Balaji Chandramohan
BRICS is an intergovernmental organization comprising nine countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates, while IBSA is a unique forum bringing together India, Brazil, and South Africa. These two organizations present different and sometimes conflicting approaches to the international system. A major obstacle to permanent cooperation within BRICS is the lack of similarity among its member countries.
Brazil is a regional power in South America, Russia is a great power in Eurasia, India is a great power in the Asia-Pacific, China is a rising superpower, and South Africa is a regional power in Africa, at best. What these countries have in common is their dissatisfaction with the current international order, which is dominated by Western powers, particularly the United States. Even in India, which views China as its primary threat, there is significant domestic opposition to the values promoted by the West and the United States, even in the second decade of the 21st century.
However, it remains uncertain whether these countries can form a cohesive alternative to the international system. Each of them continues to rely on the United States to balance against threats within their respective regions—a strategy that has historically worked in Washington’s favor since the late 19th century. Brazil seeks American support in its regional struggle for hegemony against Argentina. Russia finds it difficult to accept China’s growing influence in Central Asia and the Middle East, as does India in South and Southeast Asia. Similarly, South Africa’s position in Africa is threatened by China’s growing presence on the continent, with the latter’s disregard for human rights also being a point of contention for both Brazil and South Africa.
There is also a risk that BRICS could evolve into a platform primarily promoting China’s foreign policy, just as Moscow uses a variety of interregional cooperative bodies to further its own goals. If this occurs, the legitimacy of the organization could be jeopardized, and the remaining members may need to reconsider their involvement.
Brazil, on the other hand, has the potential to become a global player. The problem, however, is that Brasília has not yet clearly defined its grand strategic vision. Bolsonaro’s foreign policy choices, for example, remain uncertain. Rather than propelling Brazil toward a new global status, they may instead harm its international reputation.
IBSA, by contrast, is a forum bringing together India, Brazil, and South Africa—three large democracies and major economies from different continents, all facing similar challenges. These countries are developing, pluralistic, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and multi-religious nations. The forum was formalized on June 6, 2003, when the foreign ministers of the three countries met in Brasília and issued the Brasília Declaration. India is currently the IBSA Chair.
Earlier, India held the IBSA Chair in 2021 under the theme “Democracy for Demography and Development.” Meanwhile, Brazil assumed the rotating presidency of the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) on March 2, 2023, marking 20 years since the forum’s establishment. Brazil’s presidency is expected to strengthen IBSA’s three strategic pillars: political coordination, trilateral cooperation, and collaboration with other developing countries through the IBSA Fund.
IBSA was founded as a coordinating mechanism among three emerging countries with democratic credentials, social diversity, and global capacity. The grouping is committed to addressing social inequalities within its borders and expanding its influence on global issues. Its principles are rooted in participatory democracy, respect for human rights, and adherence to the rule of law in the international system. A shared vision between the three countries emphasizes that democracy and development are mutually reinforcing and key to sustainable peace and stability.
Unlike BRICS, IBSA has no headquarters or permanent executive secretariat, maintaining a flexible and open structure. It focuses on concrete projects of cooperation with less developed countries, aiming to strengthen ties and contribute to the construction of a new international system.
Brazil’s current grand strategic vision is influenced by the rise of Asia and Africa, alongside a rethinking of the 20th-century geopolitical boundaries that separated different sub-regions. Brazil is particularly focused on expanding its influence in Africa and, if possible, in Asia.
In pursuit of this vision, Brazil has engaged in strategic partnerships with major Asian powers. One such initiative is a long-discussed railway project that would link Brazil’s Atlantic coast to ports on the Pacific via the Andes—the world’s longest continental mountain range. This project could become part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with Brazil offering a shortcut for commodities and goods to bypass the Panama Canal.
Brazil’s reach into Africa and Asia is also supported by its historical ties with Portuguese-speaking countries like Angola, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Timor-Leste. Brazil’s involvement in Africa is further supported by its South American School of Defense (ESUDE) and military cooperation with African nations, such as Cape Verde and Namibia.
In terms of maritime power, Brazil’s vast coastline (7,491 km) and its continental depth offer strategic advantages similar to those of the United States. Brazil’s growing economic clout and geopolitical position are expected to drive its strategic expansion into Africa and the wider Indo-Pacific. This ambition is underscored by naval modernization and a focus on regional structures like Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance.
These developments are expected to influence both BRICS and IBSA. While South Africa also seeks to assert its role in the Global South, India and Brazil, both members of BRICS and IBSA, stand to benefit significantly from these forums. In the changing international system, Brazil is likely to challenge the United States’ Monroe Doctrine in Latin America and the Global South. India, in turn, will likely align more closely with Brazil to improve its strategic outreach in the Global South and the Western Hemisphere.
Ultimately, both BRICS and IBSA will benefit India and Brazil, even with their differing approaches to the international system. Their cooperation in these forums could prove to be a game-changer, despite the dichotomous approaches of both organizations.
[ Balaji Chandramohan is a Chennai, India based geopolitical analyst and former visiting fellow with Future Directions International, Australia]
