November 2024

Balaji Chandramohan

The Global South is, in fact, a coalition of what is referred to as the ‘Global East’ (China and Russia) and the Global South. The two components of BRICS—China and Russia—have their own distinct interests, and the Global South grouping reflects the wider scope of BRICS. The Global South sees value in this coalition due to the many failures of the US-led world order that emerged after World War II.

For instance, collective efforts on climate change by the G77 at the COP summits serve as an example, as does the broad participation of the Global South in international legal actions related to Gaza. It is understood that a world centered on national interests will always leave some space, albeit limited, for collective action.

Despite these challenges, most states of the Global South are not interested in a radical overhaul of the existing global order. Nor do they see Washington as an adversary. In fact, they would prefer to maintain strong relations with the United States, albeit in a world where American primacy no longer holds. However, their increasing alienation from the US-led order is largely due to systemic constraints that limit their rise, compounded by the transgressions and oscillating foreign policy of Washington. The US’s preference for forming military alliances has been a key factor in strengthening the need for the Global South.

One example of such constraints is the international sanctions regime, which has expanded to the point where more than a quarter of the world’s countries—and nearly a third of the global economy—are currently targeted by such sanctions.

While Washington maintains that its sanctions are not aimed at the Global South, those states perceive them differently. The secondary sanctions regime is enabled by global US dollar hegemony, making de-dollarization a major common interest across much of the Global South. However, de-dollarization is easier said than done. While BRICS has made it a key focus of its rhetoric, achieving progress would require the central banks of its member states to relinquish some degree of sovereignty—a tall order. Moreover, with China being by far the largest trading power within BRICS, India is concerned about Beijing’s dominance in any BRICS-driven alternative currency arrangement.

Efforts towards de-dollarization beyond BRICS are also underway, with mixed results. In response to sweeping Western sanctions following its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has tilted sharply toward China. This has led to the yuan replacing the dollar as the dominant currency in bilateral trade between the two countries. Indian exports to Russia have also boomed, thanks to growing trade denominated in rupees.

Southeast Asia and ASEAN are similarly pushing to empower local currencies in regional transactions. In 2023, five ASEAN countries, including Indonesia and Singapore, signed an agreement to establish a regional cross-border payment system, allowing consumers to make payments using QR codes, bypassing the foreign exchange market. Indonesia has also signed agreements with China, India, Japan, and South Korea to trade in local currencies.

Unfortunately, these efforts are still insufficient. In Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, there is a tendency to view the “rest” of the world primarily as a battleground for great power competition, or simply as victims. The Global South, however, is more aspirational than anything else. It is not seeking a savior or hoping to emerge as one itself, but rather wishes for the powers blocking its rise to step aside.

The great powers have been resistant to reforming the international system to better accommodate the growing autonomy and power of the Global South. Beijing, in particular, is seen as the biggest obstacle to the much-needed reform of the UN Security Council. Voting shares in the IMF and World Bank remain heavily skewed in favor of wealthy Western nations. Washington has mostly paid lip service to international climate finance, and there appears to be no intention in Washington, Moscow, or Beijing to de-escalate the steady march toward militarized great power competition.

The great powers are often unable to grasp the new realities of the vast middle, largely because the Global South remains an enigma they are conditioned not to understand. The Global South encompasses 120 countries that vary greatly in terms of economic interests, development trajectories, resource endowments, and political landscapes. The term itself is intellectually elusive, and the renewed interest in the ‘Global South’ should not be seen as divorced from its underlying political and strategic motivations.

While there is oversimplification inherent in the North-South binary, there are practical areas of convergence, such as climate action, trade policy, and technology, where the Global South remains relevant and generally in agreement. There are also arguments for a more nuanced understanding of the Global South, advocating for selective engagement based on economic considerations rather than ideological alignment.

The History of the Global South

The term “Global South” was coined in 1969 by Carl Ogelsby, an American writer and activist associated with the New Left. During that time, Western analysts divided the world into three “worlds,” as first conceptualized by French demographer Alfred Sauvy in 1952. These included the “First World,” comprising the United States and its Western allies; the “Second World,” composed of the Soviet Union and its Eastern bloc satellites; and the “Third World,” consisting of developing nations, many of which were newly independent from colonial rule.

The concept of the Global South as a synonym for the Third World began to gain traction in the 1970s, with the call for a New International Economic Order, but it rose to prominence with the 1980 Brandt Report. This landmark document, produced by an international commission led by former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, distinguished between wealthier nations concentrated in the Northern Hemisphere and poorer ones in the South.

The Global North, especially the West, benefited greatly from the Industrial Revolution. The majority of countries in the Global South were located south of the Brandt line, an imaginary boundary that runs from the Rio Grande through the Mediterranean Sea, Central Asia, and the Pacific Ocean. However, from a purely geographic perspective, the Brandt line left much to be desired, as many nations designated as “southern” (e.g., India) are located in the Northern Hemisphere, while countries like Australia and New Zealand, categorized as “northern,” lie south of the equator.

Following the end of the Cold War, the term “Third World” gradually fell out of favor because the Second World no longer existed and the term itself had negative connotations. In contrast, the term “Global South” emerged as a more neutral and appealing label. Over time, the Global South became synonymous with the Group of 77 (G77), a coalition of developing countries that united in 1964 to advocate for their collective economic interests. Today, the G77 comprises 134 countries, which regularly refer to themselves as the Global South. The UN has launched multiple initiatives in response to their needs, including the UN Office for South-South Cooperation.

Renewed Use of the Global South Label

The question today is whether the label “Global South,” despite its historical relevance, still makes sense. Its most obvious limitation lies in its conceptual incoherence. The label groups together a remarkably diverse set of countries—130-odd nations representing perhaps two-thirds of the world’s population and spanning Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, Oceania, and the Middle East. These nations range from emerging powers such as Brazil, India, and Nigeria to smaller states like Benin, Fiji, and Oman.

While some members of the Global South share overlapping strategic interests, the practical relevance of this broad meta-category is unclear given the vast economic, political, and cultural diversity it encompasses. The term risks reinforcing outdated dichotomies and stereotypes at the expense of appreciating the world’s full variety.

India’s Strategic Positioning within the Global South
India’s desire to assert itself as a leading voice of the Global South comes at a time when other powers, particularly China and Russia, are competing for influence in the developing world. India’s position is complex—it is both a developing economy and a strategic partner of the developed world. Additionally, India’s identity conundrum, rooted in its anti-hegemonic history, plays a role in its global ambitions.

India’s rise in the global order has significant implications for the non-Western world. A balanced and inclusive strategy will be essential in asserting India’s position. India can capitalize on its unique position by fostering triangular cooperation between Western powers and developing states. However, India must engage with the non-Western world on its own terms, rather than simply mirroring the strategies of other major powers.

Historically, India has had a unique role within the Global South. During the Cold War, under leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, India spearheaded the Non-Aligned Movement and positioned itself as a leader of developing nations. In recent years, however, India has focused more on strengthening relations with Western powers, such as Japan and the United States, viewing these relations as increasingly important.

The geopolitics of the Global South is also complicated. There is a growing divide between the West—critical of Russia, strengthening sanctions, and enhancing military support for Ukraine—and the Global South, which sees the prolongation of the war as causing economic hardship. India, for its part, has refrained from joining Western sanctions and continues to maintain strategic ties with Russia, purchasing oil and fertilizers despite the West’s disapproval.

In conclusion, the Global South plays an increasingly significant role in the international system. As India seeks a larger leadership role, claiming the mantle of Global South leadership will serve its strategic interests and help shape a more inclusive international order.

[ Balaji Chandramohan is a Chennai, India based geopolitical analyst and former visiting fellow with Future Directions International, Australia]