Syria: Reincarnation or Revision?

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Ayanangsha Maitra

◉ EMPTYING THE SMOKE from his mouth after a drag of his Marlboro cigarette, Mohammed Jalali, the $140-a-month salaried Prime Minister under Bashar al-Assad, asserted the Kurdish-oriented news outlet Rudaw that it was not the tumultuous 13-year war that ended the 54-year-old Al-Assad regime, but rather poverty and corruption. Ministers were receiving only $70 a month under Bashar Al-Assad’s autocracy, while government workers were paid a mere $20, creating an unbearable struggle for everyday life. A lightning rebel offensive in the dawn of December 8 changed the course of Syria’s fate, filling millions with euphoria and optimism. On the dawn of December 8, 2024,  Syrians were surprised to learn that their president of 24 years had sought refuge in Russia, which granted asylum to Assad and his family members. Two days after Assad’s departure, at current leader Al-Sharaa’s order, the Malboro loyalist and academia professional Mohammed Jalali  transferred the authority to Mohammed Bashir, establishing an interim government set to last until March 2025.

 

Ministry and the Men of Matches

Syria is now ruled by a hung power of multiple hardliners, drawing experiences from military warfare. De facto leader of the present time, Ahmed al-Sharaa, better known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the dominant force in the rebel alliance, spearheaded the lightning offensive that toppled Bashar al-Assad’s regime . An engineering graduate and gas industry veteran, Mohammed al-Bashir, is the man of his choice to install as interim Prime Minister. Sharaa’s general, Murhaf Abu Qasra,  is appointed to head the Defense Ministry. Once a hardcore Islamist leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa has rizzed several  Western and Arab state-leaders or diplomats. In less than a month, the HTS-led government has established formal diplomatic relations with nearly 30 countries.

Test & Trials ahead Sharaa

Spiraling inflation, a plummeting currency, and, moreover, crippling fuel shortages present the new government with its most pressing challenges, in addition to the need to restore stability and facilitate the return of millions of refugees.

Typically, a regime change leads to a currency devaluation, but Syria’s situation is an exception. Following Assad’s downfall, the country saw an influx of dollars—not only from areas that had previously been under rebel control, but also from the surge of foreign entities and organizations entering Syria.

Economy, Life & Consumption

Syria’s economic crisis, already dire before the onset of civil war in 2011, has worsened tragically. The World Bank’s 2022 data estimated the country’s economy at just $23.63 billion. The economic squeeze has been exacerbated by a stream of interconnected crises, including regional instability, international sanctions, domestic mismanagement, and of course the last devastating earthquake.  The humanitarian crisis in Syria is staggering, with over 16 million Syrians—roughly 70% of the population—now in urgent need of assistance. Nearly 90% of the population lives under poverty.

In the year 2024, World Food Programme (WFP) has provided aid to over 1 million individuals in Syria. In 2023, prior to funding cuts that led to the suspension of its General Food Assistance program, WFP was supporting 5.5 million people. Looking ahead, the organization is seeking US$250 million to help 2.8 million people in 2025. 

Syria’s Reincarnation

In the wake of World War I, the Ottoman Empire gave way to a new order, and France, was entrusted with a mandate over the northern expanse of the former Ottoman province of Syria. For nearly three decades, French rule sought to reshape the land, its people, and its governance, until, in 1946, Syria achieved her long-sought independence. In 1958, amidst a wave of pan-Arab fervor, the country entered into an ambitious alliance with Egypt, forming the short-lived United Arab Republic (UAR). But the two divorced from the union ultimately in 1961.

 

Syria’s social fabric is a mosaic, with Arabs comprising around 50% of the population, followed by significant minorities including Alawites at approximately 15%, Kurds at 10%, Levantine, and others. Under Sharaa, Syria got  her pace faster and several humanitarian agencies and western authorities are expected to come.

Ethnographic Map of Syria

 

 

                                                     ◉ In an interview with COGGS, Giorgio Cafiero, CEO of Gulf State Analytics and Adjunct Professor of Georgetown University opined that policymakers in Washington are excited that Syria is now drifting apart from Iran but how they will rule it remains a concern for them. UN Special Envoy for Syria Geir O Pedersen – while briefing to the Security Council on 8 January 2025, mentioned political transition as unclear. “We are ready to work with the caretaker authorities on how the nascent and important ideas and steps so far articulated and initiated could be developed towards a credible and inclusive political transition,” he stated further.

 

 

Before the civil war escalated in 2011, Syria was exporting 380,000 barrels per day (bpd) of oil, a key source of hard-currency revenue. However, this revenue stream vanished after the war broke out. Syria’s economic decline accelerated in 2019 when Lebanon, historically a vital economic partner, entered its own financial collapse. The once-robust economic ties between the two nations—spanning trade, banking, and remittances—disintegrated, depriving Syria of a crucial lifeline. In response, the current Syrian government introduced multiple exchange rates in a desperate attempt to regulate foreign currency flows and protect the remaining hard currency reserves.

Since the onset of the civil war in 2011, Syria’s dependence on oil imports has grown sharply, primarily relying on Iran to meet its dwindling domestic consumption needs. The country’s demand for oil has plummeted from 305,000 barrels per day (b/d) in 2010 to a mere 163,000 b/d in 2024, reflecting the profound toll the conflict has taken on Syria’s economy. Once a relatively self-sufficient producer, Syria’s oil output has drastically fallen from nearly 400,000 b/d before the war to just around 20,000 b/d today. Iraq could not supply because of Washington’s red-eye.

[Baniyas, Syria’s largest oil refinery located in the northwest part of the war-torn nation.]
Syria’s oil infrastructure has also been severely impacted by the ongoing conflict. The country operates two refineries, one in Banias with a capacity of 120,000 b/d and another in Homs, capable of processing 107,100 b/d. However, due to extensive damage and a sharp decline in demand since the war’s eruption, both refineries are functioning far below their potential. As a result, Syria has become increasingly reliant on external sources, particularly Iran, to sustain its oil supply. Iran alone owed around $30 billion for its continued support. Reportage indicates that the new Syrian government has no intention of settling the debts incurred during the Assad era. Instead, it has asserted that Iran owes Syria $300 billion for the damage caused by its forces in the country.

Syria’s financial system remains precariously fragile. Current foreign currency reserves are very little, with only about $200 million held in the central bank, along with 26 tonnes of gold, which, at current market rates, is worth roughly $2.2 billion, according to Reuters. However, the country faces a massive shortage of liquidity due to severe sanctions and the freezing of Syrian assets abroad. Western governments, seeking to pressure the Assad regime, have frozen hundreds of millions of dollars in assets in countries ranging from Switzerland to the UK. According to Swiss authorities, around 99 million Swiss francs ($112 million) in Syrian assets are currently frozen in Switzerland, while the Syria Report newsletter estimated the UK holds some $205.76 million in frozen Syrian funds, as reported by Reuters.

Beyond the issue of frozen assets, the broader trade picture remains grim. The Syrian economy has been hit by a catastrophic collapse in both exports and imports. Exports, once a major source of revenue, have plunged from $18.4 billion in 2010 to just $1.8 billion in 2021. This is largely due to the destruction of oil fields, electricity, finance mechanism, supply chain, loss of tourist income, and the disruptions caused by ongoing conflict. At the same time, Syria’s imports—especially vital food and fuel—have remained a key economic burden. Despite falling imports overall, from $22.7 billion in 2010 to $6.5 billion in 2021, the country still struggles with shortages in basic goods, as the state remains heavily reliant on imported fuel and food, with limited foreign exchange to cover these costs. Inflation rates are astronomical, with the Syrian pound plummeting against the dollar, and unemployment has skyrocketed.  Al Sharaa’s swift transition and reformist approach are promising signs, yet these two aspects remain under scrutiny, and are not entirely free from suspicion. Economic recovery is  nearly impossible without significant international investment and support. 

While the international community’s sanctions were intended to pressure the Assad regime, those sanctions have had a catastrophic effect on the general population. Syria’s economy, in its current state, has become one of the most isolated and impoverished in the world. As international support remains scarce and reconstruction efforts stalled, the country’s future depends on the nature, style and module of the leadership.

Russia’s role as a key wheat supplier has been impacted by the departure of Bashar al-Assad, and the US has shown little interest in re-engaging diplomatically with Damascus, especially with its embassy operations suspended since 2012. Meanwhile, Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia have expressed a willingness to provide energy assistance. Ankara will be a partner in reconstruction too. The status of HTS, considered a “foreign terrorist organization” by the EU, Turkey, and the US, continues to be a contentious issue, with Syrian officials like Sharaa urging the West to reconsider its designation. As the scenes in Damascus changes fast, with the region hosting diverse ethnic groups, both the US and the EU have signaled they will wait to see the policies of the new Syrian government before making decisions.

Syria faces urgent needs for investment and comprehensive restructuring across her financial, banking, energy and alternative energy, and transportation sectors. Private sector is the enabling factor of socio-economics.  Beijing’s cautious approach and calculated steps focused on loans for infrastructure without the involvement of the US, EU, or Gulf states, will redifine the diplomacy in the region and the geo-economics in broader sense. Syria has been reborn multiple times throughout its history, but now is the moment to build a promised future for its compatriots—bringing home the 15 million displaced individuals to reclaim their sense of belonging. As the Sharaa-led hung power seeks to rebuild Syria, it stands at a crossroads, where new alliances may form and long-standing bilateral relationships may be renegotiated. Damascus under Sharaa- the man of the moment, exploring the “wisdom of Idlib” and the shifting regional realities, will likely pave a path shaped by these changing factors. The extent of the incumbent’s inclusivity, the nature of its accommodation, and the type of liberal market it will embrace—these are questions that spark both curiosity and concern. Yet, above all, Syria must finally be a place for Syrians.

 

[ Cover illustration : COGGS ] 

 

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Indonesia’s Quest for Influence: Bridging Indo-Pacific and Global South | COGGS|

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Balaji Chandramohan

Being one of the foremost economic players in the Southeast Asia, Indonesia holds a significant role in the Global South and plays an increasingly significant part in the Indo-Pacific region’s geopolitics. Its strategic location, at the intersection of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, has positioned it as a key player not only in regional dynamics but also on the global stage.

Indonesia’s Geo-Strategic Importance

Indonesia occupies a vital geo-strategic location in the Indo-Pacific, connecting Asia to the Southern Hemisphere and controlling crucial maritime routes. The country straddles two significant regions—the Indian Ocean and the South-west Pacific—making it a central hub for global trade routes. The Strait of Malacca, one of the busiest and most important maritime passages in the world, runs through its territory, emphasizing Indonesia’s importance in maintaining regional stability.

24 Sea Ports on Indonesia.

Strategic Impact of Indonesia’s Location

Indonesia’s location enhances its geopolitical significance, as it governs key sea lanes vital for global shipping and energy transportation. This proximity to vital maritime chokepoints has prompted Indonesia to reframe its security strategy, focusing on maritime defense and becoming a key player in Indo-Pacific security.

Indonesia’s Evolving Maritime Strategy

In response to the evolving Indo-Pacific security landscape, Indonesia has shifted its defense focus toward maritime security. The country has unveiled a new maritime doctrine, signaling a departure from its previous inward-facing security approach.

Modernizing Indonesia’s Navy
As part of this shift, Indonesia has initiated a naval modernization plan to expand its capabilities and assert its presence in the Indo-Pacific. The plan includes the creation of a ‘green-water’ navy, with a target of 274 naval ships by 2024. This ambitious project is Indonesia’s most significant naval expansion in over four decades, aiming to enhance its maritime defense and regional influence.

Indonesia’s Growing Diplomatic and Strategic Influence
Indonesia’s maritime strategy is also supported by its growing diplomatic outreach. The country’s enhanced profile in the Indo-Pacific region has prompted it to broaden its diplomatic initiatives and strengthen ties with key players in the region and beyond.

Indonesia’s Role in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy

Indonesia in IndoPacific. Courtesy: X https://x.com/marc_saxer/status/1764861807095926836

Indonesia is becoming increasingly important in the United States’ pivot to the Indo-Pacific, serving as a crucial partner in the region’s balance of power. The country is considered a “gateway” between Eurasia and Australia, regions with growing influence in the Global South.

Indonesia’s expanding diplomatic network and strategic importance reflect its ambition to become a major player in regional geopolitics, with a focus on strengthening relationships within the Global South.

Economic Growth and Maritime Reach


Indonesia’s economic trajectory has supported its growing geopolitical role. Following significant reforms during the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2009), Indonesia has experienced robust economic growth, driven by a rising domestic consumption and increasing commodity exports such as palm oil, copper, and rubber. These reforms have not only enhanced Indonesia’s economic standing but also facilitated its maritime expansion.

Economic Reforms and Strong Growth
Indonesia’s economic reforms—including improvements in tax systems, customs, and fiscal management—set the foundation for continued growth. This robust economic performance positions Indonesia as a rising power in the Indo-Pacific, capable of investing in strategic areas such as defense modernization and military expansion.

Indonesia’s Defense Modernization and Military Expansion
To ensure its continued strategic relevance, Indonesia has embarked on an ambitious plan to modernize its armed forces. As part of the 2010 Strategic Defence Plan, Indonesia aimed to develop a minimum essential force by 2024, enhancing both its navy and air force. Indonesia has finalized a $300 million agreement to acquire 12 ANKA drones from Turkey, with deliveries scheduled for late 2025. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense has recently signed a contract with France’s Thales for the purchase of long-range military radar, a deal expected to include technology transfer and the enhancement of Indonesian personnel’s skills. However, Indonesia spends less than 1 percent of its GDP on defense, a stark contrast to Singapore, which allocates around 3 percent of its GDP despite being a smaller country.

Strengthening Indonesia’s Military Capabilities
Indonesia’s military modernization efforts include the development of a modernized navy, submarines, and combat aircraft. By increasing its defense budget and focusing on strategic areas, Indonesia is working to position itself as a major maritime power in the Indo-Pacific. These upgrades will allow Indonesia to project its influence and contribute to regional security.

Indonesia’s Future Role in Global Geopolitics
Looking ahead, Indonesia is poised to become an even more influential geo-political player in the 21st century. The country’s evolving maritime strategy and defense capabilities will solidify its position as a key partner in efforts to maintain regional stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Indonesia’s Role in the Global South

As a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement, Indonesia’s growing maritime and economic influence provides it with a unique opportunity to strengthen its role in the Global South. The country’s evolving defense capabilities and strategic alliances will further cement its position as a crucial player in the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.

In conclusion, Indonesia’s strategic outreach reflects its ambitions to solidify its position within the Global South. With a growing maritime capability, expanding economic influence, and evolving defense strategy, Indonesia is positioning itself as a key actor in the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region. As the country continues to modernize its military and strengthen its diplomatic efforts, it is poised to become a central force in shaping the future of the Indo-Pacific and contributing to global stability.

[ Balaji Chandramohan is a Chennai, India based geopolitical analyst and former visiting fellow with Future Directions International, Australia. The views expressed in this article do not reflect those of COGGS.]

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Trump’s 100 % Tariffs Threat on De-dollarization: What Means for Global South

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In a X-post on December 1, US President-elect Donald Trump issued a stark warning that he would impose 100% tariffs on the BRICS nations—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—should they attempt to establish a currency rivaling the U.S. dollar. Trump’s threat to use tariffs as a blunt instrument against economic shifts highlights his longstanding preference for trade protectionism as a tool for economic growth. Throughout his presidency, Trump advocated tariffs as a mechanism to bolster domestic industries, create jobs, and increase government revenue. However, the consequences of such measures, including increased costs for U.S. consumers, have raised questions about their long-term effectiveness. As BRICS nations seek alternatives to the U.S. dollar, the dynamics surrounding dollar dominance are evolving—an issue that warrants a more sophisticated approach than simply retaliatory tariffs.

In a panel discussion convened by COGGS, Ambassador Anil Trigunayat, advisor at COGGS, delivered a penetrating analysis of the currency dynamics redefining the global financial system, highlighting how ongoing international conflicts, notably the war in Ukraine, are driving shifts in global trade patterns and currency preferences, with particular implications for the Global South.

I. The Ripple Effects of Global Conflicts

The COGGS discussion begins with the broader context of international conflict, notably the war in Ukraine. This conflict has catalyzed a series of disruptive economic measures, including the expulsion of Russia from the SWIFT international payment system and the seizure of Russian assets by Western powers. Such actions underscore how global conflicts are increasingly shaping economy, particularly for nations that find themselves sidelined by Western economic sanctions. As countries like Russia, China, and others in the Global South are excluded from established financial networks, they are turning to alternative means of trade and finance.

One of the key consequences of these disruptions is the weaponization of commodities like energy, food, and fertilizer. This development  has disrupted global supply chains and intensified inflationary pressures worldwide. In response, nations are rethinking their reliance on the U.S. dollar, exploring alternatives such as bilateral trade agreements in local currencies. These changes, while incremental, signal a growing willingness to explore alternative financial systems that could reduce vulnerability to external pressures.

II. De-dollarization and the Rise of National Currencies

Central to COGGS’s discussion is the trend of de-dollarization—an ongoing shift away from the U.S. dollar as the dominant medium of global trade. Countries like India, Russia, and China have increasingly turned to their own national currencies in bilateral transactions, reducing reliance on the dollar. For example, India has signed trade agreements with over 20 countries, while Russia and China conduct the bulk of their $200 billion trade in their respective currencies, the ruble and the renminbi. These efforts are not an attempt to replace the dollar outright but to diversify the global financial system and reduce exposure to risks associated with U.S. monetary policy and sanctions.

This trend has accelerated in part due to a desire for greater economic autonomy, especially among nations in the Global South. By trading in their own currencies or using digital currencies, these countries are seeking to insulate themselves from the adverse effects of external economic policies. However, despite this growing momentum, the dollar remains entrenched as the primary global reserve currency, holding between 70-80% of global reserve assets. Any meaningful transition away from dollar dominance will be gradual and will require systemic adjustments on a global scale.

A dollar bill imprisoned in a decorative cage symbolizing financial confinement.

III. Challenges to the Dollar’s Dominance

Although the U.S. dollar remains dominant, the current financial architecture is showing signs of strain. The dollar’s position is not easily challenged, as it is deeply embedded in global trade, finance, and banking systems. The dollar’s dominance, however, is increasingly being questioned by countries that perceive it as a tool of U.S. geopolitical power. For many nations, the reliance on the dollar presents both economic and strategic risks—particularly in light of the volatility introduced by U.S. sanctions and the shifting global balance of power.

Nevertheless, the global shift away from the dollar will not happen overnight. These transitions are more about creating options rather than directly supplanting the dollar. While many Western media outlets frame these efforts as a direct challenge to U.S. hegemony, they are more a reflection of the changing priorities of the Global South, which is seeking greater flexibility and resilience in its trade and financial dealings.

IV. The Global South’s Position

For nations in the Global South, the motivation to reduce reliance on the U.S. dollar stems from a desire for greater economic sovereignty. Over-dependence on the dollar has made these countries vulnerable to the whims of U.S. monetary policy and economic sanctions, which can have disproportionate impacts on smaller economies. In this context, alternatives like national currencies or digital currencies offer a means of mitigating these vulnerabilities.

Global South is not necessarily seeking to isolate itself from the U.S. dollar. Rather, it is looking for a more diversified financial system that provides greater autonomy and reduces the risks associated with a single currency system. The U.S. should reconsider its reliance on punitive measures, such as tariffs, to preserve dollar dominance. Instead, the U.S. might benefit from engaging in a more collaborative dialogue with other nations about how to adapt to the evolving global economic landscape.

V. A New Currency Order?

The global economic system is in a period of flux, with shifting trade relationships and growing efforts to create alternative financial structures. In future, there will be an effective multipolar economic system – where multiple currencies and trade mechanisms will coexist. This shift, however, will be gradual and complex. The U.S. dollar, while no longer as unassailable as it once was, is unlikely to be completely displaced in the near future. Instead, the global financial system will likely evolve to incorporate a more diversified set of tools, where countries have greater freedom to choose their preferred methods of trade and finance.

 

 

The ongoing erosion of dollar dominance is a response not only to geopolitical conflicts but also to the inherent limitations of a financial system that disproportionately benefits certain nations. The transition towards a more diverse economic order will take time and negotiation.  But it’s clear that the world is moving toward a system where the U.S. dollar is no longer the sole arbiter of global finance. Trump’s threat to impose punitive tariffs on BRICS nations is emblematic of the U.S.’s protectionist stance, but it may miss the larger point: the global financial system is undergoing a transformation. As countries seek alternatives to the U.S. dollar, the U.S. must adapt to a changing world order. This process will be neither quick nor straightforward, but the outcome will undoubtedly reshape the global economic order in the years to come.

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How Central Asia is Becoming a Key Player in Global South?

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Balaji Chandramohan

Central Asia, situated at the crossroads of the Middle East and South Asia, was historically a key battleground in the Great Game between Asia and Europe throughout much of the 19th and 20th centuries. In the 21st century, it has gained significant geostrategic importance, particularly within the Global South.

In 2001, China, Russia, and four Central Asian countries formed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a countermeasure to limit Western influence in the region. India and Pakistan joined the SCO in 2017, further expanding its significance.

The SCO has grown in relevance for both Russia and China as their relations with the West have deteriorated. Experts argue that the potential of the SCO cannot be underestimated, despite the existence of other prominent regional and multinational forums such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), the G20, and the G7.

 

Colorful pushpins marking locations on a detailed map of Central Asia.

Iran’s inclusion as a full member of the SCO will strengthen the organization’s energy portfolio but is likely to provoke anger in Western capitals. As the SCO becomes more aligned against Western-led forums, India may find it increasingly challenging to strike a diplomatic balance between its various global partners.

Nonetheless, India is confident in maintaining an independent foreign policy without aligning exclusively with any one group. How New Delhi manages its diplomacy—particularly its relations with Russia, China, and Pakistan—will influence the future trajectory of the SCO.

To begin with, Russia, India’s longstanding ally, seems supportive of India’s ambition to link South and Central Asia through Iran, bypassing Pakistan. India will also work with Iran to complete this project, which will foster closer economic ties between Central Asia, Moscow, and New Delhi.

This policy suggests that Moscow is prepared to support India’s ambitions in Central Asia, at least diplomatically (though not militarily). Russia’s soft power in Central Asia is increasingly seen as a valuable countermeasure against China’s expanding diplomatic and military influence in the region.

On the other hand, Central Asia is considered China’s western periphery, and Beijing has strategically developed oil and gas pipelines connecting to the region, including routes to Kazakhstan and the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline.

Moscow is aware of China’s growing influence in the Central Asian republics, particularly through the SCO and bilateral agreements in the energy sector.

Furthermore, Afghanistan and Pakistan, both neighboring China and maintaining strong political ties with Beijing, are increasingly attuned to China’s role in mediating conflicts, such as between Saudi Arabia and Iran, as well as in the Ukraine crisis. Both nations have heightened expectations of China, and the trilateral meeting in Islamabad signaled their growing confidence in China’s diplomatic role.

Notably, Moscow and Beijing have increased their dealings with Kabul, short of formally recognizing the Taliban government, which has led to greater comfort in Central Asia toward aligning with the Global South.

Russia, Central Asian states, and China share a common perception of existential threats posed by terrorism and religious extremism, a longstanding concern of the US. This shared threat has fostered cooperation to prevent the US from establishing basing facilities in the region or allowing the Afghan Resistance (Panjshir) to use Central Asia as a sanctuary for further conflict.

Debating Central Asia’s credentials as part of the Global South offers significant academic value in at least two ways. First, it encourages scholars to revisit and rethink the region’s post-Cold War trajectory.

While Central Asia may be an uneasy fit for the Global South, it provides an appropriate framework to discuss the region’s historical and present-day significance. Viewing Central Asia as part of the Global South can shed new light on the nuances, richness, and conceptual limits of the Global South itself.

The region’s unique geographical position and its historical connections to the Silk Trade Routes have been crucial in shaping Central Asia’s geopolitical role, solidifying its place within the Global South.

These ancient routes, which connected the East and West, facilitated the exchange of people, goods, and ideas between Europe and the Far East, profoundly shaping the region’s cultural, economic, and political landscape, even when it was part of the Soviet Union.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to the independence of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—five Central Asian countries that have made significant strides in political transformation, modernization, and economic growth.

Russia-Ukraine Conflict and Central Asia

Central Asia has become increasingly significant in global geopolitics, especially due to the escalating Russia-Ukraine conflict. This conflict has attracted the attention of regional and global powers, all seeking to expand their influence in the region, thereby impacting Central Asia’s economic, political, and security dynamics.

The Russia-Ukraine crisis, which began in 2022, has had a profound effect on the economic and political landscape of Central Asian countries. For example, the energy sector has faced significant supply chain disruptions. Additionally, the economic sanctions imposed on Russia by Western countries have had a ripple effect, adversely impacting the economies of Central Asian nations that are heavily dependent on Russia.

The withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan created a vacuum in terms of Western influence, which Western countries quickly sought to fill, often overlooking the concept of the Global South.

Conversely, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has reignited Western interest in the region. A key moment was the summit in September 2023, where all five Central Asian heads of state met with US President Biden for the first time. This was the first summit-level meeting between the US and Central Asia, symbolizing a renewed engagement.

Regarding India, the past decade has seen significant developments in its relationship with Central Asia. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to all five Central Asian countries in 2015 marked a milestone, reinforcing India’s commitment to the Global South.

India views a stable and integrated Central Asia as part of its “extended neighborhood,” crucial for both security and economic interests.

In January 2022, India hosted the inaugural India-Central Asia Summit, further solidifying political ties. Indian Foreign Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar framed this relationship around the “4Cs”—commerce, capacity building, connectivity, and contacts—each of which strengthens India’s engagement with the Global South.

Meanwhile, global geopolitical transformations have sparked renewed interest in the Global South. As the US struggles to maintain its superpower status, China’s expanding economic and political influence and Russia’s challenge to the international order through its invasion of Ukraine have elevated discussions on the Global South’s role in global affairs.

These tensions have sparked debates about the credibility of the Western order and the growing influence of emerging powers. The economic, financial, and industrial development patterns of the Global South raise questions about whether its elites will challenge the existing global capitalist order or seek to revise it by shifting their positions and influence within the system.

Though discussions on the world order and the role of the Global South have been ongoing for decades, China’s assertive ambitions and Russia’s actions in Ukraine have given rise to new narratives about the role of the Global South in geopolitics.

In Europe, Russian aggression has fostered unprecedented unity and highlighted the need to diversify strategic needs in areas such as energy, military, industry, and technology.

Moscow has expressed dissatisfaction over the lack of support from the Global South during the sanctions imposed on Russia. Many countries in the Global South have trust issues with the West and question the likelihood of receiving help from Western powers when needed. As a result, they advocate for neutrality and demonstrate “strategic autonomy.” This situation aligns with Russia’s global ambitions.

It is understood that the US is capitalizing on the geopolitical challenges posed by Russia’s aggression, using them to undermine the credibility of the Global South. By advocating for Russia’s weakening, the US aims to recalibrate its political strategy while strengthening relations with Global South allies.

In this context, the growing attention to the Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions, enhanced engagement with ASEAN countries, India’s push to position itself as the leader of the Global South, and the rise of the Indo-Pacific security agenda all emphasize the participation of the Global South. Similarly, countries in Latin America are gaining increased attention as key players in the Global South, with all major global powers—China, Russia, the EU, India, and the USA—intensifying their focus on this region.

In this environment, Central Asian countries are eager to strengthen their geopolitical position and align more closely with the growing influence of the Global South.

[ Balaji Chandramohan is a Chennai, India based geopolitical analyst and former visiting fellow with Future Directions International, Australia. The views expressed in this article do not reflect those of COGGS.]

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China’s Dollar Gambit: Subtle Shift in Global Financial Power

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Mohammed Saqib

In a significant move, China’s issuance of $2 billion in USD-denominated sovereign bonds in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, has generated considerable attention for its implications. While modest in size, the bond issuance has indicated China’s potential to challenge U.S. financial dominance. This strategic manoeuvre has captured the attention of financial analysts and policymakers alike, highlighting China’s growing influence in the international monetary system, and posing potential challenges to the longstanding dominance of the U.S. Treasury market.

The bond issue attracted extraordinary demand and oversubscribed nearly 20 times to over $40 billion. This level of interest far surpasses typical U.S. Treasury auctions, which usually oversubscribe between 2x to 3x. Such robust investor confidence indicates strong market appeal for China’s dollar-denominated debt, positioning China as a formidable contender in the global bond market.

One of the most striking aspects of this bond is its interest ratClose-up of US and China flags with US dollar bills, representing international trade and finance.e. China’s bonds were priced just 1-3 basis points (0.01-0.03 %) above U.S. Treasury rates, enabling China to borrow in U.S. dollars at nearly the same cost as the U.S. government. This narrow spread is unprecedented for a non-U.S. sovereign issuer. Typically, even countries with top-tier credit ratings pay a premium of 10 to 20 basis points over U.S. Treasuries when issuing USD bonds. This achievement highlights China’s improved creditworthiness and growing appeal to global investors.

The choice of Saudi Arabia as the venue for this bond issuance is especially noteworthy. Traditionally, sovereign bonds are issued in major financial hubs such as New York, London, or Hong Kong. By opting for Riyadh, China strategically positions itself within the core of the petrodollar system—a financial framework historically dominated by the United States. This move allows China to manage dollar liquidity directly within a crucial market, offering Saudi Arabia an alternative avenue for investing its substantial USD reserves outside U.S. Such diversification not only benefits Saudi Arabia but also deepens China’s integration into the global financial infrastructure.

The implications of China’s successful bond issuance extend beyond immediate financial metrics. If China continues to scale this initiative, it could become a significant competitor to the U.S. Treasury in the global dollar bond market. This competition has the potential to create a parallel system where China influences the flow of dollars worldwide, thereby diverting funds away from U.S. Treasury bonds. For the United States, which relies heavily on selling Treasuries to finance its substantial deficits, this could pose serious financing challenges and erode the “exorbitant privilege” that has long been a cornerstone of U.S. economic power.

China’s strategy could also be linked to its expansive Belt & Road Initiative (BRI). With over 140 countries participating in the BRI, many of these nations hold significant USD-denominated debts to Western lenders. China’s ability to issue USD bonds provides a mechanism to assist these countries in refinancing their existing debts. In exchange, China can secure repayments in yuan, strategic resources, or through other bilateral agreements. This approach not only helps China manage its USD surplus but also reduces dependency on the U.S. dollar within the BRI network, thereby extending China’s economic influence on a global scale.

The United States faces a challenge from China’s financial actions. Using traditional methods, like sanctions, could lower confidence in the safety of dollar assets. This might lead investors to move away from the U.S. dollar. Raising interest rates to make U.S. Treasuries more appealing could also raise the government’s borrowing costs, making the deficit situation worse. Taking stronger actions, like limiting China’s access to dollar transactions, might split the global financial system and reduce the dollar’s role as the main reserve currency.

China’s bond issuance represents a strategic opportunity for the international community, particularly for the incoming U.S. administration. By successfully issuing competitive USD-denominated bonds with low costs, China is effectively showcasing its financial capabilities and enhancing its strategic options. The United States may find it beneficial to reexamine its relationship with China, recognizing the importance of adapting to evolving global financial dynamics. This could also signal the dawn of a new and constructive phase in international monetary relations.

[Mohammed Saqib is the Convenor of Center of Geoeconomics for the Global South]

China’s Dollar Gambit: Subtle Shift in Global Financial Power Read Post »

BRICS and IBSA: Contrasting Approaches to the World Order?

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Balaji Chandramohan

BRICS is an intergovernmental organization comprising nine countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates, while IBSA is a unique forum bringing together India, Brazil, and South Africa. These two organizations present different and sometimes conflicting approaches to the international system. A major obstacle to permanent cooperation within BRICS is the lack of similarity among its member countries.

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Brazil is a regional power in South America, Russia is a great power in Eurasia, India is a great power in the Asia-Pacific, China is a rising superpower, and South Africa is a regional power in Africa, at best. What these countries have in common is their dissatisfaction with the current international order, which is dominated by Western powers, particularly the United States. Even in India, which views China as its primary threat, there is significant domestic opposition to the values promoted by the West and the United States, even in the second decade of the 21st century.

However, it remains uncertain whether these countries can form a cohesive alternative to the international system. Each of them continues to rely on the United States to balance against threats within their respective regions—a strategy that has historically worked in Washington’s favor since the late 19th century. Brazil seeks American support in its regional struggle for hegemony against Argentina. Russia finds it difficult to accept China’s growing influence in Central Asia and the Middle East, as does India in South and Southeast Asia. Similarly, South Africa’s position in Africa is threatened by China’s growing presence on the continent, with the latter’s disregard for human rights also being a point of contention for both Brazil and South Africa.

There is also a risk that BRICS could evolve into a platform primarily promoting China’s foreign policy, just as Moscow uses a variety of interregional cooperative bodies to further its own goals. If this occurs, the legitimacy of the organization could be jeopardized, and the remaining members may need to reconsider their involvement.

Brazil, on the other hand, has the potential to become a global player. The problem, however, is that Brasília has not yet clearly defined its grand strategic vision. Bolsonaro’s foreign policy choices, for example, remain uncertain. Rather than propelling Brazil toward a new global status, they may instead harm its international reputation.

IBSA, by contrast, is a forum bringing together India, Brazil, and South Africa—three large democracies and major economies from different continents, all facing similar challenges. These countries are developing, pluralistic, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and multi-religious nations. The forum was formalized on June 6, 2003, when the foreign ministers of the three countries met in Brasília and issued the Brasília Declaration. India is currently the IBSA Chair.

Earlier, India held the IBSA Chair in 2021 under the theme “Democracy for Demography and Development.” Meanwhile, Brazil assumed the rotating presidency of the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) on March 2, 2023, marking 20 years since the forum’s establishment. Brazil’s presidency is expected to strengthen IBSA’s three strategic pillars: political coordination, trilateral cooperation, and collaboration with other developing countries through the IBSA Fund.

IBSA was founded as a coordinating mechanism among three emerging countries with democratic credentials, social diversity, and global capacity. The grouping is committed to addressing social inequalities within its borders and expanding its influence on global issues. Its principles are rooted in participatory democracy, respect for human rights, and adherence to the rule of law in the international system. A shared vision between the three countries emphasizes that democracy and development are mutually reinforcing and key to sustainable peace and stability.

Unlike BRICS, IBSA has no headquarters or permanent executive secretariat, maintaining a flexible and open structure. It focuses on concrete projects of cooperation with less developed countries, aiming to strengthen ties and contribute to the construction of a new international system.

Brazil’s current grand strategic vision is influenced by the rise of Asia and Africa, alongside a rethinking of the 20th-century geopolitical boundaries that separated different sub-regions. Brazil is particularly focused on expanding its influence in Africa and, if possible, in Asia.

In pursuit of this vision, Brazil has engaged in strategic partnerships with major Asian powers. One such initiative is a long-discussed railway project that would link Brazil’s Atlantic coast to ports on the Pacific via the Andes—the world’s longest continental mountain range. This project could become part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with Brazil offering a shortcut for commodities and goods to bypass the Panama Canal.

Brazil’s reach into Africa and Asia is also supported by its historical ties with Portuguese-speaking countries like Angola, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Timor-Leste. Brazil’s involvement in Africa is further supported by its South American School of Defense (ESUDE) and military cooperation with African nations, such as Cape Verde and Namibia.

In terms of maritime power, Brazil’s vast coastline (7,491 km) and its continental depth offer strategic advantages similar to those of the United States. Brazil’s growing economic clout and geopolitical position are expected to drive its strategic expansion into Africa and the wider Indo-Pacific. This ambition is underscored by naval modernization and a focus on regional structures like Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance.

These developments are expected to influence both BRICS and IBSA. While South Africa also seeks to assert its role in the Global South, India and Brazil, both members of BRICS and IBSA, stand to benefit significantly from these forums. In the changing international system, Brazil is likely to challenge the United States’ Monroe Doctrine in Latin America and the Global South. India, in turn, will likely align more closely with Brazil to improve its strategic outreach in the Global South and the Western Hemisphere.

Ultimately, both BRICS and IBSA will benefit India and Brazil, even with their differing approaches to the international system. Their cooperation in these forums could prove to be a game-changer, despite the dichotomous approaches of both organizations.

[ Balaji Chandramohan is a Chennai, India based geopolitical analyst and former visiting fellow with Future Directions International, Australia]

BRICS and IBSA: Contrasting Approaches to the World Order? Read Post »

New Era, New Solutions: COGGS Proposes 5 Points at Global Thinkers Dialogue

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In his lecture at the Plenary session of the Second Global South Think Tanks Dialogue in Nanjing, east China’s Jiangsu Province, on November 14th, Mohammed Saqib, Convenor of the Center for Geoeconomics for the Global South (COGGS), eloquently outlined the transformative potential of South-South Cooperation in advancing sustainable development and promoting global equity. He argued that the traditional North-South development paradigm is increasingly obsolete, and that South-South cooperation—defined by collaboration among developing nations—has emerged as a pivotal mechanism for achieving shared prosperity and addressing common challenges.

The second edition of the Think Tanks Dialogue brought together over 200 think tanks from the Global South, culminating in the formation of the Global South Think Tanks Alliance, a platform for exchanging ideas and advancing collective solutions among Global South nations.

In his address, Saqib emphasized the ongoing shift in global geopolitics, underscoring the rise of a multipolar world in which South-South cooperation plays a central role in shaping the future of global development.

He, representing COGGS, proposed five critical areas where the collective efforts of the Global South are urgently required:

I. Reforming the Global Financial System

Mohammed Saqib began by addressing a foundational issue: the global financial system, which was “established in a different era,” is no longer adequate for meeting the needs of today’s multipolar world. He called for urgent reform to make financial structures more inclusive and responsive to the needs of the Global South. As he puts it:

“The global financial system needs reform, as it was established in a different era.”

He highlighted initiatives like the New Development Bank (NDB), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and India’s RuPay card as positive steps forward in this direction. These institutions, which are spearheaded by countries from the Global South, represent an alternative to traditional Western-dominated financial bodies like the IMF and World Bank.

He argued that these efforts are important, but more must be done to “address the challenges faced by developing economies.” Specifically, he called for the creation of innovative financing mechanisms that rethink debt sustainability. This means developing more flexible financial instruments that can better serve the Global South’s needs without burdening countries with unsustainable debt.

“We should create innovative financing mechanisms that rethink debt sustainability and develop flexible instruments to serve the Global South better.”

Such reforms would empower developing nations to access capital on more favorable terms and with more autonomy, creating a financial ecosystem that is not bound by the legacy structures of the past. These reforms, according to him, are critical not only to address immediate financial challenges but also to enable long-term development and stability.

II. Digital Revolution for Development

Mohammed Saqib found immense potential in the ongoing digital revolution as a driver of development. He asserted that technology offers an opportunity for the Global South to “speed up development” and bypass traditional stages of industrialization. By skipping over certain phases of development, such as mass manufacturing or infrastructure-heavy projects, Global South nations can directly embrace new technologies, leapfrogging to more advanced systems.

“The digital revolution offers a great chance to speed up development and skip traditional stages.”

However, he stressed the importance of creating technology transfer platforms that respect intellectual property (IP) rights while also ensuring broad access to technological innovations.

He pointed to the BRICS nations as an example of how such cooperation can lead to inclusive growth. These countries, through collective initiatives, are demonstrating that the benefits of the digital revolution can be equitably distributed. Initiatives like the BRICS Network University, for instance, are providing educational and research opportunities that can accelerate technological development and knowledge sharing across member states.

 

III. Addressing Climate Change 

The convenor of COGGS brought attention to one of the most pressing challenges facing the Global South: climate change. While developing countries contribute far less to global carbon emissions, they are disproportionately affected by its consequences, from rising sea levels to extreme weather events.

“The Global South faces the harshest impacts of climate change despite contributing the least to the problem.”

Here, South-South cooperation can play a crucial role in sharing climate-resilient technologies and solutions. Mohammed Saqib highlighted successful examples of such cooperation, including China’s success in the Kubuqi Desert and India’s International Solar Alliance (ISA). The Kubuqi Desert initiative, where China transformed a barren landscape into a green area using innovative technology, showcases the power of practical solutions to environmental challenges. Meanwhile, the ISA, which includes 124 countries, represents an extraordinary collaborative effort to scale solar energy across the Global South.

He further argued that initiatives for addressing climate issues, along with the sharing of climate-resilient technologies, can help developing countries adapt to the challenges posed by climate change while reducing their carbon footprints.

IV. Healthcare and Knowledge Sharing

While addressing at the dialogue, Mohammed Saqib stressed the importance of healthcare reform and the sharing of medical knowledge.The COVID-19 pandemic revealed the deep vulnerabilities in global healthcare systems, particularly in developing countries. However, it also demonstrated the power of unity and cooperation in addressing global crises.

“The COVID-19 crisis has not only exposed our vulnerabilities but also demonstrated the power of our unity in overcoming challenges.”

South-South cooperation in healthcare, he argued, is critical not only for pandemic response but also for long-term health resilience. By sharing medical technologies, research, and healthcare best practices, Global South nations can build stronger, more responsive health systems that are better equipped to handle future health emergencies. This would also help address the chronic health disparities that exist within and between countries in the Global South.

V. Reforming Global Governance Structures

While addressing the assembly of think-tankers from the Global South nations, Saqib underscored the need for reforming global governance structures to align with the contemporary economic and political realities of a multipolar world. The current international order, according to him, is outdated and fails to reflect the growing influence of the Global South. The existing power dynamics in institutions such as the UN, the IMF, and the World Bank disproportionately favor the Global North, leaving developing countries with limited influence.

“To effectively pursue these objectives, it is important to reform global governance structures so they align with today’s economic and political realities.”

This reform, he suggested, should aim for more equitable representation of the Global South in decision-making bodies. This would involve revising voting rights, increasing participation in key international institutions, and ensuring that the interests of developing countries are better represented in global policy discussions. Only through such reforms, he argued, can the Global South fully contribute to shaping the global order in a way that benefits all nations.

New Era, New Solutions: COGGS Proposes 5 Points at Global Thinkers Dialogue Read Post »

Global South: Expanding Relevance in International System and India’s Strategic Interest

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Flat lay of travel items including a map, compass, and polaroid for adventure planning.Balaji Chandramohan

The Global South is, in fact, a coalition of what is referred to as the ‘Global East’ (China and Russia) and the Global South. The two components of BRICS—China and Russia—have their own distinct interests, and the Global South grouping reflects the wider scope of BRICS. The Global South sees value in this coalition due to the many failures of the US-led world order that emerged after World War II.

For instance, collective efforts on climate change by the G77 at the COP summits serve as an example, as does the broad participation of the Global South in international legal actions related to Gaza. It is understood that a world centered on national interests will always leave some space, albeit limited, for collective action.

Despite these challenges, most states of the Global South are not interested in a radical overhaul of the existing global order. Nor do they see Washington as an adversary. In fact, they would prefer to maintain strong relations with the United States, albeit in a world where American primacy no longer holds. However, their increasing alienation from the US-led order is largely due to systemic constraints that limit their rise, compounded by the transgressions and oscillating foreign policy of Washington. The US’s preference for forming military alliances has been a key factor in strengthening the need for the Global South.

One example of such constraints is the international sanctions regime, which has expanded to the point where more than a quarter of the world’s countries—and nearly a third of the global economy—are currently targeted by such sanctions.

While Washington maintains that its sanctions are not aimed at the Global South, those states perceive them differently. The secondary sanctions regime is enabled by global US dollar hegemony, making de-dollarization a major common interest across much of the Global South. However, de-dollarization is easier said than done. While BRICS has made it a key focus of its rhetoric, achieving progress would require the central banks of its member states to relinquish some degree of sovereignty—a tall order. Moreover, with China being by far the largest trading power within BRICS, India is concerned about Beijing’s dominance in any BRICS-driven alternative currency arrangement.

Efforts towards de-dollarization beyond BRICS are also underway, with mixed results. In response to sweeping Western sanctions following its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has tilted sharply toward China. This has led to the yuan replacing the dollar as the dominant currency in bilateral trade between the two countries. Indian exports to Russia have also boomed, thanks to growing trade denominated in rupees.

Southeast Asia and ASEAN are similarly pushing to empower local currencies in regional transactions. In 2023, five ASEAN countries, including Indonesia and Singapore, signed an agreement to establish a regional cross-border payment system, allowing consumers to make payments using QR codes, bypassing the foreign exchange market. Indonesia has also signed agreements with China, India, Japan, and South Korea to trade in local currencies.

Unfortunately, these efforts are still insufficient. In Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, there is a tendency to view the “rest” of the world primarily as a battleground for great power competition, or simply as victims. The Global South, however, is more aspirational than anything else. It is not seeking a savior or hoping to emerge as one itself, but rather wishes for the powers blocking its rise to step aside.

The great powers have been resistant to reforming the international system to better accommodate the growing autonomy and power of the Global South. Beijing, in particular, is seen as the biggest obstacle to the much-needed reform of the UN Security Council. Voting shares in the IMF and World Bank remain heavily skewed in favor of wealthy Western nations. Washington has mostly paid lip service to international climate finance, and there appears to be no intention in Washington, Moscow, or Beijing to de-escalate the steady march toward militarized great power competition.

The great powers are often unable to grasp the new realities of the vast middle, largely because the Global South remains an enigma they are conditioned not to understand. The Global South encompasses 120 countries that vary greatly in terms of economic interests, development trajectories, resource endowments, and political landscapes. The term itself is intellectually elusive, and the renewed interest in the ‘Global South’ should not be seen as divorced from its underlying political and strategic motivations.

While there is oversimplification inherent in the North-South binary, there are practical areas of convergence, such as climate action, trade policy, and technology, where the Global South remains relevant and generally in agreement. There are also arguments for a more nuanced understanding of the Global South, advocating for selective engagement based on economic considerations rather than ideological alignment.

 

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The History of the Global South

The term “Global South” was coined in 1969 by Carl Ogelsby, an American writer and activist associated with the New Left. During that time, Western analysts divided the world into three “worlds,” as first conceptualized by French demographer Alfred Sauvy in 1952. These included the “First World,” comprising the United States and its Western allies; the “Second World,” composed of the Soviet Union and its Eastern bloc satellites; and the “Third World,” consisting of developing nations, many of which were newly independent from colonial rule.

The concept of the Global South as a synonym for the Third World began to gain traction in the 1970s, with the call for a New International Economic Order, but it rose to prominence with the 1980 Brandt Report. This landmark document, produced by an international commission led by former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, distinguished between wealthier nations concentrated in the Northern Hemisphere and poorer ones in the South.

The Global North, especially the West, benefited greatly from the Industrial Revolution. The majority of countries in the Global South were located south of the Brandt line, an imaginary boundary that runs from the Rio Grande through the Mediterranean Sea, Central Asia, and the Pacific Ocean. However, from a purely geographic perspective, the Brandt line left much to be desired, as many nations designated as “southern” (e.g., India) are located in the Northern Hemisphere, while countries like Australia and New Zealand, categorized as “northern,” lie south of the equator.

Following the end of the Cold War, the term “Third World” gradually fell out of favor because the Second World no longer existed and the term itself had negative connotations. In contrast, the term “Global South” emerged as a more neutral and appealing label. Over time, the Global South became synonymous with the Group of 77 (G77), a coalition of developing countries that united in 1964 to advocate for their collective economic interests. Today, the G77 comprises 134 countries, which regularly refer to themselves as the Global South. The UN has launched multiple initiatives in response to their needs, including the UN Office for South-South Cooperation.

Renewed Use of the Global South Label

The question today is whether the label “Global South,” despite its historical relevance, still makes sense. Its most obvious limitation lies in its conceptual incoherence. The label groups together a remarkably diverse set of countries—130-odd nations representing perhaps two-thirds of the world’s population and spanning Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, Oceania, and the Middle East. These nations range from emerging powers such as Brazil, India, and Nigeria to smaller states like Benin, Fiji, and Oman.

While some members of the Global South share overlapping strategic interests, the practical relevance of this broad meta-category is unclear given the vast economic, political, and cultural diversity it encompasses. The term risks reinforcing outdated dichotomies and stereotypes at the expense of appreciating the world’s full variety.

 

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India’s Strategic Positioning within the Global South
India’s desire to assert itself as a leading voice of the Global South comes at a time when other powers, particularly China and Russia, are competing for influence in the developing world. India’s position is complex—it is both a developing economy and a strategic partner of the developed world. Additionally, India’s identity conundrum, rooted in its anti-hegemonic history, plays a role in its global ambitions.

India’s rise in the global order has significant implications for the non-Western world. A balanced and inclusive strategy will be essential in asserting India’s position. India can capitalize on its unique position by fostering triangular cooperation between Western powers and developing states. However, India must engage with the non-Western world on its own terms, rather than simply mirroring the strategies of other major powers.

Historically, India has had a unique role within the Global South. During the Cold War, under leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, India spearheaded the Non-Aligned Movement and positioned itself as a leader of developing nations. In recent years, however, India has focused more on strengthening relations with Western powers, such as Japan and the United States, viewing these relations as increasingly important.

The geopolitics of the Global South is also complicated. There is a growing divide between the West—critical of Russia, strengthening sanctions, and enhancing military support for Ukraine—and the Global South, which sees the prolongation of the war as causing economic hardship. India, for its part, has refrained from joining Western sanctions and continues to maintain strategic ties with Russia, purchasing oil and fertilizers despite the West’s disapproval.

In conclusion, the Global South plays an increasingly significant role in the international system. As India seeks a larger leadership role, claiming the mantle of Global South leadership will serve its strategic interests and help shape a more inclusive international order.

[ Balaji Chandramohan is a Chennai, India based geopolitical analyst and former visiting fellow with Future Directions International, Australia]

Global South: Expanding Relevance in International System and India’s Strategic Interest Read Post »

NDB President Dilma Rousseff Discusses NDB’s Role in Infrastructure Projects with Global Leaders

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Dilma Rousseff, President of the New Development Bank, engaged in discussions with President Vladimir Putin of Russia, On October 22, 2024 –  on the margins of 16th BRICS Summit in Kazan. Their meeting touched on significant themes such as local currency financing, the pressing issue of indebtedness in Global South countries, and the proposed expansion of BRICS, according to the official statement of New Development Bank.

President Putin recognized the significant achievements of the New Development Bank (NDB), stating, “We hold in high regard the accomplishments you have achieved in recent years, and the New Development Bank is a strong, evolving, and promising financial institution.”

President Putin underscored the New Development Bank’s impact by noting that since 2018, it has financed approximately 100 projects totaling $33 billion. President Putin further emphasized that increasing the use of national currencies for transactions helps lower debt servicing costs, enhances the financial independence of BRICS nations, and reduces geopolitical risks.

Addressing the challenges of Global South, Rousseff said, “we have indeed implemented and allocated a substantial amount of funds towards a variety of projects. However, this remains insufficient relative to the needs of the Global South. Therefore, it is crucial to provide funding in national currencies and in specialised formats. The New Development Bank is dedicated to this endeavour, funding not only sovereign projects but also private initiatives.”

Dilma Rousseff held discussions with several other heads of state and state functionaries in the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan on October 23. She reaffirmed the Bank’s dedication to advancing projects that align with the development goals of its member countries, as well as their commitments to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement. In discussions with Shavkat Mirziyoyev, President of Uzbekistan, NDB’s contributions to infrastructure and sustainable development within its member nations was raised. They explored various potential collaboration areas, including education, technological advancement, social sector support, industrial modernization, logistics, digitalization, and energy infrastructure.

During her conversation with Ilham Aliyev, President of Azerbaijan, Rousseff underscored the importance of the upcoming 29th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29) in Baku in November 2024. She emphasized that climate finance is a critical focus for international financial institutions, including the NDB.

In a meeting with Retno Marsudi, Indonesia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rousseff highlighted the alignment between Indonesia’s national strategic initiatives and the NDB’s mission, expressing optimism about future partnerships. She reiterated the Bank’s commitment to supporting infrastructure and sustainable development projects that align with its members’ development goals.

In the sidelines of the 16th BRICS Summit, Rousseff also met with Aruni Wijewardane, Foreign Secretary of Sri Lanka, to discuss potential areas for collaboration between the NDB and Sri Lanka. She reaffirmed the NDB’s role as a multilateral development bank dedicated to mobilizing resources for infrastructure and sustainable development in BRICS and other emerging markets. Rousseff engaged with Mohd Rafizi bin Ramli, Malaysia’s Minister of Economy, to further explore avenues for cooperation in the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan.

The  dialogues led by  Dilma Rousseff, President of the New Development Bank (NDB), elegantly highlight the Bank’s essential role in meeting the urgent needs of emerging markets of Global South. With holding the dialogues with leaders from Uzbekistan, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Azerbaijan, Rousseff reaffirmed the NDB’s dedication to mobilizing resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects. The focus on NDB’s initiatives and the overarching goals of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), climate finance, especially in light of the upcoming COP29, underscores the Bank’s proactive commitment to combat pressing issues, the Global South nations facing.

 

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