Europe and the Global South: A Maltese Perspective in a New Era of Conflict

thegeoeconomics.com | August 29, 2025

– Dr. Christian Cardona

Europe stands today at a turning point. The wars in Ukraine and Palestine have revealed more than just the fragility of its security architecture. they have exposed the erosion of Europe’s credibility. By defending sovereignty and international law in one conflict while appearing to ignore them in another, Europe has invited the charge of double standards. The Global South has noticed and, crucially, it is no longer content to remain silent.

The Global South is not the passive partner of yesterday. It is a dynamic bloc of states shaping trade, energy markets, and diplomatic agendas across the globe. In the UN, at the G20, and through coalitions like BRICS, the South is setting terms rather than merely receiving them. For Europe, this is not a challenge to be managed but a reality to which it must adapt. Without meaningful engagement, Europe risks isolation in a world that is increasingly multipolar.

For Malta, these shifts are not distant abstractions. Our geography places us at the crossroads of Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. regions where the strength of the Global South is already tangible. We see it in the growing assertiveness of African states demanding fairer migration and trade policies, in the energy partnerships that link the Mediterranean to the Gulf, and in the moral clarity with which Latin America and others speak about Palestine. The South is no longer waiting for Europe’s permission it is charting its own course.

Vibrant image of the Maltese flag waving proudly against a clear blue sky, showcasing Malta's national pride.

Prime Minister Robert Abela of Malta has rightly raised these realities within the European Council, urging Europe to move beyond selective morality and embrace a consistent vision of peace and security. Likewise, Foreign Minister Ian Borg has underlined that Malta’s diplomacy must be rooted in dialogue and neutrality, principles that give us credibiAdd a heading (1)lity as a bridge between continents.

But credibility is also undermined when Malta’s voice at the highest European level becomes indistinguishable from that of larger powers. Roberta Metsola, as President of the European Parliament, has too often served as an unquestioning mouthpiece for Brussels’ dominant interests. Her readiness to adopt strong positions on Ukraine while remaining hesitant, or silent, on Palestine reflects exactly the inconsistency that alienates the Global South. In moments of crisis, leadership demands independence and courage. To simply echo the agenda of the powerful is not leadership but abdication.

What Europe must now accept is that the Global South is not asking for recognition but is demanding it. Its collective economic power, demographic weight, and moral authority are reshaping the balance of the international system. Europe can either engage with this reality as an equal partner, or it can continue clinging to outdated hierarchies and watch its influence fade.

[ Agency is more important than Geography: Dr. Cardona on Global South at Global South Economic Forum 2025, Abu Dhabi, hosted by COGGS and AGDA]

Malta understands this better than most. As a small state, we know that influence does not come from size but from credibility. And credibility today means consistency — consistency in upholding international law whether in Kiev or in Gaza, consistency in dialogue, and consistency in respecting the equal voice of the South. The wars of our time should be Europe’s wake-up call. A Europe that dismisses or lectures the Global South will be a Europe left behind.

[Dr. Cardona is former Economy Minister of Malta, International Trade Law Specialist and Advisor COGGS. The views expressed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of COGGS.]

Europe and the Global South: A Maltese Perspective in a New Era of Conflict Read Post »

ASEAN–GCC Relations in Transition: Diplomatic Engagement to Economic Integration

thegeoeconomics.com | August 28, 2025

Read and Download the paper: ASEAN–GCC Relations in Transition- Diplomatic Engagement to Economic Integration

Regional cooperation is one of the factors that shapes economy of any country. The awareness of the importance of this cooperation is one of the backgrounds for the establishment of regional cooperation organizations such as ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council). ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) is a regional organization that accommodates Southeast Asian countries to enhance economic and security cooperation. ASEAN consists of 10 member countries, including Brunei, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia, Philippines, Myanmar, Malaysia, Vietnam, Laos, and Singapore – although Timor Leste is slated to become 11th member. On the other hand, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) accommodates 6 Middle Eastern economies. As one of the largest economic blocks in the world, ASEAN cooperates with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and other GCC member countries in the spheres of economy, trade, as well as cultural exchange. Although trade and investment activities between ASEAN and Gulf Arab countries have been carried out since the 1970s, the relationship between ASEAN and the GCC was only established in 1990 through the first contact between ASEAN and the GCC. At that time, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Oman,

Yousuf Bin Alawi as Chairman of the GCC Council of Ministers expressed the GCC’s desire to establish formal relations with ASEAN….

ASEAN–GCC Relations in Transition: Diplomatic Engagement to Economic Integration Read Post »

COGGS Impact Paper: ASEAN in Addressing Drug Trafficking in the Golden Triangle Region

thegeoeconomics.com | August 27, 2025

Click below to Download the Paper

ASEAN in Addressing Drug Trafficking in the Golden Triangle Region (2)

Introduction

Muhammad Indrawan Jatmika

Asisstant Professor, International Relations Department Universitas Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Jawa Timur

Adrian Naufal Rizqullah

Student, International Relations Department Universitas Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Jawa Timur

Drug trafficking is a significant threat that has garnered substantial attention in Southeast Asia. Classified as a form of transnational crime, drug trafficking poses a severe threat to international security and stability (Anggraini, 2016). The issue of illicit drug trade has been a long-standing problem in the region, making Southeast Asia one of the areas most affected by this global challenge. Central to this issue is the Golden Triangle, a region recognized as a major hub for drug production and trafficking. The Golden Triangle spans parts of Eastern Myanmar, Northern Thailand, and Western Laos, making it a focal point for the cultivation, production, and distribution of opium on a global scale. During the 1970s and 1980s, this region emerged as the world’s largest opium producer (Anggraini, 2016). The Golden Triangle remains one of the largest narcotics-producing regions globally, contributing approximately 60% of the world’s opium and heroin supply (BNN, 2018). The thriving drug trade in this region is facilitated by international drug cartels and syndicates, which have established extensive networks with groups operating in Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. These networks are instrumental in smuggling narcotics into Southeast Asia through the Golden Triangle, further establishing the region not only as a production hub but also as a strategic transit route for drug trafficking (Othman, 2004). The countries within the Golden Triangle—Myanmar, Thailand, and Laos—are often characterized by weak border controls, which exacerbate the problem of transnational crime. This lack of effective oversight has been exploited by non-state actors, who pose significant threats to regional security. These actors utilize the Golden Triangle as a transit point to supply narcotics to other Southeast Asian nations. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Southeast Asia’s narcotics trade is one of the busiest globally, rivaling the Golden Crescent region (comprising Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran) in the Middle East (Yanuarizki, 2016).

In addition to serving as a trafficking route, the Golden Triangle is a leading producer and cultivator of opium (Yanuarizki, 2016). Myanmar, Thailand, and Laos are the primary contributors to drug production in Southeast Asia. In northern and western Laos, local farmers cultivate opium extensively for distribution, predominantly within the region. Due to its strategic location, Thailand often serves as the initial destination for drugs transported from Myanmar and Laos before being distributed to other areas. Beyond opium, the Golden Triangle is also known to produce various narcotics, including methamphetamine, amphetamine, heroin, kratom, and marijuana (Anggraini, 2016). The repercussions of drug trafficking extend beyond the borders of the Golden Triangle, impacting other countries across Southeast Asia. This issue demands the attention of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a regional organization that has taken an active role in addressing transnational crime, including drug trafficking (Anggraini, 2016). Many Southeast Asian countries are characterized by weak governmental institutions, which contribute to the prevalence of transnational crimes, including drug trafficking. The rapid evolution and increasing scale of the drug trade necessitate immediate and coordinated responses from ASEAN as a regional organization. ASEAN has actively facilitated collaboration among Myanmar, Thailand, and Laos to address these challenges (Aryani & Leksono, 2017).

[ Pls download and read the paper. ]

COGGS Impact Paper: ASEAN in Addressing Drug Trafficking in the Golden Triangle Region Read Post »

GCC-Africa Ties: Can Desert Find Comforting Shade of Green?

thegeoeconomics.com | August 21, 2025

Ayanangsha Maitra, Prattyush Kala

AS THE STORMS of pragmatic geopolitics unsettle old certainties, their ripple effects—most visible in the soaring prices of essential food across African nations—are compelling the Gulf and Africa to recalibrate their equations. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the phenomenally prosperous hexad, is testing new paths for diversification and influence, making Africa, a prime ground for their engagement, soft power and development as well as capacity building partner. The fastest growing markets, and logistical corridors of Africa offer new possibilities to GCC but the one major generic factor brings the two regions together: the linguistic fraternity. At least 10 nations in the mosaic continent of 54 nations speak Arabic.

[ Screen grab , Business Insider Africa]

With lack of arable land in the region, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have turned to the nations across the continent, known for its vast arable as well highly fertile lands not only to secure affordable food supplies but also to stabilize energy flows through investments in solar, wind, and LNG projects.

Saudi Arabia’s Export & Import Composition with Africa, 2023 — [ Courtesy: Atlas of Economic Complexity and Control Risks ]

Political stability across geographies of Africa remains a priority for GCC. Horn of Africa and Red Sea regions are adjacent to critical maritime routes like Suez Canal. The blue line has been under watch of the GCC. GCC nations have expanded their military bases and increased diplomatic presence to safeguard trade as well as project power. Eritrea (Assab port, leased for 30 years) and Somalia host military bases of UAE. UAE also runs bases on Socotra and Perim islands in Yemen in order to secure strategic maritime routes like the Bab El Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden, support counter-terrorism, anti-piracy efforts, and provide regional influence through military and economic cooperation.

In the horn region, Saudi Arabia has inked a 92-year contract to build and operate a Saudi Logistics City in Djibouti’s port area. This logistics zone is intended to serve as a major hub for Saudi exports and commerce across Africa. Djibouti port is a critical gateway for African trade, and the logistics zone will provide Saudi Arabia with enhanced access to African markets.

Top Trade Partners of Middle East and North African (MENA) Countries — [ Courtesy: Visual Capitalist]

The cultural dimension is also significant as the bonhomie gets warmer. GCC nations have been funding the building and renovation of mosques, Arab-Islamic centers, and cultural events across Africa. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait, have come in the help of Ethiopia, Kenya, Senegal, Sudan, Nigeria, and Egypt for cultural and societal needs. The Gulf’s humanitarian aid efforts in Africa are also highly commendable.

Economic partnership is the forefront of the GCC-Africa ties. Over $100 billion has been invested by GCC countries in Africa in recent years, with the UAE leading at $59.4 billion, followed by Saudi Arabia with $25.6 billion, and Qatar at $7.2 billion. These investments have primarily targeted capacity building in the continent, infrastructure, energy, agriculture, and logistics. In the shipping domain too, GCC has made a significant mark. UAE’s DP World, operates ports in over ten African nations, transforming them into regional trade hubs and creating massive local employment. Saudi Arabia’s ACWA Power has committed $7 billion to several energy projects – which are enabling access to electricity, healthcare, and education.

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have contracted to get access to large tracts of farmland in Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, and Tanzania to produce cereals, fruits, and. Saudi Star’s rice farm in Ethiopia is projected to expand to 500,000 hectares. Gulf enterprises are also investing in agro-processing units, ensuring value-added food production before export. Complementary infrastructure, including irrigation systems (e.g., Qatar in Senegal, Saudi-funded dams in Mali and Chad) and logistics (e.g., DP World’s ports), strengthens food supply chains.

Africa’s food inflation rate is a significant factor for greater level of cooperation. Horrifying increases in prices for staple items such as cereals, meat, dairy, oils, fruits, and vegetables send shockwaves to households to the political corridor. Global South actors such as Angola, Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Nigeria, Sudan, South Sudan, South Africa, Uganda, Zambia are facing severe food inflation.

At a time edible essential items are hitting hard across Africa, UAE has invested in livestock, poultry, fish processing, and date palm cultivation in Egypt, leveraging the country’s global leadership in date production. Saudi Arabia, through SALIC, has acquired significant stakes in Olam Agri Holdings, with Egypt as a key node. The $5 billion injection from the Saudi Public Investment Fund into Egypt in 2025 underscores the Gulf’s long-term commitment to agribusiness, infrastructure, and food processing. Egyptian ministries are streamlining policies to facilitate such investments, while promoting joint ventures, tech collaboration, and regional food security strategies involving Egypt, the UAE, Jordan, and Iraq.

Nevertheless, triangular partnerships between GCC, South Asia, and Africa are emerging. In these arrangements for food security and economic integration, South Asia provides agri-tech and expertise, Africa offers land and labour, and the GCC supplies capital and logistics. The partnership is growing into other sectors, including mining (e.g., lithium in Zambia), tourism, real estate, and industrial development.

Saudi Arabia and UAE have earned reputation in several African defence headquarters, by offering professional military training. The gulf nations are active in conflict mediation, as seen in Qatar’s involvement in Chad and the Congo-Rwanda peace talks. Furthermore, GCC are engaging with the African Union and AfCFTA to influence policy and trade standards across the continent.

Yet, these challenges weigh heavily on the capitals of both the GCC nations and African states. Political instability in several African states, including military-led governments, sovereignty concerns around land acquisitions and foreign military presence, and competition from other global actors like China and EU pose risks. In an era of multipolarity and coalition, areas of cooperation are emerging faster. These may range from port access for landlocked African nations, development of healthcare and education infrastructure, industrial investments in critical minerals and hydrocarbons, upskilling African youth for Gulf labour markets, easing migration and visa policies, to spheres of technological collaboration in climate-resilient agriculture.

Being the bridge nation between the two, Egypt comes into the scene with big prospects and bigger dreams. Strategically located at the intersection of Africa, the Middle East, and Europe, the resurgent economy offers Gulf investors access to COMESA and AfCFTA markets, while the Suez Canal facilitates efficient trade flows. GCC sovereign wealth funds – such as Saudi Arabia’s PIF and UAE’s ADQ – have invested billions in Egyptian companies and infrastructure, using the country as a launchpad into Africa. Egypt’s strong diplomatic ties with both the GCC and African nations further position it as a mediator and platform for development collaboration. Through the Egyptian Agency of Partnership for Development (EAPD), Gulf-backed aid and technical assistance are channelled into African development initiatives.

GCC-Africa bonhomie goes far beyond cultural affinity. It is emerging as a strategic recalibration that integrates economic ambition with geopolitical foresight, development diplomacy, and shared aspirations for stability.

Security cooperation is strengthening, but food security remains the decisive front where futures will be won or lost. Africa’s fertile lands and growing agricultural capacity, combined with GCC expertise in agri-tech, fertilizers, irrigation systems, and farmer upskilling, can forge a pathway to mutual resilience. As Africa explores its abundance of Rare Earth Minerals, the Gulf finds yet another opportunity to contribute meaningfully – helping the continent unlock prosperity while diversifying its own economic future in a sanction-disrupted global marketplace.

GCC nations like UAE, with its reputation as a hub for agricultural science and growing ambition as a global AI enabler, is well-positioned to empower Africa with AI Technology. GCC has the ability to upskill African farmers and producers into more productive, applying superior technologies. Saudi Arabia and Qatar, with their deep financial and knowledge resources, can complement this vision by powering Africa’s transitions in energy, connectivity, and mobility – essentials for building a 21st-century knowledge economy.

For GCC nations to cement a constructive role in Africa’s transformation, it must think long-term, prioritize trust-driven partnerships, and align itself with each African nations aspirations. While the two are vocal about South-South cooperation, basics such as food and energy security, and upskilling youths should be kept on top priority in an era to be governed by AI. As robust Global South actors African partners across public and corporate have to learn from the past in order to remain a committed partner of the GCC.

[ Ayanangsha Maitra and Prattyush Kala work at COGGS. Opinions expressed not necessarily reflect the view of COGGS. ]

GCC-Africa Ties: Can Desert Find Comforting Shade of Green? Read Post »

Will Red-Carpet Treatment to US Goods Boost Indonesia’s Economy?

thegeoeconomics.com | August 13, 2025

Dhea Marsha Ananda

THE PROGRESS OF Indonesia‘s international trade is key to economic progress, with a focus on shifting from a commodity-based economy to investment, production, and high-value services through strategic policies. The goal of Indonesia’s economic transformation is to improve international trade ties and solidify Indonesia’s position as a global economic leader by focusing on the development of human resources, energy, infrastructure, transportation, public finance, industry, trade, and agriculture. Indonesia’s international trade growth is also influenced by far sighted economic policy. The closed model of Indonesia’s international trade has given way to a more open, globally linked model that is centered on exports as the world economy changes.

Indonesia’s trade strategy has developed rapidly, with the aim of becoming a competitive and advanced economic power. One of the strategies driving Indonesia’s economy is export-import activities, by reforming tariff policies and increasing export competitiveness. Currently, Indonesia is focusing its efforts on increasing export activities as a strategy to expand its market reach. Specifically in June 2025, Indonesia’s exports saw an increase of 11.29% year-on-year, reaching a total of U$ 23.44 billion, which is higher than the market forecast of 10.41% (Suroyo, 2025). This surge can be attributed to several factors, including:

I. Acceleration of exports in anticipation of US tariff policy

This may occur due to new tariff policies from the US. Indonesia has successfully reached an agreement that reduces US tariffs from 32% to 19%, and exporters are accelerating shipments before the deadline takes effect.

II. Non-oil and gas export performance

III. Commodities such as metal ore, slag, and ash experienced a surge of up to 3,736.49%.

IV. Animal/vegetable fats and oils increased by 22.5%, contributing 2.85%.

V. Precious metals and jewelry rose by 104.44%, contributing 2.59%.

VI. The agriculture, forestry, and fisheries sectors showed an increase of 49.55%.

As a result, exports have achieved positive cumulative growth. As of June 2025, Indonesia’s national export value reached US$135.41 billion, marking a 7.70% increase compared to the same period in the previous year. This growth reflects the strengthening performance of the international trade sector, driven by efforts to optimize export markets and diversify leading commodities.

Tabel 1. The Value of Exports (Million US$), 2025

This happened because of an evaluation of import and export tariffs. In the recent most trade negotiation, Indonesia has eliminated tariffs on more than 99% of US goods and scrap all non-tariff barriers facing American firms. However, there are exceptions for certain products, such as alcoholic beverages and pork, which are specifically excluded from the zero percent tariff provision. The US government reduced import duties on Indonesian goods from 32% to 19% in reaction to this strategy.

The US Census Bureau reports that between January and May 2025, US exports to Indonesia came to $ 4.21 billion, or Rp 67.4 trillion. In comparison, during the same period, U.S. imports from Indonesia reached $13.92 billion, or nearly Rp 222 trillion. In 2024, the United States exported goods worth $10.15 billion (around Rp 162 trillion) to Indonesia, while its imports from Indonesia amounted to $28.05 billion (approximately Rp 448 trillion). The following 10 biggest non-oil and gas export goods from the United States to Indonesia in 2024 are the target of the 0% tariff policy, according data from the United Nations (UN) Comtrade cited by Trading Economics (July 17, 2025):

I. Seed oil, grains, oleaginous fruits, seeds, and fruits, with a combined worth of $ 1.26 billion (about Rp 20.1 trillion).

II. Boilers, machinery, and nuclear reactors, totaling $1.11 billion (about Rp 17.7 trillion).

III. Organic compounds, which are worth about Rp 14.6 trillion ($ 914.96 million).

IV. Animal feed, residues, and food industry waste, totaling $ 618.06 million (about Rp 9.8 trillion).

V. Spacecraft and aircraft valued at $ 523 million, or roughly Rp 8.3 trillion. 6. Electronic and electrical equipment, valued at around Rp7 trillion ($438.46 million).

VI. Electronic and electrical equipment, valued at around Rp7 trillion ($438.46 million).

VII. Waste, fibrous cellulose products, and wood pulp, valued at $400.76 million (about Rp6.4 trillion).

VII. Equipment for photography, technology, medicine, and optics, worth $ 271.24 million (about Rp 4.3 trillion).

VIII. Food items, dairy products, eggs, and honey, totaling $214.76 million (about Rp 3.4 trillion).

IX. Plastics, valued at around Rp 3.2 trillion ($ 204.36 million).

It is anticipated that imposing zero percent tariffs on certain items will boost market access, boost bilateral trade volume, and promote expansion in key industries in both nations. It can conclude that Indonesia’s 2025 international trade policy transformation is a strategic move toward improving economic competitiveness through tariff policy reforms and export activity optimization. The 11.29% increase in exports in June 2025 is concrete proof that the national economy may benefit from quicker shipping tactics, commodity diversification, and the performance of the non-oil and gas industry. Mutually beneficial trade relations have been strengthened through bilateral trade cooperation with the United States, which includes the implementation of zero percent tariffs on the majority of commodities, a reduction in US import tariffs on Indonesian goods from 32% to 19%, Trade data indicating a surplus for Indonesia suggests significant possibilities for further market expansion and Indonesia has the potential to become one of the major economic powers in the world if it adopts a consistent and deliberate approach.

[ Dhea Marsha Ananda is an intern at COGGS. ]

References

Budiman, A. T. (2025). Hit by US tariffs, Indonesia plans to sell shrimp to China instead. PANDEGLANG: Reuters.

Dewi, N. K. (2025). 99 Persen Produk AS Dipatok Tarif 0 Persen Masuk Indonesia. Kok, Bisa? Jakarta: Tempo.com.

Gulo, D. P. (2024). ANALISIS DAMPAK KEBIJAKAN PERDAGANGAN BEBAS ASEAN TERHADAP PERTUMBUHAN EKSPOR INDONESIA KE PASAR ASEAN. Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu Administrasi Negara , 751-760.

Sudarshan Varadhan, F. N. (2025). Indonesia nickel slump piles pressure on coal miners hit by falling exports. Singapore: Reuters.

Suroyo, G. (2025). Indonesia’s exports rise again in June as U.S.-bound shipments jump. Jakarta: Reuters.

WARDANA. (2024). Indonesia’s Trade Policy Regime amidst Global Challenges. The University of Adelaide SA 5005 Australia, 1-6.

Will Red-Carpet Treatment to US Goods Boost Indonesia’s Economy? Read Post »

Bears, BRICS and Garudas: How Indonesia “Socialized” with Russia?

thegeoeconomics.com | August 10, 2025

Andhini Octa Maharatih and Alinda Rana Permata Surya

On the sidelines of the 28th St Petersburg International Economic Forum , *June 18-21* 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin held a meeting with President of Indonesia Prabowo Subianto during his state visit. [Photo: RIA Novosti/ Kremlin Photo Bank. ]

◉ THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN Indonesia and Russia has been warm since before Indonesia’s independence. Russia (the Soviet Union) played a role in supporting Indonesia’s independence and actively advocated for its right to sovereignty. Even after Indonesia officially gained independence, cooperation between Indonesia and Russia (the Soviet Union) has continued to this day, beginning during the era of Indonesia’s first president, Soekarno. The closeness between Indonesia and Russia has been reflected in strong diplomatic relations and bilateral cooperation since 1950—five years after Indonesia became an independent nation. These diplomatic ties have been mutually beneficial. Early on, Indonesia purchased a pair of fighter jets and two helicopters from Russia. In return, Russia requested payment in the form of Indonesia’s primary commodities, such as rubber and palm oil.

In addition to defense and economic cooperation, Moscow offered several scholarships for Indonesian students to study in the nation. Nikita S. Khrushchev, the Soviet leader at the time, warmly welcomed Indonesian students to the University of Russia in Moscow in 1960. Infrastructure development, such as the construction of the Bung Karno Stadium, was also credited largely to Soviet support.

Why Indonesia Prefers Russian Defence Supply Over American?

Indonesia has viewed Russia as a strategic partner in defense and security technology development. In addition to being a producer of modern weaponry, Russia offers relatively low prices and simpler regulations for defense equipment sales. Although Indonesia has not yet fully developed its own defense equipment, Russia has shown openness to technology transfer, allowing Indonesia to modify and adapt this technology domestically. This contrasts with the United States, whose strict regulations are seen as less favorable to Indonesia. As a result, Russia has become a more attractive partner for long-term defense and diplomatic cooperation.

Although relations cooled after the Indonesian Communist Party’s (1965 G30S) rebellion—when Indonesian students in Russia were repatriated—ties gradually improved after the political situation stabilized.

New Order and Post-Suharto Era

During the New Order regime, Indonesia leaned more toward the West due to the lingering effects of the communist threat. Under President Soeharto, Indonesia’s relationship with Russia began to recover after 22 years, marked by a diplomatic visit to Russia in 1989.

Following this, Indonesia entered a difficult period of political transition, facing domestic conflicts that required inward focus. Relations with Russia improved again under President Megawati Soekarnoputri, the fifth President of Indonesia. Under her leadership, cooperation that had stalled was revived in 2003, especially in technology and economic development.One example was the cooperation between Vneshtorgbank and PT Bank Mandiri to support Indonesia’s banking system during a global financial crisis. Although Megawati’s presidency was brief, she reopened channels for engagement between the two nations.

President SBY’s Era

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) continued and expanded this cooperation. Beginning in 2007, SBY intensified Indonesia’s bilateral relations with Russia, focusing on new areas such as investment, defense, and natural resources—including bauxite, aluminum, oil, and gas. These areas marked a new phase in Indonesia–Russia cooperation.

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono also promoted soft power diplomacy, particularly in tourism, and collaborated with Russia in defense modernization. Cooperation included technology transfers to Indonesia’s domestic defense industries such as PT Pindad, PT Dirgantara Indonesia, and PT PAL.

Indonesia’s closeness with Russia was evident during SBY’s presidency, especially in economic sectors. For instance, palm oil exports—although only 2% of Indonesia’s total exports in 2011—were considered significant. When talks of Indonesia joining BRICS arose, SBY remained neutral, stating that Indonesia was transitioning from a developing to an emerging economy and aimed to strengthen its national economy before joining.In competing for the Russian market, Indonesia faced challenges, especially from European countries dominating exports. To increase competitiveness, Indonesia sought to promote exports of automotive products, footwear, tires, and furniture. Trade between Russia and Indonesia increased by 4.9% in the 2011–2014 period for non-oil and gas sectors and continued to improve in 2016.

Jokowi’s Era, Connectivity and Strategic Expansion

Under President Joko Widodo (Jokowi), Russian investment in Indonesia significantly increased. Jokowi encouraged local governments to establish sister-city relationships to attract long-term and sustainable investments. Several sister-city partnerships were established, including:

Jakarta–Moscow (continued from SBY’s era)
Palembang–Belgorod
Yogyakarta–St. Petersburg
Magelang–Tula

The nature of these city connectivity projects are different, while all of them cementing Indonesia- Russia ties. The Magelang–Tula partnership, for instance, is based on similarities in geographical conditions. Tula is an advanced city in industry and agriculture, while Magelang, located between Mount Merbabu and Mount Sumbing, has a cool climate suitable for highland farming. The partnership, however, focuses more on public services, branding, economic development, and environmental management.

Meanwhile, the Yogyakarta–St. Petersburg partnership emphasizes cooperation in arts, culture, tourism, and education—proving effective in strengthening diplomacy during the Jokowi era. Long-term investments were also pursued, such as the oil refinery in the Jenu area, Tuban. This refinery, under cooperation between PT Pertamina and Russian company Rosneft, has been under construction since 2016 and is projected to process 30 million liters of fuel daily, with a capacity of 320,000 barrels per day. This project aims to enhance national energy security and reduce fuel imports.Despite geopolitical challenges such as the Russia–Ukraine conflict, Indonesia maintains a neutral, “free and active” foreign policy—supporting Ukraine’s independence while still partnering with Russia.

Indonesia in BRICS

[Foreign Minister of Indonesia Sugiono during the arrival of head of delegations at Kazan Expo to attend the 16th BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia. Kirill Zykov / BRICS-KAZAN- RIA Novosti]

Indonesia’s diplomatic presence is expected to grow further following its entry into BRICS on January 6, 2025. This move comes amid a global trade war triggered by U.S.-imposed tariffs. BRICS aims to challenge Western dominance, particularly that of the U.S. and its allies. Indonesia’s entry strengthens the bloc and provides new opportunities for economic cooperation. As a BRICS member, Indonesia can benefit from easier access to Russian defense technology and increased investment opportunities. Russia, in turn, sees Indonesia as a vital partner in Southeast Asia and a gateway to ASEAN markets. This partnership opens new avenues for cooperation in energy, technology, defense, and trade. On the global stage, both nations are likely to support each other in international forums—especially regarding world order reform, state sovereignty, and support for Palestine. Indonesia’s free-active foreign policy adds value to BRICS, helping position the bloc as an alternative for developing nations beyond Western influence. However, Indonesia must balance its global diplomacy carefully, ensuring that closer ties with Russia do not strain its relationships with Western nations like the U.S. and EU. With Indonesia joining BRICS and Russia seeking to expand its global influence, the bilateral relationship is expected to become more intensive, strategic, and mutually beneficial.

Also Read: The Falcon and Bear Braving a Storm: UAE and Russia in the Dawn of Multipolarity

[ Andhini Octa Maharatih and Alinda Rana Permata Surya are interns at COGGS from Surabaya, Indonesia, and students of International Relations at UPN Veteran Jawa Timur University. The opinions expressed do not reflect the views of COGGS. ]

Bears, BRICS and Garudas: How Indonesia “Socialized” with Russia? Read Post »

Economist Rajiv Kumar at GSEF 2025: Six Defining Global Transitions

thegeoeconomics.com | August 9, 2025

In a speech at the plenary session of Global South Economic Forum, Rajiv Kumar, a prominent economist and advisor to COGGS, delivered a powerful message on the world’s ongoing transformations and the pivotal role the Global South can play in shaping the new world order. Here’s a detailed look at his key arguments and the call to action he extended to the international community at the forum on June 17, 2025.

The World in Historical Flux

While addressing the GSEF, Kumar, the former Vice Chairman of Niti Ayog, Indian government’s finance planning thinktank opened by stressing that the world is currently experiencing an “unprecedented historical transition.” He argued that the magnitude and nature of these changes are unlike anything seen before, presenting both challenges and opportunities, especially for the nations of the Global South.

Six Defining Global Transitions

Drawing from his forthcoming book, “The Everything All At Once: The Six Global Transitions in the World Today,” Kumar outlined the six critical transformations shaping our era:

I. Geopolitical Shift: The previous notion of “the end of history” is now outdated. Instead, Kumar says, “a new history is beginning at the moment,” marked by shifting global power dynamics.

II. Geoeconomic Fragmentation: He challenged the idea that the world is economically flat, explaining that barriers, protectionism, and fragmentation are on the rise.

III. Geophysical Realignment: The locus of prominence is shifting from the Euro-Atlantic world back to the Asia-Pacific – a return to a historical norm prior to Western hegemony.

IV. Technological Revolution: Kumar described today’s technological advances, especially in artificial intelligence, as more dramatic and rapid than any prior industrial or technological revolution. He warned of an imminent “singularity,” where machine intelligence outpaces human intelligence.

V. Climate Change Crisis: He highlighted the urgent threat climate change poses, particularly to the Global South, criticizing northern nations for rhetorical support without adequate action. Kumar warned of a narrow 20-year window to avert irreversible damage.

VI. The Rise of the South: Noting that 85% of the world’s population resides in the South, contributing some 40% of global GDP—and now driving global growth more than advanced economies—Kumar underscored the region’s economic and demographic dynamism.

The Opportunity: Making This the Century of the South

Amidst these transitions, Kumar made a compelling case for the Global South to “work together in solidarity and strategic collaboration.” He further emphasized that the South is not monolithic but contains its own “north” and “south.”

He identified the expanded BRICS grouping (now including countries such as the UAE, Ethiopia, Egypt, Indonesia, among others) as the ideal platform to drive this movement forward. However, he urged BRICS to become more than a “talking shop,” advocating for concrete progress on:

Climate change mitigation,
Food security,
Harnessing artificial intelligence for development,
Exploring the creation of a new reserve currency.

India and China: Partners in Shaping the South

Economist Rajeev Kumar highlighted a special responsibility for India and China, the two largest civilizational economies. He acknowledged China’s lead, especially in strategic technologies, and proposed that “as a senior partner we look towards China to give us the lead for how to create the South-South cooperation and make it effective, implementable and operational.”

Kumar concluded with a call to devise “the modality for BRICS and, within that, India-China bilateral cooperation to play the role of making the 21st century the century of the South.” He appealed for the opportunity to design and operationalize “a new world order which is rule-based and not hegemonic.”

Economist Rajiv Kumar at GSEF 2025: Six Defining Global Transitions Read Post »

ASEAN Economic Integration in the Face of Global Shocks: Towards Sustainable Supply Chains

thegeoeconomics.com | August 8, 2025

Andhini Octa Maharatih and Dhea Marsha Ananda

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION INVOLVES aligning and unifying economic policies between countries by reducing or eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers, with the primary goal of boosting trade and lowering economic costs. One such example is the ASEAN economic integration that formed the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). ASEAN economic integration is when ten member countries join together to form a single market-based economic community with the aim of creating an efficient and integrated single market and production base across all member countries. There are several stages in economic integration:

I. ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA): Established in 1992 with the aim of reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers among ASEAN members. The six member countries began to gradually reduce their tariffs until 2010, when tariffs were reduced to 0–5 percent. Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia, which joined later, were given additional time until 2015.

II. Complementation of Brand-to-Brand/ASEAN Industrial Cooperation (AICO): This policy has been in effect since 1988 and allows manufacturing companies throughout ASEAN to lower their tariffs. One such industry is the auto parts industry.

III. AEC Blueprint 2015 and 2025: The AEC was formally established at the end of 2015, with the aim of creating a single market and production base for ASEAN member countries. The AEC Blueprint 2025 enhances integration through connectivity, digitalization, inclusion, and regional competitiveness..
IV. Regional Economy and RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership(RCEP) was signed in November 2020 by ASEAN together with Australia, China, Japan, South Korea, and other countries. Since January 2022, RCEP will expand trade integration in the Asia-Pacific to cover 30% of the world’s total population and GDP.

The purpose of this economic integration stage is to identify differences in the levels of development and capacity of ASEAN member countries. With this, ASEAN can move from a basic stage of integration to a deeper one with minimal risk and allow time for all ASEAN member countries to adapt.

Additionally, economic integration has a primary scope of a common market, where trade regulations and service standards begin to align. There is also harmonization of priority sectors, meaning ASEAN has selected 12 specific sectors to enhance competitiveness and intra-regional investment. Following that is financial integration, where ASEAN has an ASEAN+3 inter-country savings fund to assist countries in the event of a sudden financial crisis. Lastly, there is the institutional framework or ASEAN’s main rulebook to ensure all countries integrate under clear rules. Besides the rulebook, there are mechanisms to monitor ASEAN’s progress to ensure integration is carried out in accordance with plans and regulations (Menon, 2010).

ASEAN economic integration also faces several challenges and has its advantages. The ASEAN Economic Community has created a single market and a shared product base of more than 600 million consumers, as well as expanding market opportunities for companies within the ASEAN region. Integration also encourages domestic reform in many ASEAN member countries, such as legal transparency, investment climate, and better governance. Additionally, it has positioned ASEAN as a global production and integration hub through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). However, despite the numerous benefits, the ASEAN Economic Community also faces challenges such as economic disparities among member states, for example, the significant differences in GDP per capita among ASEAN members, which hinder policy harmonization and market access. There are also institutional limitations, as ASEAN relies on consensus and lacks a strong central authority, leading to slow policy implementation and inconsistencies across member states. Finally, there are non-tariff barriers such as inconsistent product regulations and trade procedures (Kiyoshi Kobayashi, 2018).

It can be concluded that economic integration creates an open and unified area to expand the market. In a systematic effort to build a Single Market and a unified production base among ASEAN member states, ASEAN economic integration is being implemented in stages. The AEC has enhanced economic opportunities, inclusive growth, and regional competitiveness in ASEAN. However, full success still depends on ASEAN’s ability to address internal issues such as development delays, infrastructure problems, and legal challenges.

Supply Chain in ASEAN

The supply chain in the ASEAN region is a system of cooperation between ASEAN member countries in effectively managing services, goods, information, and investment. It manages everything from raw materials, manufacturing processes, distribution, to the end consumer (Secretariat, 2023). The supply chain aims to improve ASEAN’s economic competitiveness at the global level by maintaining the smooth flow of trade, especially amid the challenges of the economic crisis. In addition, ASEAN also wants to have a supply chain that is inexpensive, fast, and stable. To achieve these objectives, ASEAN has a framework that serves as its primary guide: efficiency, ensuring that all processes are carried out efficiently without wasting time, costs, or resources. Resilience is also a key component, preparing systems to remain operational even during crises and ensuring that trade continues uninterrupted.

The supply chain in ASEAN can operate effectively due to investment coordination, where each country agrees to jointly fund infrastructure and technology projects. There is also the adoption of new technology, with ASEAN encouraging all parties to use modern technology in logistics and trade. Finally, there is the enhancement of human resource skills by training workers to manage modern logistics systems.

ASEAN’s main focus area currently is digital supply chain innovation, where ASEAN focuses on technology integration for the industrial revolution and the transformation of traditional transformations into digital ones in order to compete globally. Supply chain efficiency and resilience are ASEAN’s main focus in facing current global challenges. The five focus areas currently being developed by ASEAN are cross-border regulation and tariff cost reduction, digital transformation as a form of efficiency and more effective and easy supply chain tracking, ASEAN vertical integration both between companies and between countries to encourage partner trade and improve information exchange in the integrated supply chain, and finally industrial innovation to ensure product quality, durability and efficiency in the regional realm with easy access..

Meanwhile, the five ASEAN strategies and main actions in the regional supply chain include specific digitalization as a strengthening of the ASEAN single window, disaster mitigation policies for supply chain resilience and reduction of non-tariff measures that hinder, third is the diversification of sources and markets to be targeted as a strong regional coordination, fourth is the sector development roadmap as a coordination tool between the public and private sectors during economic obstacles, the last is economic corridors to improve the supply chain through an interconnected infrastructure network in market demand and supply, facilitating technology transfer through innovation partnerships and investment promotion to accelerate digitalization in the ASEAN economic sector.

One example of a Southeast Asian country is Thailand. Thailand is actively strengthening its position with a strategy of combining national policies and multilateral cooperation, strengthening its position as the regional logistics hub of ASEAN. The National Economic Policy Committee and relevant Thai government ministries are responsible for improving the connectivity of the ASEAN supply chain. In February 2024, Thailand ratified IPEF Pillar 2: Supply Chain Agreement. This provides access to mechanisms such as the supply chain council, crisis response network, and labor rights advisory board to enhance resilience against global disruptions. Additionally, operational implementation includes high-speed rail projects connecting Don Mueang and Suvarnabhumi airports. This project is scheduled to begin in 2025–2026 as part of the EEC infrastructure integration.

Initiatives such as real-time tracking, automation systems, and predictive analytics are enhancing the digitization of logistics to support operational efficiency and supply chain transparency. Thailand’s main objective in using this strategy is to reduce dependence on a single source (such as China), increase diversification, and improve resilience to pandemics and geopolitical disruptions. To achieve this goal, however, issues such as cross-agency policy synchronization, cross-sector investment stability, and interoperability between ASEAN countries must be addressed.

Despite several challenges, such as human resources, funding, and cross-border systems and sectors within them, it is hoped that this framework will enable ASEAN to position itself and maintain the integrity of its supply chain amidst the current global conditions. ASEAN’s efforts to increase efficiency and break away from dependence on a single resource source are challenging, given that ASEAN countries are not yet fully developed. Therefore, a monitoring system and policy implementation that maintains ASEAN’s centrality is necessary.

Climate Resilient Infrastructure : ASEAN’s Effectiveness in Disaster Mitigation
Southeast Asia is vulnerable to natural disasters amidst the current climate change issue. Geographically, ASEAN is located in coastal areas prone to flooding due to rising sea levels. Southeast Asia is located in the Pacific Ocean, which is vulnerable to other natural disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, and active volcanic eruptions. Furthermore, current global warming is triggering a number of new challenges, such as rising temperatures and long-term droughts. According to the AADMER work program report, 2,916 natural disasters were recorded from 2012 to 2020 due to climate change. Unexpected climate change certainly impacts the condition and resilience of existing infrastructure in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia, as a global economic and agricultural growth network, needs to implement disaster mitigation to minimize direct losses caused by unpredictable extreme weather. Concrete steps such as early warning systems and collective cooperation are needed for climate-resilient infrastructure planning. ASEAN plays a crucial role in implementing disaster mitigation. If not implemented optimally, a domino effect could occur, harming many parties.

ASEAN, as a hub for global economic activity, is also experiencing increased energy consumption, given the industrial revolution and the significant increase in demand for natural resources, which also contribute to excessive carbon emissions and the greenhouse effect. Urbanization is also making the ASEAN region increasingly densely populated, requiring protection. Dependence on fossil fuels as a profitable commodity needs to be reduced to create a zero-emission region in line with the 2050 Net Zero Emission target. This is one of ASEAN’s challenges in mitigating natural disasters caused by climate change.

As a regional organization, ASEAN has adopted a key framework to be implemented in response to climate change. One such framework for mitigating natural disasters caused by climate change is the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), which addresses an early warning system that encompasses comprehensive information and communication regarding natural disasters and public awareness to promptly respond to impending disasters. Planning and coordination with national and regional stakeholders to reduce losses, including utilizing military functions as public facilities for mobilization and safety, are also crucial. Collaborative and partnership efforts are also needed to assess the challenges faced by member countries, discuss them with regional organizations, stakeholders, partners, and allocate resources to invest in developing disaster management tools. However, ASEAN member countries certainly face a number of challenges.

According to the AADMER work program report, the challenges faced focus on data sharing and interoperability among member countries. ASEAN requires technical assistance to manage and share data and information regarding early warning systems. ASEAN is still working to strengthen partnerships with the AHA center (ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management), disaster management offices, and other stakeholders. Furthermore, ASEAN is also working to develop risk assessments through relevant actors. Furthermore, what needs to be improved is the involvement of external parties to focus on scientific approaches that align with the AADMER vision to further explore disaster mitigation.

Meanwhile, other challenges such as technological and resource disparities are major obstacles to improving disaster mitigation facilities. Member countries like Singapore have successfully created an underground tunnel waste disposal system to address flooding and process waste and water more environmentally friendly, while Indonesia has developed a Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) network in an effort to reduce carbon emissions. Meanwhile, less developed countries like Timor Leste, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar must face extreme heat and erratic rainfall patterns. In addition to vulnerable economies, government efforts to attract investors are challenging due to competition among ASEAN countries to fulfill their national interests. Other member countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, and Thailand have left the four less developed ASEAN member countries even further behind in terms of more appropriate disaster mitigation planning.

ASEAN has made significant strides in proposing work programs such as AADMER and leveraging relevant organizations and institutions to assist with disaster mitigation preparation. However, current challenges require further action, particularly regarding the equitable distribution of disaster mitigation facilities for member states vulnerable to natural disasters and extreme weather. With Timor-Leste in the group, ASEAN also needs to expand its reach to collaborate with East Asian countries with superior disaster mitigation systems and technology. This will allow for more predictable climate change impacts on ASEAN and mitigate significant long-term losses.

[ Andhini Octa Maharatih and Dhea Marsha Ananda are Indonesia based interns at COGGS. Opinion expressed doesn’t reflect the view of the organization. ]

References

Kiyoshi Kobayashi, K. A. (2018). Economic Integration and Regional Development: The ASEAN Economic Community. New York : Routledge (Taylor & Francis Group), Abingdon & New York.

Menon, H. H. (2010). ASEAN Economic Integration: Features, Fulfillments, Failures and the Future. ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration, 1-34.

Secretariat, A. (2023). Framework on ASEAN Supply Chain Efficiency and Resilience. Jakarta: The ASEAN Secretariat.

The ASEAN Secretariat. (2020). ASEAN AGREEMENT ON DISASTER MANAGEMENT AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE (AADMER) 2021-2025. ASEAN Secretariat. https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/AADMER-Work-Programme-2021-2025.pdf

ASEAN. (2021). ASEAN State of Climate Change Report. The ASEAN Secretariat. https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/ASCCR-e-publication-Correction_8-June.pdf

Asian Development Bank. (2009). The Economics of Climate Change in Southeast Asia: A Regional Review. ASsian Development Bank. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/29657/economics-climate-change-se-asia.pdf

Fransiskius, & Affabile, R. (2025). Peran Indonesia Sebagai Norm Entrepreneur Dalam Konsepsi Sentralitas ASEAN Melalui Inisiatif Karbon Lintas Batas Berbasis Teknologi Carbon, Capture and Storage (CCS), 7(01). 10.24198

Deep Tunnel Sewerage System. (2025, March 4). PUB, Singapore’s National Water Agency. Retrieved July 24, 2025, from https://www.pub.gov.sg/Professionals/Requirements/Used-Water/DTSS

Building Resilience of Health Systems in Asian Least Developed Countries to Climate Change. (n.d.). UNDP Climate Change Adaptation. Retrieved July 24, 2025, from https://www.adaptation-undp.org/projects/building-resilience-health-systems-asian-least-developed-countries-climate-change

Andrew Potter, P. C. (2011). Developing a supply chain performance tool for SMEs in Thailand. An International Journal, 20-31.

ASEAN Economic Integration in the Face of Global Shocks: Towards Sustainable Supply Chains Read Post »

August 2025

References