting collective economic interests at the international level and within the United Nations system. The economic upheavals of the 1970s further advanced this agenda, which ultimately resulted in the adoption of the ‘Declaration and Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order’ by the United Nations General Assembly in 1974. Speaking at the Fourth Ministerial meeting of the grouping in 1979, Julius K Nyerere had pointed out that ‘complete liberation of the Third World countries from external domination’ is the very objective of the G-77. The term ‘complete liberation’ meant the end of economic dependence of the developing countries on the industrialised North in every form and the establishment of a fairer international economic order. Thus, while NAM advanced the political and diplomatic freedom of the global south countries, the G-77 echoed the same freedom in the economic domain. Furthermore, the establishment of UNDP’s special unit for SSC in 1974 expanded cooperation and coordination among the developing countries in different arenas. Later renamed as the United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC), the platform facilitates knowledge sharing and technology transfer, promotes innovative development solutions, and helps implement climate change adaptation funds (such as IBSA and India-UNDP Fund) primarily to ‘enable developing countries to pursue more resilient and sustainable development.’

The latter half of the 1970s and early 1980s saw greater emphasis on enhancing technical cooperation among developing countries (TCDC). These efforts resulted in the first-ever United Nations Conference on TCDC in 1978 in Buenos Aires. The conference adopted the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA), which ‘sets out a comprehensive conceptual and operational framework for the promotion of TCDC.’ Following this the UN High Level Committee on Technical Cooperation was established in 1980, which in its report titled ‘New Direction for Cooperation Among Developing Countries’ in 1995 highlighted that although TCDC has not been fully integrated into the United Nations system but the concept remains valid and should focus on major themes such as poverty alleviation, production and employment, debt, trade and investment, among others. Thus, BAPA became a guiding light for strengthening cooperation in the technical arena among developing countries.

Diagram 1: Evolution of South-South Cooperation

 

Source: https://cooperacionsursur.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/18-DT05-Chrono-South-South2014.pdf#:~:text=in%201990%20resulted%20in%20the%20establishment%20of%20the%20South%20Centre%2C%20an&text=slogan%20on%20South%2DSouth%20Cooperation»11%20(1980)%2C%20«South%2DSouth.

SSC in the Era of BRICS and BRICS+

The post-Cold War era was largely characterised by globalisation and economic liberalisation, and SSC during this period, called ‘SSC 2.0’, shifted towards development cooperation and trade. In this expansionary phase, SSC became more visible with the emergence of groupings and forums such as the IBSA Forum, BRICS, IAFS (India-Africa Forum Summit), etc. Among these, BRICS emerged as the largest platform for enhancing horizontal cooperation by challenging the North-led inequities, particularly in the commercial and financial arena. As raised by the NIEO, the reform in the Bretton Woods system to create a transparent and democratic global economic order has been a key demand of BRICS since its first Summit in 2009. Demands such as a reform in the governance structure of the IMF ‘to increase the quota allotted to developing countries’ and to enhance representation of developing countries in the administrative structure of the World Bank and the IMF have been successful due to greater cooperation among the BRICS countries. However, despite these reforms, BRICS has established its own financial institutions and currency swap arrangements, such as the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA), largely to reduce dependence on West-led international financial institutions (IFIs).

The BRICS-led NDB was launched in July 2015 to mobilise ‘resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs).’ Since its inception, NDB has financed 108 projects worth USD 35.6 billion in various sectors such as social and digital infrastructure, clean energy, transportation, environmental protection, water and sanitation, creating ground-level impacts in developing countries (see Table 1). To give an example, NDB has financed the ‘Delhi-Ghaziabad-Meerut Regional Rapid Transit System Project’ in India, which has provided a fast and reliable public transport system for people living in surrounding areas and has improved access to education and job opportunities, particularly for vulnerable groups.

 

Table 1: Project Portfolio by Area of Cooperation in NDB

Area of Cooperation USD Amount
Clean Energy & Energy Efficiency 3.026 billion
Transport Infrastructure 10.479 billion
Water & Sanitation 2.684 billion
Environmental Protection 680 million
Social Infrastructure 810 million
Digital Infrastructure 300 million
Multi-area 3.235 billion
COVID-19 Emergency Assistance 9.016 billion

Source: https://www.ndb.int/projects/

Furthermore, the Contingent Reserve Arrangement has provided a new impetus to the SSC framework by moving towards a transparent economic architecture. Announced in the Durban BRICS Summit, CRA is a ‘USD 100 billion pooled reserve fund (see diagram 2) created to help emerging nations deal with liquidity shortages and to strengthen financial systems during a crisis.’ Established as a regional safety net for developing economies, CRA can provide financial stability to Global South countries from macroeconomic volatility, primarily at a time when reforms in IFIs are moving at a very slow pace. The governance architecture of CRA is quite democratic in nature. Although it resembles the IMF’s quota-based voting distribution for operational decisions, it does not provide veto power to any single entity party to the arrangement, making the environment consensus-driven.

Moving forward, the successful political, economic, and diplomatic coordination among the five BRICS countries has led them to make it more inclusive and multilateral by admitting countries from Southeast Asia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The new members, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Iran, joined the grouping formally in 2024, representing the mature institutional phase of SSC. Marking an inflection point in the SSC, this expansion would not only help BRICS members present their demands more emphatically at the global stage, but it would also strengthen their aim to move away from the Western-dominated international order. The call for de-dollarization at the 2024 Kazan Summit emphasizes a critical geoeconomic shift in an era where protectionist policies and tariff diplomacy are taking center stage. Accounting for 40% of the world economy and 49.5% of the global population, BRICS nations have vast market potential with a huge consumer base. Thus, BRICS countries have the rigor and diplomatic clout to further strengthen SSC and create a more inclusive, multilateral, equitable, and representative international system where the voice of developing countries is not suppressed under the weight of ‘white man’s burden.’

 

Diagram 2: BRICS Countries Contribution to CRA

 

Source: Created by author from https://brics.br/en/about-the-brics/new-development-bank#:~:text=The%20Contingent%20Reserve%20Arrangement%20(CRA,needed%20to%20request%20CRA%20resources.

 

The transformation of SSC from the Bandung Spirit to BRICS+ has been a remarkable journey representing the resilience and commitment of developing nations to make their voice heard in the almost North-led and North-dominated global order. However, power asymmetry, fragmentation, and competition among the Global South countries are some of the key obstacles in the path of SSC. To succeed in the unequal global system, countries must prioritize cooperation and collaboration instead of competition.

 

[ Navodita Kumari is an Intern at COGGS and PhD Research Scholar at University of Allahabad, India. ] 

Bandung to BRICS+: The Evolution of South-South Cooperation Read Post »

UN Day of South-South Cooperation Observed, Triangular Cooperation Stressed

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United Nations Day for South-South Cooperation

United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 58/220 designated 12 September as the United Nations Day for South-South Cooperation. This commemorates the 1978 adoption of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (BAPA), a seminal framework that redefined collaboration among nations of the Global South. BAPA recognized the agency of developing countries not merely as aid recipients, but as partners, problem-solvers, and innovators in charting a shared path of development.

“On this United Nations Day for South-South Cooperation, we celebrate the growing momentum of opportunity, innovation and solidarity across the Global South. In an increasingly multipolar world, developing countries are demonstrating remarkable resilience and ingenuity – not only in responding to crises, but in driving transformation.

They are creating bold, homegrown solutions and sharing them across borders, such as climate-smart agriculture, green technologies, digital finance and health breakthroughs.  These solutions are forged in mutual respect, shared learning and common purpose.

 South-South and triangular cooperation are engines of progress and vital to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.  Yet we also recognize the responsibilities of developed countries to help address rising inequalities and advance sustainable development. As we mark this important Day, let’s celebrate South-South collaboration as a catalyst for reinvigorated multilateralism and building a more inclusive, equitable world for all,”  António Guterres, Secretary General of the UN speaking on the observation said.

 

 

In 2025, as the international community moves beyond the midpoint of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and reflects on the outcomes of the 2024 Summit of the Future, the imperative of South-South cooperation has gained renewed urgency. The Summit’s Pact for the Future has infused momentum into multilateral reform and underscored the indispensable role of solidarity, collective action, and equitable global governance in shaping a just and sustainable world.

Development Challenges in a Polycrisis World

The global landscape remains fraught with overlapping crises:

  • Climate change: intensifying disasters, from heatwaves to flooding, disproportionately affect Global South nations.
  • Debt distress: many developing countries continue to allocate more resources to external debt servicing than to essential social investments.
  • Digital inequality: uneven connectivity perpetuates divides in education, trade, and innovation.
  • Health security and food systems: fragile supply chains and pandemic aftershocks continue to compromise resilience.
  • Extreme poverty: as of 2025, over 650 million people remain trapped in conditions of deprivation.

These challenges not only undermine progress on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), but also highlight the urgency of knowledge-sharing and context-sensitive solutions rooted in the realities of the Global South.

Focus on Triangular Cooperation

South-South and triangular cooperation function as dynamic development modalities. They are not a substitute for North-South engagement but provide complementary and adaptive pathways to address global challenges. This year’s theme, “New Opportunities and Innovation through South-South and Triangular Cooperation”, highlights the transformational potential of peer-to-peer solidarity in advancing sustainable development. Their added value lies in:

  • Practical, adaptable models: grounded in domestic experiences of resilience, recovery, and economic adjustment.
  • Innovation ecosystems: spanning digital transformation, climate-resilient agriculture, community-based health systems, and sustainable financing.
  • Inclusive partnerships: bringing together governments, civil society, the private sector, and multilateral agencies in co-designing solutions.
  • Triangular cooperation: scaling innovations by linking Global South initiatives with technical and financial support from Northern and multilateral partners.

The recent findings of UNOSSC’s Global Report on South-South Cooperation, “Bridging Horizons and Continents”, emphasize that solidarity-based cooperation is not just symbolic but a proven framework for resilience, scale, and sustainability.

Financing for a Stronger Future

At the 22nd Session of the High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation, Member States reaffirmed the necessity of sustainable financing mechanisms. Calls were made to:

Expand access to blended finance, debt-for-SDG swaps, and impact investment instruments.

Establish dedicated financing windows for South-South initiatives within UN entities.

Develop more predictable, longer-term financing models that move beyond ad hoc pledges.

These demands echo broader debates on reforming the international financial architecture to better serve low- and middle-income countries, an agenda also underscored by the Summit of the Future and the Third South Summit.

Strategic Arenas of Collective Action

The Global South today is not merely an arena of need but is emerging as an engine of innovation and leadership. Through South-South and triangular cooperation, countries are advancing systemic change in several key domains:

  • Digital Transformation: scaling digital public infrastructure to expand financial inclusion, promote e-governance, and bridge connectivity gaps.
  • Climate Resilience: advancing peer-driven climate adaptation strategies such as drought-resistant cultivation and regional renewable energy corridors.
  • Health Systems: sharing innovations in universal health coverage, pandemic preparedness, and technology-enabled care.
  • Sustainable Financing and Trade: strengthening regional value chains, building trade corridors, and creating South-led mechanisms to reduce vulnerabilities.

Toward a Just, Peaceful, and Sustainable World

The Global South is home to the majority of humanity and a critical source of solutions to today’s pressing challenges. By harnessing the strength of shared experiences, resources, and capacities, South-South cooperation embodies the spirit of global solidarity. It is central to achieving the Pact for the Future’s call for a just and peaceful world.

Member States across multiple fora — from BAPA+40 High-level Conference on South-South Cooperation to the High-Level Conference of Middle-Income Countries — have underlined the need to mobilize these modalities more strategically. The message is clear: countries of the Global South have much to offer, irrespective of their stage of development.

UN Day of South-South Cooperation Observed, Triangular Cooperation Stressed Read Post »

How Brazil Bridging Global South?

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-Dhea Marsha Ananda

 Multilateralism, a Global South’s drive, aims to balance global power, raise issues of development, economic justice, and climate change from the perspective of developing countries, and form an international system that is more democratic towards the needs of all countries, not just a handful of major powers. The need to redefine multilateralism is because the system of international cooperation based on shared rules has lost its legitimacy and success since it has failed to deal with major problems such as terrorism, war, pandemics, climate change, and economic instability (Thakur, 2025). This failure has led to geopolitical divisions, allowing minilaterals (a small group of special-purpose countries) and the Global South (GS) a stronger voice. This is especially true for developing countries like Brazil, India, and South Africa. Thus, BRICS and SCO evolved in response to the inadequacies of conventional multilateral institutions such as the UN, World Bank, IMF, and WTO. However, due to their exclusive nature, they also have the potential to threaten the viability of multilateralism. Therefore, the Global South now demands greater representation in global governance, proposes UN reforms, and emphasizes the importance of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the role of civil society in maintaining international justice. 

 

However, it is possible that the plan faces real challenges such as high poverty and inequality, and dependence on foreign aid and debt with political or economic conditions. There is also a lack of representation in global institutions, despite their growing population and economic contribution. Despite these challenges, the countries of the Global South are still working to redesign the international order, because multilateralism is no longer just a matter of diplomacy between powerful countries, but also an arena of struggle for the redistribution of global power, recognition of colonial history, and strengthening the voices of countries that have been marginalized.

Brazil and Multilateralism

Brazil demonstrates a clear commitment to form a new, inclusive multilaterality in global forums through strategic roles in the G20, BRICS, and environmental agencies like COP. At the 2024 Summit, Brazil successfully promoted the theme “Building a Just World and a Sustainable Planet” by launching important initiatives such as the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty, and G20 Social as a platform for civil society participation (The Brazilian G20 and the Climate Finance Agenda, n.d.). By encouraging the use of local currency in trade and working together on projects pertaining to artificial intelligence and climate change, Brazil also sought to strengthen the agenda for economic cooperation and increase the number of its members during its 2025 BRICS chairmanship. Brazil was successful in making BRICS a workable global model for developing countries. Additionally, by preparing for COP30, which was held in Belém do Pará, Brazil demonstrated its commitment to global environmental challenges—lowering greenhouse gas emissions, becoming ready for climate change, and giving the Global South money (Watts, 2025).

 

Black and white photo of the iconic Christ the Redeemer statue in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
The iconic Christ the Redeemer statue in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

 

IBSA is a forum for strengthening diplomacy between the South and the South that was co-founded by India, Brazil and South Africa in 2003. The nation plays an active role in promoting UN reform and social justice, including food security and gender equality. It supports peace in the South Atlantic through ZOPACAS and advocates for UN Security Council reform as part of the G4. By rejoining UNASUR and leading the Brasília Consensus, Brazil has strengthened its regional influence. Its peacekeeping efforts in the DRC, Haiti, and Lebanon show its global commitment.

However, rising trade tensions with the U.S., including a 50% increase in export tariffs, pose major challenges to Brazil’s international ambitions. This triggered countermeasures from Brazil through the WTO, with a decision to favor dialogue (Paraguassu, 2025). Another challenge was that the organization of COP30 in Belém was hampered by the accommodation crisis with “extortionate” prices accompanied by infrastructure deficiencies, to the threat of moving the location, so the government prepared alternative lodging places such as cruise ships (Borenstein, 2025).

Brazil balances its relations with the Global South and the West as part of its non-aligned foreign policy. Its policy of diplomatic and economic diversification is seen in its improved ties with the United States, China, Japan, and Mexico. Key initiatives include cooperation with Japan on supply chains and climate justice, applying for full IEA membership, and launching the “Redata” scheme to attract green tech investment in renewable-powered data centers. In addition, a US$1 billion investment with IFC and BTG Pactual was made by Brazil for bioeconomy and climate resilience initiatives in the Amazon region.

It can be concluded that Brazil successfully combined formal diplomatic leadership with practical action to strengthen the multipolar global structure. Although multilateralism is in an identity crisis due to the weak performance of global institutions and increasing geopolitical fragmentation, recovery remains possible through reforms, stronger Global South representation, flexible minilaterals, and active civil society roles in promoting justice and sustainability. Brazil’s strategy has boosted its global image and empowered Southern nations in multilateral engagement.

 

[ Dhea Marsha Ananda is an intern at COGGS and student of International Relations, UPN “Veteran” East Java University ] 

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Is Global South Modern?

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– Natasya Aulia

MODERNITY IS OFTEN understood as a product of European history that was then imposed as a universal standard for the world. This paradigm places the Global South as an entity that is always lagging behind, “less modern,” and must catch up by imitating Western development models. However, an important question that now arises is to what extent the Global South is able to define its own standards of modernity, not only as a critique of Eurocentric modernity, but also as an operational alternative. Through conceptual studies and case studies from Asia, Latin America, and Africa, evidence has emerged of a shift towards contextual plural modernities, although still overshadowed by structural obstacles such as financial and technological dependence (Fikriyah, 2024).

 

[ Russia based Political Philosopher Alexander Dugin on Global South and Modernity in an exclusive interview with COGGS. ] 

Historically, the category of the “Global South” was born not as a geographical description, but as a political construct rooted in the legacy of colonialism and Western-biased modernization. (Fry, 2017) emphasizes that the Global South was shaped by relations of domination that not only deprived it of resources, but also destroyed the value systems, knowledge, and future orientation of societies in the South. Modernity, in this case, cannot be separated from colonialism, which created conditions of “ruination” and ongoing dependency. This understanding shows that the Global South’s efforts to define standards of modernity are essentially an attempt at decolonizing knowledge (decoloniality) that seeks to dismantle old epistemic structures.

The concept of “multiple modernities” developed by Einstadt (2000) offers a theoretical framework for understanding these dynamics. Rather than a single linear path toward Western modernity, modernity can be understood as a plural process rooted in the traditions, institutions, and histories of each society. In the context of the Global South, multiple modernities are evident in the combination of global technology adoption and local values, such as the digitization of public services in India linked to social inclusion, or the solidarity economy model in Brazil that emphasizes distributive justice. In other words, the Global South is not only a consumer of modernity but also a producer of alternative standards.

However, the process of articulating plural modernities in the South is not easy. Structural barriers remain strong. A report (Aynaoui et al., 2023) published by ISPI, ORF, and PCNS shows that although the economies of the Global South now contribute a significant proportion of global GDP, political representation and decision-making capacity in international institutions remain uneven. For example, BRICS, which collectively controls 26% of global GDP, only has 14% of the votes in the IMF, an indication of epistemic and institutional injustice that hinders sovereignty in determining development standards. In these conditions, the discourse on epistemic sovereignty becomes increasingly relevant.

Indonesia and the ASEAN region provide concrete illustrations of how the Global South is attempting to negotiate its own modernity. As a country with a long colonial history, Indonesia has developed a development model that attempts to combine democracy with local cultural plurality. Meanwhile, ASEAN collectively promotes the concept of the ASEAN Way, which emphasizes consensus and non-intervention, a governance model that is often considered “unmodern” by Western standards, but is functional in maintaining regional stability (Fikriyah, 2024). Similarly, India, with its Digital India program, is not simply adopting Western technology, but emphasizing national data sovereignty. Brazil, through its social policies, presents a form of modernity that emphasizes the distribution of welfare, while South Africa seeks to articulate modernity through the discourse of Ubuntu, which emphasizes collectivity.

Although the discourse on the Global South is growing stronger, we must not turn a blind eye to the potential for fragmentation within it. As noted by (Shield, 2021), the term Global South often oversimplifies reality, given that countries included in this category have different political interests, economic orientations, and historical experiences. Differences in attitudes toward global issues, such as responses to the war in Ukraine or the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, demonstrate that solidarity within the Global South is not always linear or consistent. Therefore, when discussing alternative modernity from the Global South, it is important to avoid viewing it as a homogeneous bloc. It is precisely this internal diversity that needs to be taken into account so that the proposed standards of modernity do not lose their legitimacy or relevance.

In the context of policy design and cultural practices, (Fry, 2017) asserts that criticism of Eurocentrism is only the first step. What is more urgent is to build a knowledge ecosystem based on the needs, values, and local realities of communities in the Global South. This means that the Global South must develop a policy architecture that tangibly supports sovereignty standards, whether in the form of technology regulations, digital data governance, or development indicators that are more sensitive to social and environmental contexts. If the Global South has often been in a position of being determined by global actors, now is the time to move towards becoming an active actor that determines its own path, not only in discourse but also in institutional practice.

The concept of sustainment proposed by Fry (2017) is crucial to understanding the new direction of modernity in the Global South. Sustainment emphasizes the importance of maintaining a sustainable relationship between design, modernity, and the survival of the planet. This sustainment-based model of modernity opens up space for the Global South to offer new standards that differ from the Western model of extractive industrialization. Examples can be found in renewable energy programs in Africa that emphasize local community solutions, or in digital economy practices in Asia that expand women’s participation. The report (Aynaoui et al., 2023) also highlights that more and more Southern countries are beginning to link their development agendas to principles of social inclusivity and environmental sustainability, rather than solely economic growth.

Overall, the question “Can the Global South define its own standards of modernity?” can be answered with cautious optimism. There is ample empirical and conceptual evidence showing that Southern countries are moving towards a form of modernity that is more in line with local needs and values. However, significant obstacles remain, ranging from financial dependence on international financial institutions, technological dominance by developed countries, to global knowledge hegemony that places Western theories and experiences as the main benchmark.

Therefore, efforts to build a Global South version of modernity cannot stop at criticizing the West, but must be realized in the form of strong policy development, regulations that favor domestic interests, and an independent knowledge ecosystem. This challenge is also a great opportunity. If successful, the Global South can show that modernity does not have to mean imitating European or American models, but can arise from the historical experiences, cultures, and creativity of Southern societies themselves. In other words, modernity from the Global South has the potential to bring about new standards that are more inclusive, fair, and sustainable for the world.

 

[ Natasya Aulia is an Indonesian intern at COGGS and student of International Relations.]

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Global South’s Climate Challenges: Victim or Negotiator ?

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– Iftah Al Aqliyah

The biggest crisis of the twenty-first century is climate change and it threatens ecosystems, economies, and human security globally. The Global South, a broad term for nations in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Pacific, is experiencing this crisis severely over the past few decades. These nations suffer the most from the effects of climate change, including persistent droughts, devastating floods, sea-level rise, and increasing food insecurity, even though they emit least in the world. Because of this systemic disequilibrium, the Global South has historically been perceived as the “victim” of global warming and reliant on the technological and financial assistance of the Global North. New global climate diplomatic patterns, however, herald a change.Global South nations are becoming more proactive negotiators rather than passive recipients of aid, as seen in the establishment of the Loss and Damage Fund during COP27, the G77 + China’s braver step, and South-South cooperation taking shape. This article explores this ambivalence by examining the paradoxes and difficulties of the Global South’s dual role as a victim of global warming and a emerging new agenda-shaper in international climate negotiation.

Global South as the Victims

Even while the Global South contributes significantly less to global emissions than the Global North, they still face the brunt of the climate catastrophe.  In other areas, the influence is evident.  Food shortages, severe flooding, and protracted droughts are persistent issues in Sub-Saharan Africa, where most nations are classified as high vulnerability and low readiness.  While Bangladesh, India, and the Philippines are regularly struck by severe floods and tropical storms, small island nations like Tuvalu and the Maldives in South Asia and the Pacific face the prospect of submersion.  Similar circumstances exist in Latin America, where forest fires and deforestation increase climatic sensitivity and pose a health risk to the populace. The Germanwatch Climate Risk Index report ranks Pakistan, India, and the Philippines as the countries with the highest impact of extreme climate disasters in the last three decades.

Some social groups in the Global South are more severely impacted by climate change than others, in addition to being geographically vulnerable.  For instance, when disasters occur, women and children are more likely to lose access to food, healthcare, and education.  People with impairments and older individuals frequently encounter obstacles when trying to evacuate or get emergency help.  Meanwhile, when droughts or floods devastate agricultural land and essential infrastructure, disadvantaged communities and informal laborers are the first to lose their livelihoods.  According to a comprehensive assessment, these populations face socioeconomic disparities that worsen their circumstances in addition to physical harm.

However, the Global South remains a victim because to its weak capacity for adaptation.  According to Columbia University’s 2025 Global Climate Risk Index on Vulnerability and Access to Finance, two-thirds of the nations in the “red zone” category are in Africa and have little access to international adaptation funding.  Countries in the Global South are dependent on aid from the Global North and international organizations due to a lack of financial resources, poor technology, and a weak infrastructure for adaptation.  This demonstrates that their situation will continue to be impacted by the global climate problem in the absence of equitable support. Protest sign at climate change rally reading 'There is no Planet B'.

Global South as Negotiator

Despite its reputation as the most climate-vulnerable region, the Global South has changed from being a victim to an active participant in international climate diplomacy.  In international forums, this shift in role is particularly noticeable since the 2022 COP27 in Egypt.  The establishment of the Loss and Damage Fund, which acknowledges the historical responsibility of wealthier nations for the climate issue, was successfully pushed for at that gathering by countries in the Global South.  Because the voices of poor nations are now influencing the design of global climate policy for the first time, this achievement is regarded as a significant turning point.

Active engagement also strengthens negotiations. Diplomatic efforts by Global South countries in seeking climate justice and fairer access to funding are still led by the G77 + China. In addition, platforms such as the High-Level Global South Dialogue, to be held in 2025 from Marrakech to Belém, demonstrate the growing cross-regional coordination. As actors with the ability to steer international debate, Global South countries are not only addressing the impacts of climate change but also developing an agenda for a just energy transition. Additionally, South-South Cooperation (SSC) improves the Global South’s bargaining power outside of international venues.  Countries like South Africa, Brazil, and Indonesia actively contribute to the development of adaptation capability in their areas, whether it be through disaster management, renewable energy, or sustainable agriculture technologies. These programs demonstrate that the Global South is providing practical answers that can be implemented globally rather than only waiting for assistance.

In fact, developing nations are now using the Columbia Climate Vulnerability Index (2025) study as a guide when calling for more equitable access to international finance, demonstrating their capacity to employ technical tools to bolster their diplomatic stance. Through various active initiatives, the Global South has successfully demonstrated that it is not merely standing by and waiting for assistance, but is moving forward to fight for justice for vulnerable countries and promote a more equitable and sustainable transformation of global governance.

Despite the fact that the Global South’s participation in climate diplomacy is becoming more significant, several significant obstacles still limit its efficacy.  Since the interests of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) diverge from those of big developing nations like China, Brazil, or India, priorities and interests are a significant problem.  Furthermore, several nations face a conflict between their commitments to climate change and economic growth due to their reliance on extractive sectors like coal, oil, and palm oil.  Their negotiating position at the table is further weakened by limited access to foreign funds and adaption technologies.

 

Conclusion

Being both a victim and a negotiator puts the Global South in a precarious situation.  It is undoubtedly the most susceptible to the effects of climate change, but it is also increasingly influencing the structure of international climate diplomacy.  It is no longer a passive actor, as evidenced by its leadership in the Global South dialogue and the successful negotiation of the Loss and Damage Fund at COP27. But in order to be genuinely acknowledged as equal negotiators, the Global South must resolve its own issues, fortify regional unity, and make sure that climate diplomacy is implemented domestically. Whether the Global South can continue to hold this dual position as the foundation for the fight for global climate justice will have a significant impact on the direction of climate diplomacy in the future.

 

[ Iftah Al Aqliyah is an Intern at COGGS and student of International Relations, UPN Jawa Timur  Veteran University, Surabaya, Indonesia. Opinions expressed don’t necessarily reflect the views of COGGS.  ]

References

Adjani, W. K. (2022). Mapping Indonesia’s South-South triangular cooperation initiatives. Global South Review, 3(1), 59–78. https://doi.org/10.22146/globalsouth.64191

Columbia Climate School. (2025, June 25). Global Climate Risk Index ranks 188 countries by vulnerability and access to finance. Columbia University. https://news.climate.columbia.edu/2025/06/25/global-climate-risk-index-ranks-188-countries-by-vulnerability-and-access-to-finance/

Germanwatch. (2024). Global Climate Risk Index 2024. Germanwatch e.V. https://www.germanwatch.org/en/cri

Golding, J. (2023). COP27 and the new rise of the Global South. New England Journal of Public Policy, 35(2), Article 9. https://scholarworks.umb.edu/nejpp/vol35/iss2/9

Ngcamu, B. S. (2023). Climate change effects on vulnerable populations in the Global South: A systematic review. Natural Hazards, 118(2), 977–991. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-023-06070-2

Sono, D., Wei, Y., & Jin, Y. (2021). Assessing the climate resilience of Sub-Saharan Africa. Land, 10(1205), 1–15. https://doi.org/10.3390/land10121205

United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation. (2025, July 30). From Marrakech to Belém: High-level Global South dialogue amplifies Southern leadership in shaping the climate agenda. UNOSSC. https://unsouthsouth.org/2025/07/30/from-marrakech-to-belem-high%E2%80%91level-global-south-dialogue-amplifies-southern-leadership-in-shaping-the-climate-agenda/

Wuppertal Institute. (2024). From COP28 to COP29: Climate negotiations at a crossroads. Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy. https://wupperinst.org/en/a/wi/a/s/ad/9003/

Budiana, M. (2024). Climate change and international politics: Cooperation or conflict. Journal of Law, Social Sciences and Humanities, 6(2), 23–35. https://doi.org/10.5555/jlssh.2024.6.2

 

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What makes the SCO Resilient?

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The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has set a model for a new type of international relations, Chinese President Xi Jinping made the remarks while addressing the 25th Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the SCO in China’s Tianjin on September 1. The member states were the first to put forward the vision of global governance featuring extensive consultation and joint contribution for shared benefit as an effort to practice true multilateralism,  President Xi said.

Against protectionist headwinds, true multilateralism is what the international community has called for several times.Under this vision, the SCO’s remarkable development over 24 years has propelled it into a vital platform for regional security, economic collaboration, and international diplomacy, demonstrating a model of multilateralism rooted in mutual trust and respect.

“We were the first to conclude a treaty on long-term good-neighborliness, friendship and cooperation, proclaiming our commitment to forge lasting friendships and refrain from hostilities,” Xi added.

Over the past decades, the SCO has made substantial strides in fostering mutual political trust and safeguarding regional security. What was initially founded as a security group has evolved into a comprehensive organization representing a quarter of global GDP over the years.

China’s investment stock in other SCO member states has exceeded $84 billion, and its annual bilateral trade with other SCO member states has surpassed $500 billion. Chinese companies have established over 3,000 enterprises in other SCO member countries, generating an average of more than 200,000 employment opportunities annually, according to China’s Ministry of Commerce.

This year’s summit has further consolidated these gains, reaffirming the SCO as a stabilizing force amid turmoil.

Xi pledged to provide 2 billion yuan ($281 million) in grants to SCO member states this year. The country will also issue an additional 10 billion yuan ($1.4 billion) in loans to the member banks of the SCO Interbank Consortium over the next three years. Pragmatism is a key word that was stressed several times in Xi’s Monday remarks. This perhaps explains the SCO’s increasing popularity on the international arena.

It is worth noting that this year’s summit is the largest in SCO history, reflecting the organization’s expanding membership and influence. The organization has now expanded into a 26-nation family spanning Asia, Europe and Africa.

This growth enhances the SCO’s significance as an alternative model for regional cooperation compared to Western-dominated organizations.

The inclusion of diverse members underscores the SCO’s appeal as a platform where sovereignty and non-interference are respected while pursuing common goals of security, economic development, and cultural exchange. This adherence to core principles has made the SCO attractive to countries seeking balanced partnerships.

China, as a founding member, has proposed the Belt and Road Initiative, the SCO Interbank Consortium and others to strengthen this vision of a shared future.

Hosting the summit in Tianjin is a showcase of China’s commitment to leading a cooperative, multipolar world order. China, on several occasions, has clearly indicated its dedication to making the SCO not just a forum for dialogue but a substantive actor in global governance.

This set the tone for the summit’s agenda, aiming to chart the course for a high-quality, sustained partnership among member states. China’s focus on equality, mutual respect, and shared growth resonates within the SCO framework, enhancing the organization’s appeal and influence.

 

This year’s summit comes at a challenging time. But the SCO’s enhanced cooperation mechanisms and expanding appeal underscore its relevance in today’s multipolar world. The SCO Tianjin Summit has further cemented the organization’s role in fostering a stable, prosperous and interconnected region, embodying the enduring “Shanghai Spirit” and setting a precedent for the future of international cooperation.

[ This article is republished from CGTN’s First Voice  under a content syndication arrangement. The views expressed are those of CGTN.] 

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Europe and the Global South: A Maltese Perspective in a New Era of Conflict

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– Dr. Christian Cardona
Europe stands today at a turning point. The wars in Ukraine and Palestine have revealed more than just the fragility of its security architecture. they have exposed the erosion of Europe’s credibility. By defending sovereignty and international law in one conflict while appearing to ignore them in another, Europe has invited the charge of double standards. The Global South has noticed and, crucially, it is no longer content to remain silent.
The Global South is not the passive partner of yesterday. It is a dynamic bloc of states shaping trade, energy markets, and diplomatic agendas across the globe. In the UN, at the G20, and through coalitions like BRICS, the South is setting terms rather than merely receiving them. For Europe, this is not a challenge to be managed but a reality to which it must adapt. Without meaningful engagement, Europe risks isolation in a world that is increasingly multipolar.
For Malta, these shifts are not distant abstractions. Our geography places us at the crossroads of Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. regions where the strength of the Global South is already tangible. We see it in the growing assertiveness of African states demanding fairer migration and trade policies, in the energy partnerships that link the Mediterranean to the Gulf, and in the moral clarity with which Latin America and others speak about Palestine. The South is no longer waiting for Europe’s permission it is charting its own course.
Vibrant image of the Maltese flag waving proudly against a clear blue sky, showcasing Malta's national pride.
Prime Minister Robert Abela of Malta has rightly raised these realities within the European Council, urging Europe to move beyond selective morality and embrace a consistent vision of peace and security. Likewise, Foreign Minister Ian Borg has underlined that Malta’s diplomacy must be rooted in dialogue and neutrality, principles that give us credibiAdd a heading (1)lity as a bridge between continents.
But credibility is also undermined when Malta’s voice at the highest European level becomes indistinguishable from that of larger powers. Roberta Metsola, as President of the European Parliament, has too often served as an unquestioning mouthpiece for Brussels’ dominant interests. Her readiness to adopt strong positions on Ukraine while remaining hesitant, or silent, on Palestine reflects exactly the inconsistency that alienates the Global South. In moments of crisis, leadership demands independence and courage. To simply echo the agenda of the powerful is not leadership but abdication.
What Europe must now accept is that the Global South is not asking for recognition but is demanding it. Its collective economic power, demographic weight, and moral authority are reshaping the balance of the international system. Europe can either engage with this reality as an equal partner, or it can continue clinging to outdated hierarchies and watch its influence fade.

[ Agency is more important than Geography: Dr. Cardona on Global South at Global South Economic Forum 2025, Abu Dhabi, hosted by COGGS and AGDA] 

Malta understands this better than most. As a small state, we know that influence does not come from size but from credibility. And credibility today means consistency — consistency in upholding international law whether in Kiev or in Gaza, consistency in dialogue, and consistency in respecting the equal voice of the South. The wars of our time should be Europe’s wake-up call. A Europe that dismisses or lectures the Global South will be a Europe left behind.
[Dr. Cardona is former Economy Minister of Malta, International Trade Law Specialist and Advisor COGGS.  The views expressed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of COGGS.]

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