September 2025

Is Global South Modern?

– Natasya Aulia

MODERNITY IS OFTEN understood as a product of European history that was then imposed as a universal standard for the world. This paradigm places the Global South as an entity that is always lagging behind, “less modern,” and must catch up by imitating Western development models. However, an important question that now arises is to what extent the Global South is able to define its own standards of modernity, not only as a critique of Eurocentric modernity, but also as an operational alternative. Through conceptual studies and case studies from Asia, Latin America, and Africa, evidence has emerged of a shift towards contextual plural modernities, although still overshadowed by structural obstacles such as financial and technological dependence (Fikriyah, 2024).

 

[ Russia based Political Philosopher Alexander Dugin on Global South and Modernity in an exclusive interview with COGGS. ] 

Historically, the category of the “Global South” was born not as a geographical description, but as a political construct rooted in the legacy of colonialism and Western-biased modernization. (Fry, 2017) emphasizes that the Global South was shaped by relations of domination that not only deprived it of resources, but also destroyed the value systems, knowledge, and future orientation of societies in the South. Modernity, in this case, cannot be separated from colonialism, which created conditions of “ruination” and ongoing dependency. This understanding shows that the Global South’s efforts to define standards of modernity are essentially an attempt at decolonizing knowledge (decoloniality) that seeks to dismantle old epistemic structures.

The concept of “multiple modernities” developed by Einstadt (2000) offers a theoretical framework for understanding these dynamics. Rather than a single linear path toward Western modernity, modernity can be understood as a plural process rooted in the traditions, institutions, and histories of each society. In the context of the Global South, multiple modernities are evident in the combination of global technology adoption and local values, such as the digitization of public services in India linked to social inclusion, or the solidarity economy model in Brazil that emphasizes distributive justice. In other words, the Global South is not only a consumer of modernity but also a producer of alternative standards.

However, the process of articulating plural modernities in the South is not easy. Structural barriers remain strong. A report (Aynaoui et al., 2023) published by ISPI, ORF, and PCNS shows that although the economies of the Global South now contribute a significant proportion of global GDP, political representation and decision-making capacity in international institutions remain uneven. For example, BRICS, which collectively controls 26% of global GDP, only has 14% of the votes in the IMF, an indication of epistemic and institutional injustice that hinders sovereignty in determining development standards. In these conditions, the discourse on epistemic sovereignty becomes increasingly relevant.

Indonesia and the ASEAN region provide concrete illustrations of how the Global South is attempting to negotiate its own modernity. As a country with a long colonial history, Indonesia has developed a development model that attempts to combine democracy with local cultural plurality. Meanwhile, ASEAN collectively promotes the concept of the ASEAN Way, which emphasizes consensus and non-intervention, a governance model that is often considered “unmodern” by Western standards, but is functional in maintaining regional stability (Fikriyah, 2024). Similarly, India, with its Digital India program, is not simply adopting Western technology, but emphasizing national data sovereignty. Brazil, through its social policies, presents a form of modernity that emphasizes the distribution of welfare, while South Africa seeks to articulate modernity through the discourse of Ubuntu, which emphasizes collectivity.

Although the discourse on the Global South is growing stronger, we must not turn a blind eye to the potential for fragmentation within it. As noted by (Shield, 2021), the term Global South often oversimplifies reality, given that countries included in this category have different political interests, economic orientations, and historical experiences. Differences in attitudes toward global issues, such as responses to the war in Ukraine or the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, demonstrate that solidarity within the Global South is not always linear or consistent. Therefore, when discussing alternative modernity from the Global South, it is important to avoid viewing it as a homogeneous bloc. It is precisely this internal diversity that needs to be taken into account so that the proposed standards of modernity do not lose their legitimacy or relevance.

In the context of policy design and cultural practices, (Fry, 2017) asserts that criticism of Eurocentrism is only the first step. What is more urgent is to build a knowledge ecosystem based on the needs, values, and local realities of communities in the Global South. This means that the Global South must develop a policy architecture that tangibly supports sovereignty standards, whether in the form of technology regulations, digital data governance, or development indicators that are more sensitive to social and environmental contexts. If the Global South has often been in a position of being determined by global actors, now is the time to move towards becoming an active actor that determines its own path, not only in discourse but also in institutional practice.

The concept of sustainment proposed by Fry (2017) is crucial to understanding the new direction of modernity in the Global South. Sustainment emphasizes the importance of maintaining a sustainable relationship between design, modernity, and the survival of the planet. This sustainment-based model of modernity opens up space for the Global South to offer new standards that differ from the Western model of extractive industrialization. Examples can be found in renewable energy programs in Africa that emphasize local community solutions, or in digital economy practices in Asia that expand women’s participation. The report (Aynaoui et al., 2023) also highlights that more and more Southern countries are beginning to link their development agendas to principles of social inclusivity and environmental sustainability, rather than solely economic growth.

Overall, the question “Can the Global South define its own standards of modernity?” can be answered with cautious optimism. There is ample empirical and conceptual evidence showing that Southern countries are moving towards a form of modernity that is more in line with local needs and values. However, significant obstacles remain, ranging from financial dependence on international financial institutions, technological dominance by developed countries, to global knowledge hegemony that places Western theories and experiences as the main benchmark.

Therefore, efforts to build a Global South version of modernity cannot stop at criticizing the West, but must be realized in the form of strong policy development, regulations that favor domestic interests, and an independent knowledge ecosystem. This challenge is also a great opportunity. If successful, the Global South can show that modernity does not have to mean imitating European or American models, but can arise from the historical experiences, cultures, and creativity of Southern societies themselves. In other words, modernity from the Global South has the potential to bring about new standards that are more inclusive, fair, and sustainable for the world.

 

[ Natasya Aulia is an Indonesian intern at COGGS and student of International Relations.]

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Global South’s Climate Challenges: Victim or Negotiator ?

 

– Iftah Al Aqliyah

The biggest crisis of the twenty-first century is climate change and it threatens ecosystems, economies, and human security globally. The Global South, a broad term for nations in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Pacific, is experiencing this crisis severely over the past few decades. These nations suffer the most from the effects of climate change, including persistent droughts, devastating floods, sea-level rise, and increasing food insecurity, even though they emit least in the world. Because of this systemic disequilibrium, the Global South has historically been perceived as the “victim” of global warming and reliant on the technological and financial assistance of the Global North. New global climate diplomatic patterns, however, herald a change.Global South nations are becoming more proactive negotiators rather than passive recipients of aid, as seen in the establishment of the Loss and Damage Fund during COP27, the G77 + China’s braver step, and South-South cooperation taking shape. This article explores this ambivalence by examining the paradoxes and difficulties of the Global South’s dual role as a victim of global warming and a emerging new agenda-shaper in international climate negotiation.

Global South as the Victims

Even while the Global South contributes significantly less to global emissions than the Global North, they still face the brunt of the climate catastrophe.  In other areas, the influence is evident.  Food shortages, severe flooding, and protracted droughts are persistent issues in Sub-Saharan Africa, where most nations are classified as high vulnerability and low readiness.  While Bangladesh, India, and the Philippines are regularly struck by severe floods and tropical storms, small island nations like Tuvalu and the Maldives in South Asia and the Pacific face the prospect of submersion.  Similar circumstances exist in Latin America, where forest fires and deforestation increase climatic sensitivity and pose a health risk to the populace. The Germanwatch Climate Risk Index report ranks Pakistan, India, and the Philippines as the countries with the highest impact of extreme climate disasters in the last three decades.

Some social groups in the Global South are more severely impacted by climate change than others, in addition to being geographically vulnerable.  For instance, when disasters occur, women and children are more likely to lose access to food, healthcare, and education.  People with impairments and older individuals frequently encounter obstacles when trying to evacuate or get emergency help.  Meanwhile, when droughts or floods devastate agricultural land and essential infrastructure, disadvantaged communities and informal laborers are the first to lose their livelihoods.  According to a comprehensive assessment, these populations face socioeconomic disparities that worsen their circumstances in addition to physical harm.

However, the Global South remains a victim because to its weak capacity for adaptation.  According to Columbia University’s 2025 Global Climate Risk Index on Vulnerability and Access to Finance, two-thirds of the nations in the “red zone” category are in Africa and have little access to international adaptation funding.  Countries in the Global South are dependent on aid from the Global North and international organizations due to a lack of financial resources, poor technology, and a weak infrastructure for adaptation.  This demonstrates that their situation will continue to be impacted by the global climate problem in the absence of equitable support. Protest sign at climate change rally reading 'There is no Planet B'.

Global South as Negotiator

Despite its reputation as the most climate-vulnerable region, the Global South has changed from being a victim to an active participant in international climate diplomacy.  In international forums, this shift in role is particularly noticeable since the 2022 COP27 in Egypt.  The establishment of the Loss and Damage Fund, which acknowledges the historical responsibility of wealthier nations for the climate issue, was successfully pushed for at that gathering by countries in the Global South.  Because the voices of poor nations are now influencing the design of global climate policy for the first time, this achievement is regarded as a significant turning point.

Active engagement also strengthens negotiations. Diplomatic efforts by Global South countries in seeking climate justice and fairer access to funding are still led by the G77 + China. In addition, platforms such as the High-Level Global South Dialogue, to be held in 2025 from Marrakech to Belém, demonstrate the growing cross-regional coordination. As actors with the ability to steer international debate, Global South countries are not only addressing the impacts of climate change but also developing an agenda for a just energy transition. Additionally, South-South Cooperation (SSC) improves the Global South’s bargaining power outside of international venues.  Countries like South Africa, Brazil, and Indonesia actively contribute to the development of adaptation capability in their areas, whether it be through disaster management, renewable energy, or sustainable agriculture technologies. These programs demonstrate that the Global South is providing practical answers that can be implemented globally rather than only waiting for assistance.

In fact, developing nations are now using the Columbia Climate Vulnerability Index (2025) study as a guide when calling for more equitable access to international finance, demonstrating their capacity to employ technical tools to bolster their diplomatic stance. Through various active initiatives, the Global South has successfully demonstrated that it is not merely standing by and waiting for assistance, but is moving forward to fight for justice for vulnerable countries and promote a more equitable and sustainable transformation of global governance.

Despite the fact that the Global South’s participation in climate diplomacy is becoming more significant, several significant obstacles still limit its efficacy.  Since the interests of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) diverge from those of big developing nations like China, Brazil, or India, priorities and interests are a significant problem.  Furthermore, several nations face a conflict between their commitments to climate change and economic growth due to their reliance on extractive sectors like coal, oil, and palm oil.  Their negotiating position at the table is further weakened by limited access to foreign funds and adaption technologies.

 

Conclusion

Being both a victim and a negotiator puts the Global South in a precarious situation.  It is undoubtedly the most susceptible to the effects of climate change, but it is also increasingly influencing the structure of international climate diplomacy.  It is no longer a passive actor, as evidenced by its leadership in the Global South dialogue and the successful negotiation of the Loss and Damage Fund at COP27. But in order to be genuinely acknowledged as equal negotiators, the Global South must resolve its own issues, fortify regional unity, and make sure that climate diplomacy is implemented domestically. Whether the Global South can continue to hold this dual position as the foundation for the fight for global climate justice will have a significant impact on the direction of climate diplomacy in the future.

 

[ Iftah Al Aqliyah is an Intern at COGGS and student of International Relations, UPN Jawa Timur  Veteran University, Surabaya, Indonesia. Opinions expressed don’t necessarily reflect the views of COGGS.  ]

References

Adjani, W. K. (2022). Mapping Indonesia’s South-South triangular cooperation initiatives. Global South Review, 3(1), 59–78. https://doi.org/10.22146/globalsouth.64191

Columbia Climate School. (2025, June 25). Global Climate Risk Index ranks 188 countries by vulnerability and access to finance. Columbia University. https://news.climate.columbia.edu/2025/06/25/global-climate-risk-index-ranks-188-countries-by-vulnerability-and-access-to-finance/

Germanwatch. (2024). Global Climate Risk Index 2024. Germanwatch e.V. https://www.germanwatch.org/en/cri

Golding, J. (2023). COP27 and the new rise of the Global South. New England Journal of Public Policy, 35(2), Article 9. https://scholarworks.umb.edu/nejpp/vol35/iss2/9

Ngcamu, B. S. (2023). Climate change effects on vulnerable populations in the Global South: A systematic review. Natural Hazards, 118(2), 977–991. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-023-06070-2

Sono, D., Wei, Y., & Jin, Y. (2021). Assessing the climate resilience of Sub-Saharan Africa. Land, 10(1205), 1–15. https://doi.org/10.3390/land10121205

United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation. (2025, July 30). From Marrakech to Belém: High-level Global South dialogue amplifies Southern leadership in shaping the climate agenda. UNOSSC. https://unsouthsouth.org/2025/07/30/from-marrakech-to-belem-high%E2%80%91level-global-south-dialogue-amplifies-southern-leadership-in-shaping-the-climate-agenda/

Wuppertal Institute. (2024). From COP28 to COP29: Climate negotiations at a crossroads. Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy. https://wupperinst.org/en/a/wi/a/s/ad/9003/

Budiana, M. (2024). Climate change and international politics: Cooperation or conflict. Journal of Law, Social Sciences and Humanities, 6(2), 23–35. https://doi.org/10.5555/jlssh.2024.6.2

 

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What makes the SCO Resilient?

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has set a model for a new type of international relations, Chinese President Xi Jinping made the remarks while addressing the 25th Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the SCO in China’s Tianjin on September 1. The member states were the first to put forward the vision of global governance featuring extensive consultation and joint contribution for shared benefit as an effort to practice true multilateralism,  President Xi said.

Against protectionist headwinds, true multilateralism is what the international community has called for several times.Under this vision, the SCO’s remarkable development over 24 years has propelled it into a vital platform for regional security, economic collaboration, and international diplomacy, demonstrating a model of multilateralism rooted in mutual trust and respect.

“We were the first to conclude a treaty on long-term good-neighborliness, friendship and cooperation, proclaiming our commitment to forge lasting friendships and refrain from hostilities,” Xi added.

Over the past decades, the SCO has made substantial strides in fostering mutual political trust and safeguarding regional security. What was initially founded as a security group has evolved into a comprehensive organization representing a quarter of global GDP over the years.

China’s investment stock in other SCO member states has exceeded $84 billion, and its annual bilateral trade with other SCO member states has surpassed $500 billion. Chinese companies have established over 3,000 enterprises in other SCO member countries, generating an average of more than 200,000 employment opportunities annually, according to China’s Ministry of Commerce.

This year’s summit has further consolidated these gains, reaffirming the SCO as a stabilizing force amid turmoil.

Xi pledged to provide 2 billion yuan ($281 million) in grants to SCO member states this year. The country will also issue an additional 10 billion yuan ($1.4 billion) in loans to the member banks of the SCO Interbank Consortium over the next three years. Pragmatism is a key word that was stressed several times in Xi’s Monday remarks. This perhaps explains the SCO’s increasing popularity on the international arena.

It is worth noting that this year’s summit is the largest in SCO history, reflecting the organization’s expanding membership and influence. The organization has now expanded into a 26-nation family spanning Asia, Europe and Africa.

This growth enhances the SCO’s significance as an alternative model for regional cooperation compared to Western-dominated organizations.

The inclusion of diverse members underscores the SCO’s appeal as a platform where sovereignty and non-interference are respected while pursuing common goals of security, economic development, and cultural exchange. This adherence to core principles has made the SCO attractive to countries seeking balanced partnerships.

China, as a founding member, has proposed the Belt and Road Initiative, the SCO Interbank Consortium and others to strengthen this vision of a shared future.

Hosting the summit in Tianjin is a showcase of China’s commitment to leading a cooperative, multipolar world order. China, on several occasions, has clearly indicated its dedication to making the SCO not just a forum for dialogue but a substantive actor in global governance.

This set the tone for the summit’s agenda, aiming to chart the course for a high-quality, sustained partnership among member states. China’s focus on equality, mutual respect, and shared growth resonates within the SCO framework, enhancing the organization’s appeal and influence.

 

This year’s summit comes at a challenging time. But the SCO’s enhanced cooperation mechanisms and expanding appeal underscore its relevance in today’s multipolar world. The SCO Tianjin Summit has further cemented the organization’s role in fostering a stable, prosperous and interconnected region, embodying the enduring “Shanghai Spirit” and setting a precedent for the future of international cooperation.

[ This article is republished from CGTN’s First Voice  under a content syndication arrangement. The views expressed are those of CGTN.] 

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